Chrome Vulnerability Reward Program FAQ

What are the differences between the vulnerability categories in the Chrome VRP?

We have several different classifications for security vulnerabilities that are reported to us. More information about each category can be found below:

  • Sandbox escape / Memory corruption in a non-sandboxed process: a bug that allows malicious code to execute in a non-sandboxed process (like the browser process), or to circumvent the protections of the sandbox. (ex:
  • Universal Cross Site Scripting (includes Site Isolation bypass): a flaw allowing an attacker to execute script in the context of any other origin, similar to how Cross Site Scripting can be leveraged against insecure websites. (ex:
  • Renderer RCE / memory corruption in a sandboxed process: a bug that allows malicious code to be executed inside a renderer or other sandboxed process. (ex:
  • Security UI Spoofing: a situation in which an attacker gains an illegitimate advantage on a user interface surface. In Chrome this includes spoofing the displayed URL or creating fake permission prompts outside of the frame containing the site. (ex:
  • User information disclosure: unauthorized access to information that should be inaccessible to an attacker. (ex:
  • Web Platform Privilege Escalation: a bug that allows a site to obtain a permission or capability that was not granted by a user, such as escaping an iframe sandbox or bypassing cross-origin checks.
  • Exploitation Mitigation Bypass: a bug which makes exploitation easier, such as an out of bounds read in a sandboxed process, or which bypasses security checks in Chrome. (ex:,

User information disclosure, web platform privilege escalation and exploitation mitigation bypasses exist on a continuum based on how harmful they are to users.

What about rewards for Site Isolation?

Site Isolation vulnerabilities are no longer receiving special rewards and will be categorized and rewarded as Universal Cross-site Scripting vulnerabilities.

Site Isolation makes it possible for sites (i.e., combination of scheme and eTLD+1) to run in dedicated renderer processes. This can mitigate speculative side channel attacks as well as attacks from compromised renderer processes. Site Isolation is enabled for all sites on desktop platforms. On Android, Site Isolation is enabled for sites where users enter passwords, but it does not yet mitigate compromised renderers.

In scope:

  • Bugs that cause two or more cross-site documents from the web to commit in the same process. i.e. force pre-Site Isolation behaviour.
  • Bugs that cause cross-site data disclosure, even if the bug assumes a compromised renderer. Examples of data protected by Site Isolation: cookies, saved passwords, localStorage, IndexedDB, HTTP resources covered by CORB or CORP.

Out of scope and known issues:

  • Site Isolation on Android is not enabled for all sites or devices. Reports should work when Site Isolation is enabled for the victim site (e.g., when the victim site is specified in chrome://flags/#isolate-origins).
  • Compromised renderers are currently out of scope for Site Isolation on Android reports.
  • Sandboxed frames and data: URLs are currently treated as the same site as their creator.
  • CORB is not enforced for the Flash plugin, which is disabled by default and will be removed. CORB is also not enforced for a small set of allowlisted extensions, until these extensions have a chance to update to the new security model.
  • Compromised renderers can still spoof other sites (e.g., spoof Origin headers or Sec-Fetch-Site headers).
  • Timing attacks and cross-site-search attacks are out of scope and may need to be mitigated by robust server-side CSRF protection.
  • Problems in websites (e.g. missing CORB protection because of incorrect Content-Type header) or extensions (e.g., privilege escalation via messages from a compromised content script) are out of scope of the Chrome VRP, but may be covered by a separate website-specific or extension-specific VRP.

Examples of in-scope Site Isolation issues: