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// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "extensions/common/csp_validator.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <vector>
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/strings/string_split.h"
#include "base/strings/string_tokenizer.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "content/public/common/url_constants.h"
#include "extensions/common/constants.h"
#include "extensions/common/error_utils.h"
#include "extensions/common/install_warning.h"
#include "extensions/common/manifest_constants.h"
#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
namespace extensions {
namespace csp_validator {
namespace {
const char kDefaultSrc[] = "default-src";
const char kScriptSrc[] = "script-src";
const char kObjectSrc[] = "object-src";
const char kPluginTypes[] = "plugin-types";
const char kObjectSrcDefaultDirective[] = "object-src 'self';";
const char kScriptSrcDefaultDirective[] =
"script-src 'self' chrome-extension-resource:;";
const char kSandboxDirectiveName[] = "sandbox";
const char kAllowSameOriginToken[] = "allow-same-origin";
const char kAllowTopNavigation[] = "allow-top-navigation";
// This is the list of plugin types which are fully sandboxed and are safe to
// load up in an extension, regardless of the URL they are navigated to.
const char* const kSandboxedPluginTypes[] = {
"application/pdf",
"application/x-google-chrome-pdf",
"application/x-pnacl"
};
// List of CSP hash-source prefixes that are accepted. Blink is a bit more
// lenient, but we only accept standard hashes to be forward-compatible.
// http://www.w3.org/TR/2015/CR-CSP2-20150721/#hash_algo
const char* const kHashSourcePrefixes[] = {
"'sha256-",
"'sha384-",
"'sha512-"
};
struct DirectiveStatus {
explicit DirectiveStatus(const char* name)
: directive_name(name), seen_in_policy(false) {}
const char* directive_name;
bool seen_in_policy;
};
// Returns whether |url| starts with |scheme_and_separator| and does not have a
// too permissive wildcard host name. If |should_check_rcd| is true, then the
// Public suffix list is used to exclude wildcard TLDs such as "https://*.org".
bool isNonWildcardTLD(const std::string& url,
const std::string& scheme_and_separator,
bool should_check_rcd) {
if (!base::StartsWith(url, scheme_and_separator,
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE))
return false;
size_t start_of_host = scheme_and_separator.length();
size_t end_of_host = url.find("/", start_of_host);
if (end_of_host == std::string::npos)
end_of_host = url.size();
// Note: It is sufficient to only compare the first character against '*'
// because the CSP only allows wildcards at the start of a directive, see
// host-source and host-part at http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-syntax
bool is_wildcard_subdomain = end_of_host > start_of_host + 2 &&
url[start_of_host] == '*' && url[start_of_host + 1] == '.';
if (is_wildcard_subdomain)
start_of_host += 2;
size_t start_of_port = url.rfind(":", end_of_host);
// The ":" check at the end of the following condition is used to avoid
// treating the last part of an IPv6 address as a port.
if (start_of_port > start_of_host && url[start_of_port - 1] != ':') {
bool is_valid_port = false;
// Do a quick sanity check. The following check could mistakenly flag
// ":123456" or ":****" as valid, but that does not matter because the
// relaxing CSP directive will just be ignored by Blink.
for (size_t i = start_of_port + 1; i < end_of_host; ++i) {
is_valid_port = base::IsAsciiDigit(url[i]) || url[i] == '*';
if (!is_valid_port)
break;
}
if (is_valid_port)
end_of_host = start_of_port;
}
std::string host(url, start_of_host, end_of_host - start_of_host);
// Global wildcards are not allowed.
if (host.empty() || host.find("*") != std::string::npos)
return false;
if (!is_wildcard_subdomain || !should_check_rcd)
return true;
// Allow *.googleapis.com to be whitelisted for backwards-compatibility.
