| // Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "net/base/x509_certificate.h" |
| |
| #include "base/lazy_instance.h" |
| #include "base/logging.h" |
| #include "base/pickle.h" |
| #include "base/sha1.h" |
| #include "base/string_tokenizer.h" |
| #include "base/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/utf_string_conversions.h" |
| #include "crypto/rsa_private_key.h" |
| #include "crypto/scoped_capi_types.h" |
| #include "net/base/asn1_util.h" |
| #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h" |
| #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h" |
| #include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h" |
| #include "net/base/net_errors.h" |
| #include "net/base/scoped_cert_chain_context.h" |
| #include "net/base/test_root_certs.h" |
| #include "net/base/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h" |
| |
| #pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib") |
| |
| using base::Time; |
| |
| namespace net { |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle< |
| HCERTSTORE, |
| crypto::CAPIDestroyerWithFlags<HCERTSTORE, |
| CertCloseStore, 0> > ScopedHCERTSTORE; |
| |
| struct FreeChainEngineFunctor { |
| void operator()(HCERTCHAINENGINE engine) const { |
| if (engine) |
| CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle<HCERTCHAINENGINE, FreeChainEngineFunctor> |
| ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE; |
| |
| //----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| // TODO(wtc): This is a copy of the MapSecurityError function in |
| // ssl_client_socket_win.cc. Another function that maps Windows error codes |
| // to our network error codes is WinInetUtil::OSErrorToNetError. We should |
| // eliminate the code duplication. |
| int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) { |
| // There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus |
| // far find interesting. |
| switch (err) { |
| case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel |
| case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; |
| case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel |
| case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; |
| case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel |
| case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; |
| case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK: |
| return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; |
| case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: |
| return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; |
| case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // Schannel and CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; |
| case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN: |
| case CERT_E_ROLE: |
| return ERR_CERT_INVALID; |
| case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: |
| // TODO(wtc): Should we add ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE? |
| return ERR_CERT_INVALID; |
| // We received an unexpected_message or illegal_parameter alert message |
| // from the server. |
| case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE: |
| return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR; |
| case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH: |
| return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH; |
| case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE: |
| return ERR_UNEXPECTED; |
| case SEC_E_OK: |
| return OK; |
| default: |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; |
| return ERR_FAILED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Map the errors in the chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus returned by |
| // CertGetCertificateChain to our certificate status flags. |
| int MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(DWORD error_status) { |
| int cert_status = 0; |
| |
| // We don't include CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED because it's obsolete and |
| // we wouldn't consider it an error anyway |
| const DWORD kDateInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | |
| CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID; |
| if (error_status & kDateInvalidErrors) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; |
| |
| const DWORD kAuthorityInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT | |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST | |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN; |
| if (error_status & kAuthorityInvalidErrors) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; |
| |
| if ((error_status & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN) && |
| !(error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION)) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; |
| |
| if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; |
| |
| if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; |
| |
| const DWORD kWrongUsageErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE | |
| CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; |
| if (error_status & kWrongUsageErrors) { |
| // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE? |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| // The rest of the errors. |
| const DWORD kCertInvalidErrors = |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID | |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS | |
| CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_NO_ISSUANCE_CHAIN_POLICY | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT; |
| if (error_status & kCertInvalidErrors) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| |
| return cert_status; |
| } |
| |
| void ExplodedTimeToSystemTime(const base::Time::Exploded& exploded, |
| SYSTEMTIME* system_time) { |
| system_time->wYear = exploded.year; |
| system_time->wMonth = exploded.month; |
| system_time->wDayOfWeek = exploded.day_of_week; |
| system_time->wDay = exploded.day_of_month; |
| system_time->wHour = exploded.hour; |
| system_time->wMinute = exploded.minute; |
| system_time->wSecond = exploded.second; |
| system_time->wMilliseconds = exploded.millisecond; |
| } |
| |
| //----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| // Wrappers of malloc and free for CRYPT_DECODE_PARA, which requires the |
| // WINAPI calling convention. |
| void* WINAPI MyCryptAlloc(size_t size) { |
| return malloc(size); |
| } |
| |
| void WINAPI MyCryptFree(void* p) { |
| free(p); |
| } |
| |
| // Decodes the cert's subjectAltName extension into a CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO |
| // structure and stores it in *output. |
| void GetCertSubjectAltName(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO>* output) { |
| PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2, |
| cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, |
| cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); |
| if (!extension) |
| return; |
| |
| CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; |
| decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); |
| decode_para.pfnAlloc = MyCryptAlloc; |
| decode_para.pfnFree = MyCryptFree; |
| CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO* alt_name_info = NULL; |
| DWORD alt_name_info_size = 0; |
| BOOL rv; |
| rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, |
| szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2, |
| extension->Value.pbData, |
| extension->Value.cbData, |
| CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, |
| &decode_para, |
| &alt_name_info, |
| &alt_name_info_size); |
| if (rv) |
| output->reset(alt_name_info); |
| } |
| |
| // Returns true if any common name in the certificate's Subject field contains |
| // a NULL character. |
| bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { |
| CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; |
| decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); |
| decode_para.pfnAlloc = MyCryptAlloc; |
| decode_para.pfnFree = MyCryptFree; |
| CERT_NAME_INFO* name_info = NULL; |
| DWORD name_info_size = 0; |
| BOOL rv; |
| rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, |
| X509_NAME, |
| cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, |
| cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData, |
| CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, |
| &decode_para, |
| &name_info, |
| &name_info_size); |
| if (rv) { |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_NAME_INFO> scoped_name_info(name_info); |
| |
| // The Subject field may have multiple common names. According to the |
| // "PKI Layer Cake" paper, CryptoAPI uses every common name in the |
| // Subject field, so we inspect every common name. |
| // |
| // From RFC 5280: |
| // X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { |
| // teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) } |
| // |
| // We also check IA5String and VisibleString. |
| for (DWORD i = 0; i < name_info->cRDN; ++i) { |
| PCERT_RDN rdn = &name_info->rgRDN[i]; |
| for (DWORD j = 0; j < rdn->cRDNAttr; ++j) { |
| PCERT_RDN_ATTR rdn_attr = &rdn->rgRDNAttr[j]; |
| if (strcmp(rdn_attr->pszObjId, szOID_COMMON_NAME) == 0) { |
| switch (rdn_attr->dwValueType) { |
| // After the CryptoAPI ASN.1 security vulnerabilities described in |
| // http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-056.mspx |
| // were patched, we get CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB for a common name |
| // that contains a NULL character. |
| case CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB: |
| break; |
| // Array of 8-bit characters. |
| case CERT_RDN_PRINTABLE_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_TELETEX_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_IA5_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_VISIBLE_STRING: |
| for (DWORD k = 0; k < rdn_attr->Value.cbData; ++k) { |
| if (rdn_attr->Value.pbData[k] == '\0') |
| return true; |
| } |
| break; |
| // Array of 16-bit characters. |
| case CERT_RDN_BMP_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_UTF8_STRING: { |
| DWORD num_wchars = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 2; |
| wchar_t* common_name = |
| reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); |
