blob: 7ac743e2a017360b4c00e6a71f4b8a4cc843bfa8 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include <stdint.h>
#include "base/memory/ref_counted.h"
#include "net/base/net_export.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
#include "net/socket/next_proto.h"
#include "net/ssl/ssl_private_key.h"
namespace net {
// Various TLS/SSL ProtocolVersion values encoded as uint16_t
// struct {
// uint8_t major;
// uint8_t minor;
// } ProtocolVersion;
// The most significant byte is |major|, and the least significant byte
// is |minor|.
enum {
enum TokenBindingParam {
TB_PARAM_RSA2048_PKCS15 = 0,
// Default minimum protocol version.
NET_EXPORT extern const uint16_t kDefaultSSLVersionMin;
// Default maximum protocol version.
NET_EXPORT extern const uint16_t kDefaultSSLVersionMax;
// Default minimum protocol version that it's acceptable to fallback to.
NET_EXPORT extern const uint16_t kDefaultSSLVersionFallbackMin;
// A collection of SSL-related configuration settings.
struct NET_EXPORT SSLConfig {
// Default to revocation checking.
SSLConfig(const SSLConfig& other);
// Returns true if |cert| is one of the certs in |allowed_bad_certs|.
// The expected cert status is written to |cert_status|. |*cert_status| can
// be NULL if user doesn't care about the cert status.
bool IsAllowedBadCert(X509Certificate* cert, CertStatus* cert_status) const;
// Same as above except works with DER encoded certificates instead
// of X509Certificate.
bool IsAllowedBadCert(const base::StringPiece& der_cert,
CertStatus* cert_status) const;
// Returns the set of flags to use for certificate verification, which is a
// bitwise OR of CertVerifier::VerifyFlags that represent this SSLConfig's
// configuration.
int GetCertVerifyFlags() const;
// rev_checking_enabled is true if online certificate revocation checking is
// enabled (i.e. OCSP and CRL fetching).
// Regardless of this flag, CRLSet checking is always enabled and locally
// cached revocation information will be considered.
bool rev_checking_enabled;
// rev_checking_required_local_anchors is true if revocation checking is
// required to succeed when certificates chain to local trust anchors (that
// is, non-public CAs). If revocation information cannot be obtained, such
// certificates will be treated as revoked ("hard-fail").
// Note: This is distinct from rev_checking_enabled. If true, it is
// equivalent to also setting rev_checking_enabled, but only when the
// certificate chain chains to a local (non-public) trust anchor.
bool rev_checking_required_local_anchors;
// sha1_local_anchors_enabled is true if SHA-1 signed certificates issued by a
// local (non-public) trust anchor should be allowed.
bool sha1_local_anchors_enabled;
// The minimum and maximum protocol versions that are enabled.
// (Use the SSL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_xxx enumerators defined above.)
// SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0 are not supported. If version_max < version_min, it
// means no protocol versions are enabled.
uint16_t version_min;
uint16_t version_max;
// version_fallback_min contains the minimum version that is acceptable to
// fallback to. Versions before this may be tried to see whether they would
// have succeeded and thus to give a better message to the user, but the
// resulting connection won't be used in these cases.
uint16_t version_fallback_min;
// Presorted list of cipher suites which should be explicitly prevented from
// being used in addition to those disabled by the net built-in policy.
// Though cipher suites are sent in TLS as "uint8_t CipherSuite[2]", in
// big-endian form, they should be declared in host byte order, with the
// first uint8_t occupying the most significant byte.
// Ex: To disable TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, specify 0x0004, while to
// disable TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, specify 0xC002.
std::vector<uint16_t> disabled_cipher_suites;
// Enables deprecated cipher suites. These cipher suites are selected under a
// fallback to distinguish servers which require them from servers which
// merely prefer them.
// NOTE: because they are under a fallback, connections are still vulnerable
// to them as far as downgrades are concerned, so this should only be used for
// measurement of ciphers not to be carried long-term. It is no fix for
// servers with bad configurations without full removal.
bool deprecated_cipher_suites_enabled;
// Enables DHE cipher suites.
bool dhe_enabled;
bool channel_id_enabled; // True if TLS channel ID extension is enabled.
// List of Token Binding key parameters supported by the client. If empty,
// Token Binding will be disabled, even if token_binding_enabled is true.
std::vector<TokenBindingParam> token_binding_params;
bool false_start_enabled; // True if we'll use TLS False Start.
// True if the Certificate Transparency signed_certificate_timestamp
// TLS extension is enabled.
bool signed_cert_timestamps_enabled;
// If true, causes only ECDHE cipher suites to be enabled.
bool require_ecdhe;
// TODO(wtc): move the following members to a new SSLParams structure. They
// are not SSL configuration settings.
struct NET_EXPORT CertAndStatus {
std::string der_cert;
CertStatus cert_status;
// Add any known-bad SSL certificate (with its cert status) to
// |allowed_bad_certs| that should not trigger an ERR_CERT_* error when
// calling SSLClientSocket::Connect. This would normally be done in
// response to the user explicitly accepting the bad certificate.
std::vector<CertAndStatus> allowed_bad_certs;
// True if we should send client_cert to the server.
bool send_client_cert;
bool verify_ev_cert; // True if we should verify the certificate for EV.
bool version_fallback; // True if we are falling back to an older protocol
// version (one still needs to decrement
// version_max).
// If cert_io_enabled is false, then certificate verification will not
// result in additional HTTP requests. (For example: to fetch missing
// intermediates or to perform OCSP/CRL fetches.) It also implies that online
// revocation checking is disabled.
// NOTE: Only used by NSS.
bool cert_io_enabled;
// The list of application level protocols supported with ALPN (Application
// Layer Protocol Negotation), in decreasing order of preference. Protocols
// will be advertised in this order during TLS handshake.
NextProtoVector alpn_protos;
// The list of application level protocols supported with NPN (Next Protocol
// Negotiation). The last item on the list is selected if there is no overlap
// between |npn_protos| and the protocols supported by the server, otherwise
// server preference is observed and the order of |npn_protos| is irrelevant.
// Note that due to NSS limitations, ports which use NSS will use
// |alpn_protos| for both ALPN and NPN. However, if |npn_protos| is empty, NPN
// will still be disabled.
// TODO(bnc): Deprecate NPN, see
NextProtoVector npn_protos;
// True if renegotiation should be allowed for the default application-level
// protocol when the peer negotiates neither ALPN nor NPN.
bool renego_allowed_default;
// The list of application-level protocols to enable renegotiation for.
NextProtoVector renego_allowed_for_protos;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> client_cert;
scoped_refptr<SSLPrivateKey> client_private_key;
} // namespace net