blob: be65a56546ac5e9274b79ce6ad3bfc3e12e99a3f [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/containers/hash_tables.h"
#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
#include "content/browser/dom_storage/dom_storage_context_wrapper.h"
#include "content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_namespace_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/frame_host/navigator.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_view_host_factory.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_view_host_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.h"
#include "content/common/frame_messages.h"
#include "content/common/view_messages.h"
#include "content/public/browser/browser_context.h"
#include "content/public/browser/interstitial_page.h"
#include "content/public/browser/interstitial_page_delegate.h"
#include "content/public/browser/storage_partition.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/test/browser_test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_utils.h"
#include "content/shell/browser/shell.h"
#include "ipc/ipc_security_test_util.h"
#include "net/dns/mock_host_resolver.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/embedded_test_server.h"
using IPC::IpcSecurityTestUtil;
namespace content {
namespace {
// This is a helper function for the tests which attempt to create a
// duplicate RenderViewHost or RenderWidgetHost. It tries to create two objects
// with the same process and routing ids, which causes a collision.
// It creates a couple of windows in process 1, which causes a few routing ids
// to be allocated. Then a cross-process navigation is initiated, which causes a
// new process 2 to be created and have a pending RenderViewHost for it. The
// routing id of the RenderViewHost which is target for a duplicate is set
// into |target_routing_id| and the pending RenderViewHost which is used for
// the attempt is the return value.
RenderViewHostImpl* PrepareToDuplicateHosts(Shell* shell,
int* target_routing_id) {
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
// Start off with initial navigation, so we get the first process allocated.
NavigateToURL(shell, foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell->web_contents()->GetTitle());
// Open another window, so we generate some more routing ids.
ShellAddedObserver shell2_observer;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(
shell->web_contents(), "window.open(document.URL + '#2');"));
Shell* shell2 = shell2_observer.GetShell();
// The new window must be in the same process, but have a new routing id.
EXPECT_EQ(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID());
*target_routing_id =
shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID();
EXPECT_NE(*target_routing_id,
shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID());
// Now, simulate a link click coming from the renderer.
GURL extension_url("https://bar.com/simple_page.html");
WebContentsImpl* wc = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell->web_contents());
wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->navigator()->RequestOpenURL(
wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->current_frame_host(), extension_url,
Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB,
false, true);
// Since the navigation above requires a cross-process swap, there will be a
// pending RenderViewHost. Ensure it exists and is in a different process
// than the initial page.
RenderViewHostImpl* pending_rvh =
wc->GetRenderManagerForTesting()->pending_render_view_host();
EXPECT_TRUE(pending_rvh != NULL);
EXPECT_NE(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
pending_rvh->GetProcess()->GetID());
return pending_rvh;
}
} // namespace
// The goal of these tests will be to "simulate" exploited renderer processes,
// which can send arbitrary IPC messages and confuse browser process internal
// state, leading to security bugs. We are trying to verify that the browser
// doesn't perform any dangerous operations in such cases.
class SecurityExploitBrowserTest : public ContentBrowserTest {
public:
SecurityExploitBrowserTest() {}
void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) override {
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndWaitUntilReady());
// Add a host resolver rule to map all outgoing requests to the test server.
// This allows us to use "real" hostnames in URLs, which we can use to
// create arbitrary SiteInstances.
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kHostResolverRules,
"MAP * " +
net::HostPortPair::FromURL(embedded_test_server()->base_url())
.ToString() +
",EXCLUDE localhost");
}
};
// Ensure that we kill the renderer process if we try to give it WebUI
// properties and it doesn't have enabled WebUI bindings.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest, SetWebUIProperty) {
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
NavigateToURL(shell(), foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell()->web_contents()->GetTitle());
EXPECT_EQ(0,
shell()->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetEnabledBindings());
content::RenderProcessHostWatcher terminated(
shell()->web_contents(),
content::RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
shell()->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->SetWebUIProperty(
"toolkit", "views");
terminated.Wait();
}
// This is a test for crbug.com/312016 attempting to create duplicate
// RenderViewHosts. SetupForDuplicateHosts sets up this test case and leaves
// it in a state with pending RenderViewHost. Before the commit of the new
// pending RenderViewHost, this test case creates a new window through the new
// process.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest,
AttemptDuplicateRenderViewHost) {
int duplicate_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
RenderViewHostImpl* pending_rvh =
PrepareToDuplicateHosts(shell(), &duplicate_routing_id);
EXPECT_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, duplicate_routing_id);
// Since this test executes on the UI thread and hopping threads might cause
// different timing in the test, let's simulate a CreateNewWindow call coming
// from the IO thread.