| for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_wchars; ++k) { |
| if (common_name[k] == L'\0') |
| return true; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| // Array of ints (32-bit). |
| case CERT_RDN_UNIVERSAL_STRING: { |
| DWORD num_ints = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 4; |
| int* common_name = |
| reinterpret_cast<int*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); |
| for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_ints; ++k) { |
| if (common_name[k] == 0) |
| return true; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| default: |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Saves some information about the certificate chain chain_context in |
| // *verify_result. The caller MUST initialize *verify_result before calling |
| // this function. |
| void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, |
| CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { |
| if (chain_context->cChain == 0) |
| return; |
| |
| PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; |
| int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL; |
| std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain; |
| |
| // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with |
| // the root CA certificate (i = num_elements - 1). Do not inspect the |
| // signature algorithm of the root CA certificate because the signature on |
| // the trust anchor is not important. |
| for (int i = 0; i < num_elements - 1; ++i) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; |
| if (i == 0) { |
| verified_cert = cert; |
| } else { |
| verified_chain.push_back(cert); |
| } |
| |
| const char* algorithm = cert->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId; |
| if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD5RSA) == 0) { |
| // md5WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4 |
| verify_result->has_md5 = true; |
| if (i != 0) |
| verify_result->has_md5_ca = true; |
| } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD2RSA) == 0) { |
| // md2WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2 |
| verify_result->has_md2 = true; |
| if (i != 0) |
| verify_result->has_md2_ca = true; |
| } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD4RSA) == 0) { |
| // md4WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.3 |
| verify_result->has_md4 = true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (verified_cert) { |
| // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above. |
| if (num_elements > 1) |
| verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext); |
| verify_result->verified_cert = |
| X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO |
| // structure and stores it in *output. |
| void GetCertPoliciesInfo(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO>* output) { |
| PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_CERT_POLICIES, |
| cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, |
| cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); |
| if (!extension) |
| return; |
| |
| CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; |
| decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); |
| decode_para.pfnAlloc = MyCryptAlloc; |
| decode_para.pfnFree = MyCryptFree; |
| CERT_POLICIES_INFO* policies_info = NULL; |
| DWORD policies_info_size = 0; |
| BOOL rv; |
| rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, |
| szOID_CERT_POLICIES, |
| extension->Value.pbData, |
| extension->Value.cbData, |
| CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, |
| &decode_para, |
| &policies_info, |
| &policies_info_size); |
| if (rv) |
| output->reset(policies_info); |
| } |
| |
| // Helper function to parse a principal from a WinInet description of that |
| // principal. |
| void ParsePrincipal(const std::string& description, |
| CertPrincipal* principal) { |
| // The description of the principal is a string with each LDAP value on |
| // a separate line. |
| const std::string kDelimiters("\r\n"); |
| |
| std::vector<std::string> common_names, locality_names, state_names, |
| country_names; |
| |
| // TODO(jcampan): add business_category and serial_number. |
| const std::string kPrefixes[] = { std::string("CN="), |
| std::string("L="), |
| std::string("S="), |
| std::string("C="), |
| std::string("STREET="), |
| std::string("O="), |
| std::string("OU="), |
| std::string("DC=") }; |
| |
| std::vector<std::string>* values[] = { |
| &common_names, &locality_names, |
| &state_names, &country_names, |
| &(principal->street_addresses), |
| &(principal->organization_names), |
| &(principal->organization_unit_names), |
| &(principal->domain_components) }; |
| DCHECK(arraysize(kPrefixes) == arraysize(values)); |
| |
| StringTokenizer str_tok(description, kDelimiters); |
| while (str_tok.GetNext()) { |
| std::string entry = str_tok.token(); |
| for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(kPrefixes); i++) { |
| if (!entry.compare(0, kPrefixes[i].length(), kPrefixes[i])) { |
| std::string value = entry.substr(kPrefixes[i].length()); |
