blob: 24fbbd71f771c9cb7ac7eccc2db99d8e8b96b3d2 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <limits>
#include <memory>
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/free_deleter.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
using std::nothrow;
using std::numeric_limits;
namespace {
// This function acts as a compiler optimization barrier. We use it to
// prevent the compiler from making an expression a compile-time constant.
// We also use it so that the compiler doesn't discard certain return values
// as something we don't need (see the comment with calloc below).
template <typename Type>
NOINLINE Type HideValueFromCompiler(volatile Type value) {
#if defined(__GNUC__)
// In a GCC compatible compiler (GCC or Clang), make this compiler barrier
// more robust than merely using "volatile".
__asm__ volatile ("" : "+r" (value));
#endif // __GNUC__
return value;
// Tcmalloc and Windows allocator shim support setting malloc limits.
// - NO_TCMALLOC (should be defined if compiled with use_allocator!="tcmalloc")
// - ADDRESS_SANITIZER and SYZYASAN because they have their own memory allocator
// - IOS does not use tcmalloc
// - OS_MACOSX does not use tcmalloc
// - Windows allocator shim defines ALLOCATOR_SHIM
#if (!defined(NO_TCMALLOC) || defined(ALLOCATOR_SHIM)) && \
!defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) && !defined(OS_IOS) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && \
#define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) function
#define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) DISABLED_##function
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
// Detect runtime TCMalloc bypasses.
bool IsTcMallocBypassed() {
// This should detect a TCMalloc bypass from Valgrind.
char* g_slice = getenv("G_SLICE");
if (g_slice && !strcmp(g_slice, "always-malloc"))
return true;
return false;
// There are platforms where these tests are known to fail. We would like to
// be able to easily check the status on the bots, but marking tests as
// FAILS_ is too clunky.
void OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(bool overflow_detected) {
if (!overflow_detected) {
#if defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
// Sadly, on Linux, Android, and OSX we don't have a good story yet. Don't
// fail the test, but report.
printf("Platform has overflow: %s\n",
!overflow_detected ? "yes." : "no.");
// Otherwise, fail the test. (Note: EXPECT are ok in subfunctions, ASSERT
// aren't).
#if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(THREAD_SANITIZER)
#define MAYBE_NewOverflow DISABLED_NewOverflow
#define MAYBE_NewOverflow NewOverflow
// Test array[TooBig][X] and array[X][TooBig] allocations for int overflows.
// IOS doesn't honor nothrow, so disable the test there.
// Disabled under XSan because asan aborts when new returns nullptr,
TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_NewOverflow) {
const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
// We want something "dynamic" here, so that the compiler doesn't
// immediately reject crazy arrays.
const size_t kDynamicArraySize = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize);
const size_t kMaxSizeT = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
const size_t kArraySize2 = kMaxSizeT / kArraySize + 10;
const size_t kDynamicArraySize2 = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize2);
std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize]> array_pointer(
new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize2][kArraySize]);
// Prevent clang from optimizing away the whole test.
char* volatile p = reinterpret_cast<char*>(array_pointer.get());
// On windows, the compiler prevents static array sizes of more than
// 0x7fffffff (error C2148).
#if defined(OS_WIN) && defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize2]> array_pointer(
new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize][kArraySize2]);
// Prevent clang from optimizing away the whole test.
char* volatile p = reinterpret_cast<char*>(array_pointer.get());
#endif // !defined(OS_WIN) || !defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
// Check if ptr1 and ptr2 are separated by less than size chars.
bool ArePointersToSameArea(void* ptr1, void* ptr2, size_t size) {
ptrdiff_t ptr_diff = reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::max(ptr1, ptr2)) -
reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::min(ptr1, ptr2));
return static_cast<size_t>(ptr_diff) <= size;
// Check if TCMalloc uses an underlying random memory allocator.
TEST(SecurityTest, MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(RandomMemoryAllocations)) {
if (IsTcMallocBypassed())
size_t kPageSize = 4096; // We support x86_64 only.
// Check that malloc() returns an address that is neither the kernel's
// un-hinted mmap area, nor the current brk() area. The first malloc() may
// not be at a random address because TCMalloc will first exhaust any memory
// that it has allocated early on, before starting the sophisticated
// allocators.
void* default_mmap_heap_address =
mmap(0, kPageSize, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
ASSERT_EQ(munmap(default_mmap_heap_address, kPageSize), 0);
void* brk_heap_address = sbrk(0);
ASSERT_NE(brk_heap_address, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
ASSERT_TRUE(brk_heap_address != NULL);
// 1 MB should get us past what TCMalloc pre-allocated before initializing
// the sophisticated allocators.
size_t kAllocSize = 1<<20;
std::unique_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter> ptr(
// If two pointers are separated by less than 512MB, they are considered
// to be in the same area.
// Our random pointer could be anywhere within 0x3fffffffffff (46bits),
// and we are checking that it's not withing 1GB (30 bits) from two
// addresses (brk and mmap heap). We have roughly one chance out of
// 2^15 to flake.
const size_t kAreaRadius = 1<<29;
bool in_default_mmap_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
ptr.get(), default_mmap_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
bool in_default_brk_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
ptr.get(), brk_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
// In the implementation, we always mask our random addresses with
// kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
bool impossible_random_address =
reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
#endif // defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
} // namespace