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
DOMStorageContextWrapper* dom_storage_context =
static_cast<DOMStorageContextWrapper*>(
BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
shell()->web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(),
pending_rvh->GetSiteInstance())->GetDOMStorageContext());
scoped_refptr<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl> session_storage(
new SessionStorageNamespaceImpl(dom_storage_context));
// Cause a deliberate collision in routing ids.
int main_frame_routing_id = duplicate_routing_id + 1;
pending_rvh->CreateNewWindow(duplicate_routing_id,
main_frame_routing_id,
params,
session_storage.get());
// If the above operation doesn't cause a crash, the test has succeeded!
}
// This is a test for crbug.com/312016. It tries to create two RenderWidgetHosts
// with the same process and routing ids, which causes a collision. It is almost
// identical to the AttemptDuplicateRenderViewHost test case.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest,
AttemptDuplicateRenderWidgetHost) {
int duplicate_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
RenderViewHostImpl* pending_rvh =
PrepareToDuplicateHosts(shell(), &duplicate_routing_id);
EXPECT_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, duplicate_routing_id);
// Since this test executes on the UI thread and hopping threads might cause
// different timing in the test, let's simulate a CreateNewWidget call coming
// from the IO thread. Use the existing window routing id to cause a
// deliberate collision.
pending_rvh->CreateNewWidget(duplicate_routing_id, blink::WebPopupTypeSelect);
// If the above operation doesn't crash, the test has succeeded!
}
class SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage : public InterstitialPageDelegate {
public:
explicit SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage(WebContents* contents) {
InterstitialPage* interstitial = InterstitialPage::Create(
contents, true, contents->GetLastCommittedURL(), this);
interstitial->Show();
}
// InterstitialPageDelegate implementation.
void CommandReceived(const std::string& command) override {
last_command_ = command;
}
std::string GetHTMLContents() override {
return "<html><head><script>"
"window.domAutomationController.setAutomationId(1);"
"window.domAutomationController.send(\"okay\");"
"</script></head>"
"<body>this page is an interstitial</body></html>";
}
std::string last_command() { return last_command_; }
private:
std::string last_command_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage);
};
// Fails due to InterstitialPage's reliance on PostNonNestableTask
// http://crbug.com/432737
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent \
DISABLED_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent
#else
#define MAYBE_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent \
InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent
#endif
// The interstitial should not be controllable by the underlying content.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest,
MAYBE_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent) {
// Start off with initial navigation, to allocate the process.
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
NavigateToURL(shell(), foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell()->web_contents()->GetTitle());
DOMMessageQueue message_queue;
// Install and show an interstitial page.
SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage* interstitial =
new SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage(shell()->web_contents());
ASSERT_EQ("", interstitial->last_command());
content::WaitForInterstitialAttach(shell()->web_contents());
InterstitialPage* interstitial_page =
shell()->web_contents()->GetInterstitialPage();
ASSERT_TRUE(interstitial_page != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(shell()->web_contents()->ShowingInterstitialPage());
ASSERT_TRUE(interstitial_page->GetDelegateForTesting() == interstitial);
// The interstitial page ought to be able to send a message.
std::string message;
ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&message));
ASSERT_EQ("\"okay\"", message);
ASSERT_EQ("\"okay\"", interstitial->last_command());
// Send an automation message from the underlying content and wait for it to
// be dispatched on this thread. This message should not be received by the
// interstitial.
content::RenderFrameHost* compromised_renderer =
shell()->web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
FrameHostMsg_DomOperationResponse evil(compromised_renderer->GetRoutingID(),
"evil", MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
IpcSecurityTestUtil::PwnMessageReceived(
compromised_renderer->GetProcess()->GetChannel(), evil);
ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&message));
ASSERT_EQ("evil", message)
<< "Automation message should be received by WebContents.";
ASSERT_EQ("\"okay\"", interstitial->last_command())
<< "Interstitial should not be affected.";
// Send a second message from the interstitial page, and make sure that the
// "evil" message doesn't arrive in the intervening period.
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
interstitial_page->GetRenderViewHostForTesting(),
"window.domAutomationController.send(\"okay2\");"));
ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&message));
ASSERT_EQ("\"okay2\"", message);
ASSERT_EQ("\"okay2\"", interstitial->last_command());
}
} // namespace content