| // Remove enclosing double-quotes if any. |
| if (value.size() >= 2 && |
| value[0] == '"' && value[value.size() - 1] == '"') |
| value = value.substr(1, value.size() - 2); |
| values[i]->push_back(value); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // We don't expect to have more than one CN, L, S, and C. If there is more |
| // than one entry for CN, L, S, and C, we will use the first entry. Although |
| // RFC 2818 Section 3.1 says the "most specific" CN should be used, that term |
| // has been removed in draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check, which requires |
| // that the Subject field contains only one CN. So it is fine for us to just |
| // use the first CN. |
| std::vector<std::string>* single_value_lists[4] = { |
| &common_names, &locality_names, &state_names, &country_names }; |
| std::string* single_values[4] = { |
| &principal->common_name, &principal->locality_name, |
| &principal->state_or_province_name, &principal->country_name }; |
| for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(single_value_lists); ++i) { |
| int length = static_cast<int>(single_value_lists[i]->size()); |
| if (!single_value_lists[i]->empty()) |
| *(single_values[i]) = (*(single_value_lists[i]))[0]; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void AddCertsFromStore(HCERTSTORE store, |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandles* results) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL; |
| |
| while ((cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert)) != NULL) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT to_add = NULL; |
| if (CertAddCertificateContextToStore( |
| NULL, // The cert won't be persisted in any cert store. This breaks |
| // any association the context currently has to |store|, which |
| // allows us, the caller, to safely close |store| without |
| // releasing the cert handles. |
| cert, |
| CERT_STORE_ADD_USE_EXISTING, |
| &to_add) && to_add != NULL) { |
| // When processing stores generated from PKCS#7/PKCS#12 files, it |
| // appears that the order returned is the inverse of the order that it |
| // appeared in the file. |
| // TODO(rsleevi): Ensure this order is consistent across all Win |
| // versions |
| results->insert(results->begin(), to_add); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandles ParsePKCS7(const char* data, size_t length) { |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandles results; |
| CERT_BLOB data_blob; |
| data_blob.cbData = length; |
| data_blob.pbData = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(const_cast<char*>(data)); |
| |
| HCERTSTORE out_store = NULL; |
| |
| DWORD expected_types = CERT_QUERY_CONTENT_FLAG_PKCS7_SIGNED | |
| CERT_QUERY_CONTENT_FLAG_PKCS7_SIGNED_EMBED | |
| CERT_QUERY_CONTENT_FLAG_PKCS7_UNSIGNED; |
| |
| if (!CryptQueryObject(CERT_QUERY_OBJECT_BLOB, &data_blob, expected_types, |
| CERT_QUERY_FORMAT_FLAG_BINARY, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, |
| &out_store, NULL, NULL) || out_store == NULL) { |
| return results; |
| } |
| |
| AddCertsFromStore(out_store, &results); |
| CertCloseStore(out_store, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG); |
| |
| return results; |
| } |
| |
| void AppendPublicKeyHashes(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, |
| std::vector<SHA1Fingerprint>* hashes) { |
| if (chain->cChain == 0) |
| return; |
| |
| PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* const element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| |
| const DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; |
| |
| base::StringPiece der_bytes( |
| reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), |
| cert->cbCertEncoded); |
| base::StringPiece spki_bytes; |
| if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes)) |
| continue; |
| |
| SHA1Fingerprint hash; |
| base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()), |
| spki_bytes.size(), hash.data); |
| hashes->push_back(hash); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| void X509Certificate::Initialize() { |
| std::wstring subject_info; |
| std::wstring issuer_info; |
| DWORD name_size; |
| DCHECK(cert_handle_); |
| name_size = CertNameToStr(cert_handle_->dwCertEncodingType, |
| &cert_handle_->pCertInfo->Subject, |
| CERT_X500_NAME_STR | CERT_NAME_STR_CRLF_FLAG, |
| NULL, 0); |
| name_size = CertNameToStr(cert_handle_->dwCertEncodingType, |
| &cert_handle_->pCertInfo->Subject, |
| CERT_X500_NAME_STR | CERT_NAME_STR_CRLF_FLAG, |
| WriteInto(&subject_info, name_size), name_size); |
| name_size = CertNameToStr(cert_handle_->dwCertEncodingType, |
| &cert_handle_->pCertInfo->Issuer, |
| CERT_X500_NAME_STR | CERT_NAME_STR_CRLF_FLAG, |
| NULL, 0); |
| name_size = CertNameToStr(cert_handle_->dwCertEncodingType, |
| &cert_handle_->pCertInfo->Issuer, |
| CERT_X500_NAME_STR | CERT_NAME_STR_CRLF_FLAG, |
| WriteInto(&issuer_info, name_size), name_size); |
| ParsePrincipal(WideToUTF8(subject_info), &subject_); |
| ParsePrincipal(WideToUTF8(issuer_info), &issuer_); |
| |
| valid_start_ = Time::FromFileTime(cert_handle_->pCertInfo->NotBefore); |
