// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
#include "base/test/histogram_tester.h"
#include "chrome/browser/ui/browser.h"
#include "chrome/browser/ui/browser_commands.h"
#include "chrome/browser/ui/singleton_tabs.h"
#include "chrome/browser/ui/tabs/tab_strip_model.h"
#include "chrome/common/extensions/extension_process_policy.h"
#include "chrome/test/base/in_process_browser_test.h"
#include "chrome/test/base/ui_test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/browser/notification_observer.h"
#include "content/public/browser/notification_service.h"
#include "content/public/browser/notification_types.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_frame_host.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_process_host.h"
#include "content/public/browser/resource_request_details.h"
#include "content/public/browser/web_contents_observer.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/test/browser_test_utils.h"
#include "net/dns/mock_host_resolver.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/embedded_test_server.h"

// The goal of these tests is to "simulate" exploited renderer processes, which
// can send arbitrary IPC messages and confuse browser process internal state,
// leading to security bugs. We are trying to verify that the browser doesn't
// perform any dangerous operations in such cases.
// This is similar to the security_exploit_browsertest.cc tests, but also
// includes chrome/ layer concepts such as extensions.
class ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest : public InProcessBrowserTest {
 public:
  ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest() {}
  ~ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest() override {}

  void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
    ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->Start());
    host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
  }

  void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
    // Since we assume exploited renderer process, it can bypass the same origin
    // policy at will. Simulate that by passing the disable-web-security flag.
    command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableWebSecurity);
  }

 private:
  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest);
};

IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest,
                       ChromeExtensionResources) {
  // Load a page that requests a chrome-extension:// image through XHR. We
  // expect this load to fail, as it is an illegal request.
  GURL foo = embedded_test_server()->GetURL("foo.com",
                                            "/chrome_extension_resource.html");

  content::DOMMessageQueue msg_queue;

  ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), foo);

  std::string status;
  std::string expected_status("0");
  EXPECT_TRUE(msg_queue.WaitForMessage(&status));
  EXPECT_STREQ(status.c_str(), expected_status.c_str());
}

// Extension isolation prevents a normal renderer process from being able to
// create a "blob:chrome-extension://" resource.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest,
                       CreateBlobInExtensionOrigin) {
  // This test relies on extensions documents running in extension processes,
  // which is guaranteed with --isolate-extensions. Without it, the checks are
  // not enforced and this test will time out waiting for the process to be
  // killed.
  if (!extensions::IsIsolateExtensionsEnabled())
    return;

  ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(
      browser(),
      embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.root-servers.net", "/title1.html"));

  content::RenderFrameHost* rfh =
      browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->GetMainFrame();

  // All these are attacker controlled values. The UUID is arbitrary.
  std::string blob_id = "2ce53a26-0409-45a3-86e5-f8fb9f5566d8";
  std::string blob_type = "text/html";
  std::string blob_contents = "<script>chrome.extensions</script>";
  std::string blob_path = "5881f76e-10d2-410d-8c61-ef210502acfd";

  // Target the bookmark manager extension.
  std::string target_origin =
      "chrome-extension://eemcgdkfndhakfknompkggombfjjjeno";

  // Set up a blob ID and populate it with attacker-controlled value. This
  // message is allowed, because this data is not in any origin.
  content::PwnMessageHelper::CreateBlobWithPayload(
      rfh->GetProcess(), blob_id, blob_type, "", blob_contents);

  // This IPC should result in a kill because |target_origin| is not commitable
  // in |rfh->GetProcess()|.
  base::HistogramTester histograms;
  content::RenderProcessHostWatcher crash_observer(
      rfh->GetProcess(),
      content::RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);

  content::PwnMessageHelper::RegisterBlobURL(
      rfh->GetProcess(), GURL("blob:" + target_origin + "/" + blob_path),
      blob_id);

  // If the process is killed, this test passes.
  crash_observer.Wait();
  histograms.ExpectUniqueSample("Stability.BadMessageTerminated.Content", 139,
                                1);
}

// Extension isolation prevents a normal renderer process from being able to
// create a "filesystem:chrome-extension://sdgkjaghsdg/temporary/" resource.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ChromeSecurityExploitBrowserTest,
                       CreateFilesystemURLInExtensionOrigin) {
  GURL page_url =
      embedded_test_server()->GetURL("a.root-servers.net", "/title1.html");
  ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), page_url);

  content::RenderFrameHost* rfh =
      browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->GetMainFrame();

  // Block the renderer on operation that never completes, to shield it from
  // receiving unexpected browser->renderer IPCs that might CHECK.
  rfh->ExecuteJavaScriptWithUserGestureForTests(
      base::ASCIIToUTF16("var r = new XMLHttpRequest();"
                         "r.open('GET', '/slow?99999', false);"
                         "r.send(null);"
                         "while (1);"));

  // JS code that the attacker would like to run in an extension process.
  std::string payload = "<html><body>pwned.</body></html>";
  std::string payload_type = "text/html";

  // Target the bookmark manager extension.
  std::string target_origin =
      "chrome-extension://eemcgdkfndhakfknompkggombfjjjeno/";

  // Set up a blob ID and populate it with the attacker-controlled payload.
  // This is allowed, because this data is not in any origin;
  // the UUID is arbitrary.
  std::string blob_id = "2ce53a26-0409-45a3-86e5-f8fb9f5566d8";
  content::PwnMessageHelper::CreateBlobWithPayload(rfh->GetProcess(), blob_id,
                                                   payload_type, "", payload);

  // Note: a well-behaved renderer would always send the following message here,
  // but it's actually not necessary for the original attack to succeed, so we
  // omit it. As a result there are some log warnings from the quota observer.
  //
  // IPC::IpcSecurityTestUtil::PwnMessageReceived(
  //     rfh->GetProcess()->GetChannel(),
  //     FileSystemHostMsg_OpenFileSystem(22, GURL(target_origin),
  //                                      storage::kFileSystemTypeTemporary));

  GURL target_url =
      GURL("filesystem:" + target_origin + "temporary/exploit.html");

  content::PwnMessageHelper::FileSystemCreate(rfh->GetProcess(), 23, target_url,
                                              false, false, false);

  // Write the blob into the file. If successful, this places an
  // attacker-controlled value in a resource on the extension origin.
  content::PwnMessageHelper::FileSystemWrite(rfh->GetProcess(), 24, target_url,
                                             blob_id, 0);

  // Now navigate to |target_url| in a new tab. It should not contain |payload|.
  AddTabAtIndex(0, target_url, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED);
  content::WaitForLoadStop(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(0));
  rfh = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->GetMainFrame();
  EXPECT_EQ(GURL(target_origin), rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
  std::string body;
  EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
      rfh, "window.domAutomationController.send(document.body.innerText);",
      &body));
  if (extensions::IsIsolateExtensionsEnabled()) {
    EXPECT_EQ(
        "\nYour file was not found\n\n"
        "It may have been moved or deleted.\n"
        "ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND\n",
        body);
  } else {
    // Without --isolate-extensions, the above steps must succeed, since
    // unblessed extension frames are allowed in ordinary renderer processes.
    EXPECT_EQ("pwned.", body);
  }
}