// (crbug.com/409952)
if (host == "googleapis.com")
return true;
// Wildcards on subdomains of a TLD are not allowed.
size_t registry_length = net::registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
host,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
return registry_length != 0;
}
// Checks whether the source is a syntactically valid hash.
bool IsHashSource(const std::string& source) {
size_t hash_end = source.length() - 1;
if (source.empty() || source[hash_end] != '\'') {
return false;
}
for (const char* prefix : kHashSourcePrefixes) {
if (base::StartsWith(source, prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
for (size_t i = strlen(prefix); i < hash_end; ++i) {
const char c = source[i];
// The hash must be base64-encoded. Do not allow any other characters.
if (!base::IsAsciiAlpha(c) && !base::IsAsciiDigit(c) && c != '+' &&
c != '/' && c != '=') {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
InstallWarning CSPInstallWarning(const std::string& csp_warning) {
return InstallWarning(csp_warning, manifest_keys::kContentSecurityPolicy);
}
void GetSecureDirectiveValues(const std::string& directive_name,
base::StringTokenizer* tokenizer,
int options,
std::vector<std::string>* sane_csp_parts,
std::vector<InstallWarning>* warnings) {
sane_csp_parts->push_back(directive_name);
while (tokenizer->GetNext()) {
std::string source_literal = tokenizer->token();
std::string source_lower = base::ToLowerASCII(source_literal);
bool is_secure_csp_token = false;
// We might need to relax this whitelist over time.
if (source_lower == "'self'" || source_lower == "'none'" ||
source_lower == "http://127.0.0.1" || source_lower == "blob:" ||
source_lower == "filesystem:" || source_lower == "http://localhost" ||
base::StartsWith(source_lower, "http://127.0.0.1:",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) ||
base::StartsWith(source_lower, "http://localhost:",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) ||
isNonWildcardTLD(source_lower, "https://", true) ||
isNonWildcardTLD(source_lower, "chrome://", false) ||
isNonWildcardTLD(source_lower,
std::string(extensions::kExtensionScheme) +
url::kStandardSchemeSeparator,
false) ||
IsHashSource(source_literal) ||
base::StartsWith(source_lower, "chrome-extension-resource:",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
is_secure_csp_token = true;
} else if ((options & OPTIONS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_EVAL) &&
source_lower == "'unsafe-eval'") {
is_secure_csp_token = true;
}
if (is_secure_csp_token) {
sane_csp_parts->push_back(source_literal);
} else if (warnings) {
warnings->push_back(CSPInstallWarning(ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
manifest_errors::kInvalidCSPInsecureValue, source_literal,
directive_name)));
}
}
// End of CSP directive that was started at the beginning of this method. If
// none of the values are secure, the policy will be empty and default to
// 'none', which is secure.
sane_csp_parts->back().push_back(';');
}
// Returns true if |directive_name| matches |status.directive_name|.
bool UpdateStatus(const std::string& directive_name,
base::StringTokenizer* tokenizer,
DirectiveStatus* status,
int options,
std::vector<std::string>* sane_csp_parts,
std::vector<InstallWarning>* warnings) {
if (directive_name != status->directive_name)
return false;
if (!status->seen_in_policy) {
status->seen_in_policy = true;
GetSecureDirectiveValues(directive_name, tokenizer, options, sane_csp_parts,
warnings);
} else {
// Don't show any errors for duplicate CSP directives, because it will be
// ignored by the CSP parser (http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#policy-parsing).
GetSecureDirectiveValues(directive_name, tokenizer, options, sane_csp_parts,
NULL);
}
return true;
}
// Returns true if the |plugin_type| is one of the fully sandboxed plugin types.
bool PluginTypeAllowed(const std::string& plugin_type) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kSandboxedPluginTypes); ++i) {
if (plugin_type == kSandboxedPluginTypes[i])
return true;
}
return false;
}
// Returns true if the policy is allowed to contain an insecure object-src
// directive. This requires OPTIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_OBJECT_SRC to be specified
// as an option and the plugin-types that can be loaded must be restricted to
// the set specified in kSandboxedPluginTypes.