| valid_expiry_ = Time::FromFileTime(cert_handle_->pCertInfo->NotAfter); |
| |
| fingerprint_ = CalculateFingerprint(cert_handle_); |
| |
| const CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB* serial = &cert_handle_->pCertInfo->SerialNumber; |
| scoped_array<uint8> serial_bytes(new uint8[serial->cbData]); |
| for (unsigned i = 0; i < serial->cbData; i++) |
| serial_bytes[i] = serial->pbData[serial->cbData - i - 1]; |
| serial_number_ = std::string( |
| reinterpret_cast<char*>(serial_bytes.get()), serial->cbData); |
| // Remove leading zeros. |
| while (serial_number_.size() > 1 && serial_number_[0] == 0) |
| serial_number_ = serial_number_.substr(1, serial_number_.size() - 1); |
| } |
| |
| // IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA |
| // which we recognise as a standard root. |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) { |
| PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; |
| int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| if (num_elements < 1) |
| return false; |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; |
| |
| SHA1Fingerprint hash = CalculateFingerprint(cert); |
| return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray( |
| hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes)); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| X509Certificate* X509Certificate::CreateSelfSigned( |
| crypto::RSAPrivateKey* key, |
| const std::string& subject, |
| uint32 serial_number, |
| base::TimeDelta valid_duration) { |
| // Get the ASN.1 encoding of the certificate subject. |
| std::wstring w_subject = ASCIIToWide(subject); |
| DWORD encoded_subject_length = 0; |
| if (!CertStrToName( |
| X509_ASN_ENCODING, |
| w_subject.c_str(), |
| CERT_X500_NAME_STR, NULL, NULL, &encoded_subject_length, NULL)) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| scoped_array<BYTE> encoded_subject(new BYTE[encoded_subject_length]); |
| if (!CertStrToName( |
| X509_ASN_ENCODING, |
| w_subject.c_str(), |
| CERT_X500_NAME_STR, NULL, |
| encoded_subject.get(), |
| &encoded_subject_length, NULL)) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| CERT_NAME_BLOB subject_name; |
| memset(&subject_name, 0, sizeof(subject_name)); |
| subject_name.cbData = encoded_subject_length; |
| subject_name.pbData = encoded_subject.get(); |
| |
| CRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER sign_algo; |
| memset(&sign_algo, 0, sizeof(sign_algo)); |
| sign_algo.pszObjId = szOID_RSA_SHA1RSA; |
| |
| base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now(); |
| base::Time not_after = not_before + valid_duration; |
| base::Time::Exploded exploded; |
| |
| // Create the system time structs representing our exploded times. |
| not_before.UTCExplode(&exploded); |
| SYSTEMTIME start_time; |
| ExplodedTimeToSystemTime(exploded, &start_time); |
| not_after.UTCExplode(&exploded); |
| SYSTEMTIME end_time; |
| ExplodedTimeToSystemTime(exploded, &end_time); |
| |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_handle = |
| CertCreateSelfSignCertificate(key->provider(), &subject_name, |
| CERT_CREATE_SELFSIGN_NO_KEY_INFO, NULL, |
| &sign_algo, &start_time, &end_time, NULL); |
| DCHECK(cert_handle) << "Failed to create self-signed certificate: " |
| << GetLastError(); |
| if (!cert_handle) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| X509Certificate* cert = CreateFromHandle(cert_handle, OSCertHandles()); |
| FreeOSCertHandle(cert_handle); |
| return cert; |
| } |
| |
| void X509Certificate::GetSubjectAltName( |
| std::vector<std::string>* dns_names, |
| std::vector<std::string>* ip_addrs) const { |
| if (dns_names) |
| dns_names->clear(); |
| if (ip_addrs) |
| ip_addrs->clear(); |
| |
| if (!cert_handle_) |
| return; |
| |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO> alt_name_info; |
| GetCertSubjectAltName(cert_handle_, &alt_name_info); |
| CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO* alt_name = alt_name_info.get(); |
| if (alt_name) { |
| int num_entries = alt_name->cAltEntry; |
| for (int i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) { |
| // dNSName is an ASN.1 IA5String representing a string of ASCII |
| // characters, so we can use WideToASCII here. |
| const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY& entry = alt_name->rgAltEntry[i]; |
| |
| if (dns_names && entry.dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME) { |
| dns_names->push_back(WideToASCII(entry.pwszDNSName)); |
| } else if (ip_addrs && |
| entry.dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS) { |
| ip_addrs->push_back(std::string( |
| reinterpret_cast<const char*>(entry.IPAddress.pbData), |
| entry.IPAddress.cbData)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| class GlobalCertStore { |
| public: |
| HCERTSTORE cert_store() { |
| return cert_store_; |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| friend struct base::DefaultLazyInstanceTraits<GlobalCertStore>; |
| |
| GlobalCertStore() |
| : cert_store_(CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY, 0, NULL, 0, NULL)) { |
| } |
| |
| ~GlobalCertStore() { |
| CertCloseStore(cert_store_, 0 /* flags */); |
