blob: ae6c07a508d5d1f2dddd11f5a61008f3bec00aa7 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2019 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "services/network/sec_header_helpers.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include <string>
#include "base/feature_list.h"
#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
#include "net/http/http_request_headers.h"
#include "net/url_request/url_request.h"
#include "services/network/initiator_lock_compatibility.h"
#include "services/network/public/cpp/features.h"
#include "services/network/public/cpp/is_potentially_trustworthy.h"
#include "services/network/public/cpp/request_mode.h"
#include "services/network/public/mojom/fetch_api.mojom.h"
#include "services/network/public/mojom/network_context.mojom.h"
namespace network {
namespace {
const char kSecFetchMode[] = "Sec-Fetch-Mode";
const char kSecFetchSite[] = "Sec-Fetch-Site";
// Sec-Fetch-Site infrastructure:
//
// Note that the order of enum values below is significant - it is important for
// std::max invocations that kSameOrigin < kSameSite < kCrossSite.
enum class SecFetchSiteValue {
kNoOrigin,
kSameOrigin,
kSameSite,
kCrossSite,
};
const char* GetSecFetchSiteHeaderString(const SecFetchSiteValue& value) {
switch (value) {
case SecFetchSiteValue::kNoOrigin:
return "none";
case SecFetchSiteValue::kSameOrigin:
return "same-origin";
case SecFetchSiteValue::kSameSite:
return "same-site";
case SecFetchSiteValue::kCrossSite:
return "cross-site";
}
}
SecFetchSiteValue SecFetchSiteHeaderValue(const GURL& target_url,
const url::Origin& initiator) {
url::Origin target_origin = url::Origin::Create(target_url);
if (target_origin == initiator)
return SecFetchSiteValue::kSameOrigin;
// Cross-scheme initiator should be considered cross-site (even if it's host
// is same-site with the target). See also https://crbug.com/979257.
if (initiator.scheme() == target_origin.scheme() &&
net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
initiator, target_origin,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
return SecFetchSiteValue::kSameSite;
}
return SecFetchSiteValue::kCrossSite;
}
void SetSecFetchSiteHeader(
net::URLRequest* request,
const GURL* pending_redirect_url,
const mojom::URLLoaderFactoryParams& factory_params) {
SecFetchSiteValue header_value;
// Browser-initiated requests with no initiator origin will send
// `Sec-Fetch-Site: None`. Other requests start with `kSameOrigin`, and walk
// the request's URL chain to calculate the right value.
if (factory_params.process_id == mojom::kBrowserProcessId &&
!request->initiator().has_value()) {
header_value = SecFetchSiteValue::kNoOrigin;
} else {
header_value = SecFetchSiteValue::kSameOrigin;
url::Origin initiator = GetTrustworthyInitiator(
factory_params.request_initiator_site_lock, request->initiator());
for (const GURL& target_url : request->url_chain()) {
header_value = std::max(header_value,
SecFetchSiteHeaderValue(target_url, initiator));
}
if (pending_redirect_url) {
header_value =
std::max(header_value,
SecFetchSiteHeaderValue(*pending_redirect_url, initiator));
}
}
request->SetExtraRequestHeaderByName(
kSecFetchSite, GetSecFetchSiteHeaderString(header_value),
/* overwrite = */ true);
}
// Sec-Fetch-Mode
void SetSecFetchModeHeader(net::URLRequest* request,
network::mojom::RequestMode mode) {
std::string header_value = "no-cors";
header_value = RequestModeToString(mode);
if (mode == network::mojom::RequestMode::kNavigateNestedFrame) {
header_value = "nested-navigate";
} else if (mode == network::mojom::RequestMode::kNavigateNestedObject) {
// TODO(mkwst): We might want this to be something more specific:
// https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-fetch-metadata/issues/37.
header_value = "no-cors";
}
request->SetExtraRequestHeaderByName(kSecFetchMode, header_value, false);
}
} // namespace
void SetFetchMetadataHeaders(
net::URLRequest* request,
network::mojom::RequestMode mode,
const GURL* pending_redirect_url,
const mojom::URLLoaderFactoryParams& factory_params) {
DCHECK(request);
DCHECK_NE(0u, request->url_chain().size());
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFetchMetadata))
return;
// Only append the header to potentially trustworthy URLs.
const GURL& target_url =
pending_redirect_url ? *pending_redirect_url : request->url();
if (!IsUrlPotentiallyTrustworthy(target_url))
return;
SetSecFetchSiteHeader(request, pending_redirect_url, factory_params);
SetSecFetchModeHeader(request, mode);
}
void MaybeRemoveSecHeaders(net::URLRequest* request,
const GURL& pending_redirect_url) {
DCHECK(request);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFetchMetadata))
return;
// If our redirect destination is not trusted it would not have had sec-ch- or
// sec-fetch- prefixed headers added to it. Our previous hops may have added
// these headers if the current url is trustworthy though so we should try to
// remove these now.
if (IsUrlPotentiallyTrustworthy(request->url()) &&
!IsUrlPotentiallyTrustworthy(pending_redirect_url)) {
// Check each of our request headers and if it is a "sec-ch-" or
// "sec-fetch-" prefixed header we'll remove it.
const net::HttpRequestHeaders::HeaderVector request_headers =
request->extra_request_headers().GetHeaderVector();
for (const auto& header : request_headers) {
if (StartsWith(header.key, "sec-ch-",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII) ||
StartsWith(header.key, "sec-fetch-",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
request->RemoveRequestHeaderByName(header.key);
}
}
}
}
} // namespace network