bool AllowedToHaveInsecureObjectSrc(
int options,
const std::vector<std::string>& directives) {
if (!(options & OPTIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_OBJECT_SRC))
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input = directives[i];
base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n");
if (!tokenizer.GetNext())
continue;
if (!base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(tokenizer.token(), kPluginTypes))
continue;
while (tokenizer.GetNext()) {
if (!PluginTypeAllowed(tokenizer.token()))
return false;
}
// All listed plugin types are whitelisted.
return true;
}
// plugin-types not specified.
return false;
}
} // namespace
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsLegal(const std::string& policy) {
// We block these characters to prevent HTTP header injection when
// representing the content security policy as an HTTP header.
const char kBadChars[] = {',', '\r', '\n', '\0'};
return policy.find_first_of(kBadChars, 0, arraysize(kBadChars)) ==
std::string::npos;
}
std::string SanitizeContentSecurityPolicy(
const std::string& policy,
int options,
std::vector<InstallWarning>* warnings) {
// See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm.
std::vector<std::string> directives = base::SplitString(
policy, ";", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
DirectiveStatus default_src_status(kDefaultSrc);
DirectiveStatus script_src_status(kScriptSrc);
DirectiveStatus object_src_status(kObjectSrc);
bool allow_insecure_object_src =
AllowedToHaveInsecureObjectSrc(options, directives);
std::vector<std::string> sane_csp_parts;
std::vector<InstallWarning> default_src_csp_warnings;
for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) {
std::string& input = directives[i];
base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n");
if (!tokenizer.GetNext())
continue;
std::string directive_name = base::ToLowerASCII(tokenizer.token_piece());
if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, &tokenizer, &default_src_status, options,
&sane_csp_parts, &default_src_csp_warnings))
continue;
if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, &tokenizer, &script_src_status, options,
&sane_csp_parts, warnings))
continue;
if (!allow_insecure_object_src &&
UpdateStatus(directive_name, &tokenizer, &object_src_status, options,
&sane_csp_parts, warnings))
continue;
// Pass the other CSP directives as-is without further validation.
sane_csp_parts.push_back(input + ";");
}
if (default_src_status.seen_in_policy) {
if (!script_src_status.seen_in_policy ||
!object_src_status.seen_in_policy) {
// Insecure values in default-src are only relevant if either script-src
// or object-src is omitted.
if (warnings)
warnings->insert(warnings->end(),
default_src_csp_warnings.begin(),
default_src_csp_warnings.end());
}
} else {
if (!script_src_status.seen_in_policy) {
sane_csp_parts.push_back(kScriptSrcDefaultDirective);
if (warnings)
warnings->push_back(CSPInstallWarning(ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
manifest_errors::kInvalidCSPMissingSecureSrc, kScriptSrc)));
}
if (!object_src_status.seen_in_policy && !allow_insecure_object_src) {
sane_csp_parts.push_back(kObjectSrcDefaultDirective);
if (warnings)
warnings->push_back(CSPInstallWarning(ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
manifest_errors::kInvalidCSPMissingSecureSrc, kObjectSrc)));
}
}
return base::JoinString(sane_csp_parts, " ");
}
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSandboxed(
const std::string& policy, Manifest::Type type) {
// See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm.
bool seen_sandbox = false;
for (const std::string& input : base::SplitString(
policy, ";", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL)) {
base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n");
if (!tokenizer.GetNext())
continue;
std::string directive_name = base::ToLowerASCII(tokenizer.token_piece());
if (directive_name != kSandboxDirectiveName)
continue;
seen_sandbox = true;
while (tokenizer.GetNext()) {
std::string token = base::ToLowerASCII(tokenizer.token_piece());
// The same origin token negates the sandboxing.
if (token == kAllowSameOriginToken)
return false;
// Platform apps don't allow navigation.
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP) {
if (token == kAllowTopNavigation)
return false;
}
}
}
return seen_sandbox;
}
} // namespace csp_validator
} // namespace extensions