| } |
| |
| const HCERTSTORE cert_store_; |
| |
| DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(GlobalCertStore); |
| }; |
| |
| static base::LazyInstance<GlobalCertStore, |
| base::LeakyLazyInstanceTraits<GlobalCertStore> > |
| g_cert_store(base::LINKER_INITIALIZED); |
| |
| // static |
| HCERTSTORE X509Certificate::cert_store() { |
| return g_cert_store.Get().cert_store(); |
| } |
| |
| int X509Certificate::VerifyInternal(const std::string& hostname, |
| int flags, |
| CertVerifyResult* verify_result) const { |
| if (!cert_handle_) |
| return ERR_UNEXPECTED; |
| |
| // Build and validate certificate chain. |
| CERT_CHAIN_PARA chain_para; |
| memset(&chain_para, 0, sizeof(chain_para)); |
| chain_para.cbSize = sizeof(chain_para); |
| // ExtendedKeyUsage. |
| // We still need to request szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO and szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE |
| // today because some certificate chains need them. IE also requests these |
| // two usages. |
| static const LPSTR usage[] = { |
| szOID_PKIX_KP_SERVER_AUTH, |
| szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO, |
| szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE |
| }; |
| chain_para.RequestedUsage.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR; |
| chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = arraysize(usage); |
| chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = |
| const_cast<LPSTR*>(usage); |
| // We can set CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS to get more chains. |
| DWORD chain_flags = CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_END_CERT; |
| if (flags & VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; |
| chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT; |
| } else { |
| chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY; |
| // EV requires revocation checking. |
| flags &= ~VERIFY_EV_CERT; |
| } |
| |
| // Get the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate. |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO> policies_info; |
| LPSTR ev_policy_oid = NULL; |
| if (flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) { |
| GetCertPoliciesInfo(cert_handle_, &policies_info); |
| if (policies_info.get()) { |
| EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); |
| for (DWORD i = 0; i < policies_info->cPolicyInfo; ++i) { |
| LPSTR policy_oid = policies_info->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier; |
| if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_oid)) { |
| ev_policy_oid = policy_oid; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 1; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = |
| &ev_policy_oid; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // For non-test scenarios, use the default HCERTCHAINENGINE, NULL, which |
| // corresponds to HCCE_CURRENT_USER and is is initialized as needed by |
| // crypt32. However, when testing, it is necessary to create a new |
| // HCERTCHAINENGINE and use that instead. This is because each |
| // HCERTCHAINENGINE maintains a cache of information about certificates |
| // encountered, and each test run may modify the trust status of a |
| // certificate. |
| ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE chain_engine(NULL); |
| if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance()) |
| chain_engine.reset(TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->GetChainEngine()); |
| |
| PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context; |
| // IE passes a non-NULL pTime argument that specifies the current system |
| // time. IE passes CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT as the |
| // chain_flags argument. |
| if (!CertGetCertificateChain( |
| chain_engine, |
| cert_handle_, |
| NULL, // current system time |
| cert_handle_->hCertStore, |
| &chain_para, |
| chain_flags, |
| NULL, // reserved |
| &chain_context)) { |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE) { |
| ev_policy_oid = NULL; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 0; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = NULL; |
| CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); |
| if (!CertGetCertificateChain( |
| chain_engine, |
| cert_handle_, |
| NULL, // current system time |
| cert_handle_->hCertStore, |
| &chain_para, |
| chain_flags, |
| NULL, // reserved |
| &chain_context)) { |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| } |
| ScopedCertChainContext scoped_chain_context(chain_context); |
| |
| GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result); |
| verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus( |
| chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus); |
| |
| // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid. |
| if (verify_result->has_md4) |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| |
| // Flag certificates signed using weak signature algorithms. |
| if (verify_result->has_md2) |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| |
| // Flag certificates that have a Subject common name with a NULL character. |
