blob: 9c99444d8e381a866a5f43aa1968f54ede006516 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/sha1.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "net/android/cert_verify_result_android.h"
#include "net/android/network_library.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
namespace net {
namespace {
// Returns true if the certificate verification call was successful (regardless
// of its result), i.e. if |verify_result| was set. Otherwise returns false.
bool VerifyFromAndroidTrustManager(const std::vector<std::string>& cert_bytes,
const std::string& hostname,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
android::CertVerifyStatusAndroid status;
std::vector<std::string> verified_chain;
// TODO(joth): Fetch the authentication type from SSL rather than hardcode.
android::VerifyX509CertChain(cert_bytes, "RSA", hostname,
&status, &verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root,
&verified_chain);
switch (status) {
case android::VERIFY_FAILED:
return false;
case android::VERIFY_OK:
break;
case android::VERIFY_NO_TRUSTED_ROOT:
verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
break;
case android::VERIFY_EXPIRED:
case android::VERIFY_NOT_YET_VALID:
verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
break;
case android::VERIFY_UNABLE_TO_PARSE:
verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
break;
case android::VERIFY_INCORRECT_KEY_USAGE:
verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
break;
}
// Save the verified chain.
if (!verified_chain.empty()) {
std::vector<base::StringPiece> verified_chain_pieces(verified_chain.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < verified_chain.size(); i++) {
verified_chain_pieces[i] = base::StringPiece(verified_chain[i]);
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> verified_cert =
X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain(verified_chain_pieces);
if (verified_cert)
verify_result->verified_cert = verified_cert;
}
// Extract the algorithm information from the certs
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles chain;
const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates =
verify_result->verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
chain.push_back(verify_result->verified_cert->os_cert_handle());
chain.insert(chain.end(), intermediates.begin(), intermediates.end());
// If the chain successfully verified, ignore the trust anchor (the last
// certificate). Otherwise, assume the chain is partial. This is not entirely
// correct, as a full chain may have been constructed and then failed to
// validate. However, if that is the case, the more serious error will
// override any SHA-1 considerations.
size_t correction_for_root = (status == android::VERIFY_OK) ? 1 : 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size() - correction_for_root; ++i) {
int sig_alg = OBJ_obj2nid(chain[i]->sig_alg->algorithm);
if (sig_alg == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption) {
verify_result->has_md2 = true;
} else if (sig_alg == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) {
verify_result->has_md4 = true;
} else if (sig_alg == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption ||
sig_alg == NID_md5WithRSA) {
verify_result->has_md5 = true;
} else if (sig_alg == NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption ||
sig_alg == NID_dsaWithSHA || sig_alg == NID_dsaWithSHA1 ||
sig_alg == NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 || sig_alg == NID_sha1WithRSA ||
sig_alg == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) {
verify_result->has_sha1 = true;
}
}
// Extract the public key hashes.
for (size_t i = 0; i < verified_chain.size(); i++) {
base::StringPiece spki_bytes;
if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(verified_chain[i], &spki_bytes))
continue;
HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1);
base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()),
spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data());
verify_result->public_key_hashes.push_back(sha1);
HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha256.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length);
verify_result->public_key_hashes.push_back(sha256);
}
return true;
}
bool GetChainDEREncodedBytes(X509Certificate* cert,
std::vector<std::string>* chain_bytes) {
X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle();
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles cert_handles =
cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
// Make sure the peer's own cert is the first in the chain, if it's not
// already there.
if (cert_handles.empty() || cert_handles[0] != cert_handle)
cert_handles.insert(cert_handles.begin(), cert_handle);
chain_bytes->reserve(cert_handles.size());
for (X509Certificate::OSCertHandles::const_iterator it =
cert_handles.begin(); it != cert_handles.end(); ++it) {
std::string cert_bytes;
if(!X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(*it, &cert_bytes))
return false;
chain_bytes->push_back(cert_bytes);
}
return true;
}
} // namespace
CertVerifyProcAndroid::CertVerifyProcAndroid() {}
CertVerifyProcAndroid::~CertVerifyProcAndroid() {}
bool CertVerifyProcAndroid::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
return false;
}
int CertVerifyProcAndroid::VerifyInternal(
X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname,
&verify_result->common_name_fallback_used)) {
verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
}
std::vector<std::string> cert_bytes;
if (!GetChainDEREncodedBytes(cert, &cert_bytes))
return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
if (!VerifyFromAndroidTrustManager(cert_bytes, hostname, verify_result)) {
NOTREACHED();
return ERR_FAILED;
}
if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
return OK;
}
} // namespace net