blob: 4719a0e9121a38d89d30d8a1dae7bd99a149d51c [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string>
#include "base/base_switches.h"
#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/debug/activity_tracker.h"
#include "base/debug/profiler.h"
#include "base/feature_list.h"
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/hash.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/memory/shared_memory.h"
#include "base/metrics/field_trial.h"
#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
#include "base/path_service.h"
#include "base/process/launch.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "base/sys_info.h"
#include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
#include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
#include "base/win/win_util.h"
#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
#include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_features.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
#include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
#include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h" // nogncheck: unused #ifdef NACL_WIN64
#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
namespace content {
namespace {
// The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
// when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
// versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
// For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
// of it, see:
// https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown.
L"activedetect32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
L"activedetect64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
L"airfoilinject3.dll", // Airfoil.
L"akinsofthook32.dll", // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
L"assistant_x64.dll", // Unknown.
L"avcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8.
L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator.
L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth.
L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security.
L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris.
L"cplushook.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock.
L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others.
L"esspd.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5.
L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
L"guard64.dll", // Comodo Internet Security x64.
L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector.
L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter.
L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus.
L"icatcdll.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
L"icdcnl.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic).
L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
L"libdivx.dll", // DivX.
L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam.
L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library).
L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour.
L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus.
L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy.
L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX.
L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008.
L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older).
L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor.
L"pastali32.dll", // PastaLeads.
L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security.
L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus.
L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
L"picrmi32.dll", // PicRec.
L"picrmi64.dll", // PicRec.
L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems.
L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone.
L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor.
L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown.
L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2.
L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard).
L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6.
L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5.
L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX.
L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface.
L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools).
L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
L"windowsapihookdll32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
L"windowsapihookdll64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006.
};
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
// Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
// If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
// apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
base::FilePath directory;
if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
return false;
if (sub_dir)
directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
sandbox::ResultCode result;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
directory.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
if (children)
directory_str += L"*";
// Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
directory_str.c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
return true;
}
#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
// Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
// XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
return false;
}
if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
return false;
base::FilePath fname(path);
return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
}
// Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
// If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
// is also loaded in this process.
void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
bool check_in_browser,
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
if (!module) {
// The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
// the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
// 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
std::wstring name(module_name);
size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
if (period <= 8)
return;
for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
if (check_in_browser) {
module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
if (!module)
return;
// We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
// want to make sure it is the right one.
if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
return;
}
// Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
}
}
policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
return;
}
// Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
// Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
// does not get a chance to execute any code.
void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
}
// Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
// Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
static DWORD s_session_id = 0;
if (s_session_id == 0) {
HANDLE token;
DWORD session_id_length;
DWORD session_id = 0;
CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
CloseHandle(token);
if (session_id)
s_session_id = session_id;
}
return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%lu%ls", s_session_id, object);
}
// Checks if the sandbox can be let to run without a job object assigned.
// Returns true if the job object has to be applied to the sandbox and false
// otherwise.
bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
// Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
// job.
if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
return true;
BOOL in_job = true;
// Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
if (!in_job)
return true;
// ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {};
if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
return true;
}
if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
return true;
// Lastly in place of the flag which was supposed to be used only for running
// Chrome in remote sessions we do this check explicitly here.
// According to MS this flag can be false for a remote session only on Windows
// Server 2012 and newer so if we do the check last we should be on the safe
// side. See: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa380798.aspx.
if (!::GetSystemMetrics(SM_REMOTESESSION)) {
// Measure how often we would have decided to apply the sandbox but the
// user actually wanted to avoid it.
// TODO(pastarmovj): Remove this check and the flag altogether once we are
// convinced that the automatic logic is good enough.
bool set_job = !cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Process.Sandbox.FlagOverrodeRemoteSessionCheck",
!set_job);
return set_job;
}
// Allow running without the sandbox in this case. This slightly reduces the
// ability of the sandbox to protect its children from spawning new processes
// or preventing them from shutting down Windows or accessing the clipboard.
return false;
}
// Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
sandbox::ResultCode AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result;
// Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
// in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
// "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
// Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
// in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
// "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
// system services.