| if (CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(cert_handle_)) |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| |
| std::wstring wstr_hostname = ASCIIToWide(hostname); |
| |
| SSL_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA extra_policy_para; |
| memset(&extra_policy_para, 0, sizeof(extra_policy_para)); |
| extra_policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(extra_policy_para); |
| extra_policy_para.dwAuthType = AUTHTYPE_SERVER; |
| extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = 0; |
| extra_policy_para.pwszServerName = |
| const_cast<wchar_t*>(wstr_hostname.c_str()); |
| |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA policy_para; |
| memset(&policy_para, 0, sizeof(policy_para)); |
| policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(policy_para); |
| policy_para.dwFlags = 0; |
| policy_para.pvExtraPolicyPara = &extra_policy_para; |
| |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS policy_status; |
| memset(&policy_status, 0, sizeof(policy_status)); |
| policy_status.cbSize = sizeof(policy_status); |
| |
| if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, |
| chain_context, |
| &policy_para, |
| &policy_status)) { |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| |
| if (policy_status.dwError) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( |
| MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); |
| |
| // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy reports only one error (in |
| // policy_status.dwError) if the certificate has multiple errors. |
| // CertGetCertificateChain doesn't report certificate name mismatch, so |
| // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy is the only function that can report |
| // certificate name mismatch. |
| // |
| // To prevent a potential certificate name mismatch from being hidden by |
| // some other certificate error, if we get any other certificate error, |
| // we call CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy again, ignoring all other |
| // certificate errors. Both extra_policy_para.fdwChecks and |
| // policy_para.dwFlags allow us to ignore certificate errors, so we set |
| // them both. |
| if (policy_status.dwError != CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH) { |
| const DWORD extra_ignore_flags = |
| 0x00000080 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION |
| 0x00000100 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA |
| 0x00002000 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID |
| 0x00000200; // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE |
| extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = extra_ignore_flags; |
| const DWORD ignore_flags = |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_NOT_TIME_VALID_FLAGS | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_NAME_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_POLICY_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_REV_UNKNOWN_FLAGS | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_TESTROOT_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_TRUST_TESTROOT_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_PEER_TRUST_FLAG; |
| policy_para.dwFlags = ignore_flags; |
| if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, |
| chain_context, |
| &policy_para, |
| &policy_status)) { |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| if (policy_status.dwError) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( |
| MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be |
| // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004). |
| verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; |
| |
| if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) |
| return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); |
| |
| AppendPublicKeyHashes(chain_context, &verify_result->public_key_hashes); |
| verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(chain_context); |
| |
| if (ev_policy_oid && CheckEV(chain_context, ev_policy_oid)) |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; |
| return OK; |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(std::string* encoded) { |
| if (!cert_handle_->pbCertEncoded || !cert_handle_->cbCertEncoded) |
| return false; |
| encoded->clear(); |
| encoded->append(reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert_handle_->pbCertEncoded), |
| cert_handle_->cbCertEncoded); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Returns true if the certificate is an extended-validation certificate. |
| // |
| // This function checks the certificatePolicies extensions of the |
| // certificates in the certificate chain according to Section 7 (pp. 11-12) |
| // of the EV Certificate Guidelines Version 1.0 at |
| // http://cabforum.org/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf. |
| bool X509Certificate::CheckEV(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, |
| const char* policy_oid) const { |
| DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), chain_context->cChain); |
| // If the cert doesn't match any of the policies, the |
| // CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE bit (0x10) in |
| // chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus is set. |
| DWORD error_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus; |
| DWORD info_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus; |
| if (!chain_context->cChain || error_status != CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Check the end certificate simple chain (chain_context->rgpChain[0]). |
| // If the end certificate's certificatePolicies extension contains the |
| // EV policy OID of the root CA, return true. |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement; |
| int num_elements = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->cElement; |
| if (num_elements < 2) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Look up the EV policy OID of the root CA. |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT root_cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; |
| SHA1Fingerprint fingerprint = CalculateFingerprint(root_cert); |
| EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); |
| return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, policy_oid); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle a, |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandle b) { |
| DCHECK(a && b); |
| if (a == b) |
| return true; |
| return a->cbCertEncoded == b->cbCertEncoded && |
| memcmp(a->pbCertEncoded, b->pbCertEncoded, a->cbCertEncoded) == 0; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandle X509Certificate::CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes( |
| const char* data, int length) { |
| OSCertHandle cert_handle = NULL; |
| if (!CertAddEncodedCertificateToStore( |
| cert_store(), X509_ASN_ENCODING, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(data), |
| length, CERT_STORE_ADD_USE_EXISTING, &cert_handle)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return cert_handle; |
| } |
| |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandles X509Certificate::CreateOSCertHandlesFromBytes( |
| const char* data, int length, Format format) { |
| OSCertHandles results; |
| switch (format) { |
| case FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE: { |
| OSCertHandle handle = CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(data, length); |
| if (handle != NULL) |
| results.push_back(handle); |
| break; |
| } |
| case FORMAT_PKCS7: |
| results = ParsePKCS7(data, length); |
| break; |
| default: |
| NOTREACHED() << "Certificate format " << format << " unimplemented"; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return results; |
| } |
| |
| |
| // static |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandle X509Certificate::DupOSCertHandle( |
| OSCertHandle cert_handle) { |
| return CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert_handle); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| void X509Certificate::FreeOSCertHandle(OSCertHandle cert_handle) { |
| CertFreeCertificateContext(cert_handle); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| SHA1Fingerprint X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint( |
| OSCertHandle cert) { |
| DCHECK(NULL != cert->pbCertEncoded); |
| DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), cert->cbCertEncoded); |
| |
| BOOL rv; |
| SHA1Fingerprint sha1; |
| DWORD sha1_size = sizeof(sha1.data); |
| rv = CryptHashCertificate(NULL, CALG_SHA1, 0, cert->pbCertEncoded, |
| cert->cbCertEncoded, sha1.data, &sha1_size); |
| DCHECK(rv && sha1_size == sizeof(sha1.data)); |
| if (!rv) |
| memset(sha1.data, 0, sizeof(sha1.data)); |
| return sha1; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| X509Certificate::OSCertHandle |
| X509Certificate::ReadOSCertHandleFromPickle(const Pickle& pickle, |
| void** pickle_iter) { |
| const char* data; |
| int length; |
| if (!pickle.ReadData(pickle_iter, &data, &length)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| OSCertHandle cert_handle = NULL; |
| if (!CertAddSerializedElementToStore( |
| cert_store(), reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(data), length, |
| CERT_STORE_ADD_USE_EXISTING, 0, CERT_STORE_CERTIFICATE_CONTEXT_FLAG, |
| NULL, reinterpret_cast<const void **>(&cert_handle))) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return cert_handle; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::WriteOSCertHandleToPickle(OSCertHandle cert_handle, |
| Pickle* pickle) { |
| DWORD length = 0; |
| if (!CertSerializeCertificateStoreElement(cert_handle, 0, NULL, &length)) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::vector<BYTE> buffer(length); |
| // Serialize |cert_handle| in a way that will preserve any extended |
| // attributes set on the handle, such as the location to the certificate's |
| // private key. |
| if (!CertSerializeCertificateStoreElement(cert_handle, 0, &buffer[0], |
| &length)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return pickle->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&buffer[0]), |
| length); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace net |