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
// Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
// the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
// Add the policy for debug message only in debug
#ifndef NDEBUG
base::FilePath app_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;
wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
long_path_buf,
MAX_PATH);
if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE;
base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
debug_message.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
#endif // NDEBUG
// Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for stack traces.
#if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
base::FilePath exe;
if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;
base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
pdb_path.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
#endif
#if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE)
DWORD coverage_dir_size =
::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0);
if (coverage_dir_size == 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work.";
} else {
std::wstring coverage_dir;
wchar_t* coverage_dir_str =
base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size);
coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(
L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size);
CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size);
base::FilePath sancov_path =
base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov");
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
sancov_path.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
}
#endif
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}
void LogLaunchWarning(sandbox::ResultCode last_warning, DWORD last_error) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.WarningResultCode",
last_warning);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Warning", last_error);
}
sandbox::ResultCode AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
// Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
// On 2003/Vista+ the initial token has to be restricted if the main
// token is restricted.
result = policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
// Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
result = policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
result = policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
result = policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
// We ignore the result of setting the alternate desktop, however log
// a launch warning.
LogLaunchWarning(result, ::GetLastError());
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}
return result;
}
// Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
// have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
// command_line as needed.
void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
// Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
if (value.empty() || value == type) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
}
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
}
}
// This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
// DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
HANDLE source_handle,
HANDLE target_process_handle,
LPHANDLE target_handle,
DWORD desired_access,
BOOL inherit_handle,
DWORD options);
DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
"You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
" process.\n Please contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
// Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
NTSTATUS error;
error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
// Get the object basic information.
OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
size = sizeof(basic_info);
error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
&size);
CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
kDuplicateHandleWarning;
if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
kDuplicateHandleWarning;
}
}
BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
HANDLE source_handle,
HANDLE target_process_handle,
LPHANDLE target_handle,
DWORD desired_access,
BOOL inherit_handle,
DWORD options) {
// Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
target_process_handle, target_handle,
desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
return FALSE;
// We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
return TRUE;
// Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
// We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
HANDLE temp_handle;
CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
target_process_handle,
::GetCurrentProcess(),
&temp_handle,
PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
FALSE, 0));
base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
}
}
if (is_in_job) {
// We never allow inheritable child handles.
CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
// Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
HANDLE temp_handle;
CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
// Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
}
return TRUE;
}
#endif
bool IsAppContainerEnabled() {
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
return false;
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
const std::string appcontainer_group_name =
base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("EnableAppContainer");
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppContainer))
return false;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppContainer))
return true;
return base::StartsWith(appcontainer_group_name, "Enabled",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
}
sandbox::ResultCode SetJobMemoryLimit(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
DCHECK_NE(policy->GetJobLevel(), sandbox::JOB_NONE);
#ifdef _WIN64
int64_t GB = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
size_t memory_limit = 4 * GB;
// Note that this command line flag hasn't been fetched by all
// callers of SetJobLevel, only those in this file.
if (cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType) ==
switches::kGpuProcess) {
// Allow the GPU process's sandbox to access more physical memory if
// it's available on the system.
int64_t physical_memory = base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory();
if (physical_memory > 16 * GB) {
memory_limit = 16 * GB;
} else if (physical_memory > 8 * GB) {
memory_limit = 8 * GB;
}
}
return policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(memory_limit);
#else
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
#endif
}
} // namespace
sandbox::ResultCode SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
uint32_t ui_exceptions,
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
if (!ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line))
return policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
sandbox::ResultCode ret = policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
if (ret != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return ret;
return SetJobMemoryLimit(cmd_line, policy);
}
// This is for finch. See also crbug.com/464430 for details.
const base::Feature kEnableCsrssLockdownFeature{
"EnableCsrssLockdown", base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT};
// TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
// Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
sandbox::ResultCode AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN10) {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kEnableCsrssLockdownFeature)) {
// Close all ALPC ports.
sandbox::ResultCode ret =
policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"ALPC Port", NULL);
if (ret != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
return ret;
}
}
}
// TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
return policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
}
sandbox::ResultCode AddAppContainerPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy,
const wchar_t* sid) {
if (IsAppContainerEnabled())
return policy->SetLowBox(sid);
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}
sandbox::ResultCode AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy,
bool enable_opm) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
if (!IsWin32kLockdownEnabled())
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
// Enable win32k lockdown if not already.
sandbox::MitigationFlags flags = policy->GetProcessMitigations();
if ((flags & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE) ==
sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE)
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
sandbox::ResultCode result =
policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
enable_opm ? sandbox::TargetPolicy::IMPLEMENT_OPM_APIS
: sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
nullptr);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
if (enable_opm)
policy->SetEnableOPMRedirection();
flags |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
return policy->SetProcessMitigations(flags);
#else
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
#endif
}
bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
// TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
// See <http://b/1287166>.
DCHECK(broker_services);
DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
g_broker_services = broker_services;
// In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
// In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
// patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
// original function.
if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
!is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
HMODULE module = NULL;
wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
&module));
DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
DuplicateHandlePatch);
CHECK(result == 0);
g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
}
}
#endif
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
}
bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
DCHECK(target_services);
sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
}
sandbox::ResultCode StartSandboxedProcess(
SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
base::CommandLine* cmd_line,
const base::HandlesToInheritVector& handles_to_inherit,
base::Process* process) {
DCHECK(delegate);
const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
TRACE_EVENT1("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess", "type", type_str);
// Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
}
ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
if (IsUnsandboxedSandboxType(delegate->GetSandboxType()) ||
browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
base::LaunchOptions options;
options.handles_to_inherit = handles_to_inherit;
*process = base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, options);
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}
scoped_refptr<sandbox::TargetPolicy> policy =
g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
// Add any handles to be inherited to the policy.
for (HANDLE handle : handles_to_inherit)
policy->AddHandleToShare(handle);
// Pre-startup mitigations.
sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP |
sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE |
sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWinSboxDisableExtensionPoints))
mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE;
sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;
result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess && IsWin32kLockdownEnabled()) {
result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy.get(), false);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
}
#endif
// Post-startup mitigations.
mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
result = policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
result = SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy.get());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
if (!delegate->DisableDefaultPolicy()) {
result = AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy.get());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
}
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess ||
type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS, NULL, true,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, policy.get());
}
#endif
if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
// Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
// this subprocess. See
// http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
}
result = AddGenericPolicy(policy.get());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
NOTREACHED();
return result;
}
// Allow the renderer and gpu processes to access the log file.
if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess ||
type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
if (logging::IsLoggingToFileEnabled()) {
DCHECK(base::FilePath(logging::GetLogFileFullPath()).IsAbsolute());
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
logging::GetLogFileFullPath().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return result;
}
}
#if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
// If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
// have no effect. These calls can fail with SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS.
policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
#endif
if (!delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy.get()))
return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_DELEGATE_PRE_SPAWN;
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS");
PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
sandbox::ResultCode last_warning = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
DWORD last_error = ERROR_SUCCESS;
result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(), policy, &last_warning,
&last_error, &temp_process_info);
base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS");
base::debug::GlobalActivityTracker* tracker =
base::debug::GlobalActivityTracker::Get();
if (tracker) {
tracker->RecordProcessLaunch(target.process_id(),
cmd_line->GetCommandLineString());
}
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error", last_error);
if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
else
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
return result;
}
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != last_warning) {
LogLaunchWarning(last_warning, last_error);
}
delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != static_cast<DWORD>(-1));
*process = base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}
} // namespace content