| // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "net/cert/ct_policy_enforcer.h" |
| |
| #include <string> |
| |
| #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" |
| #include "base/time/time.h" |
| #include "base/version.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha2.h" |
| #include "net/base/test_data_directory.h" |
| #include "net/cert/ct_ev_whitelist.h" |
| #include "net/cert/ct_verify_result.h" |
| #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" |
| #include "net/test/cert_test_util.h" |
| #include "net/test/ct_test_util.h" |
| #include "testing/gmock/include/gmock/gmock.h" |
| #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" |
| |
| namespace net { |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| class DummyEVCertsWhitelist : public ct::EVCertsWhitelist { |
| public: |
| DummyEVCertsWhitelist(bool is_valid_response, bool contains_hash_response) |
| : canned_is_valid_(is_valid_response), |
| canned_contains_response_(contains_hash_response) {} |
| |
| bool IsValid() const override { return canned_is_valid_; } |
| |
| bool ContainsCertificateHash( |
| const std::string& certificate_hash) const override { |
| return canned_contains_response_; |
| } |
| |
| base::Version Version() const override { return base::Version(); } |
| |
| protected: |
| ~DummyEVCertsWhitelist() override {} |
| |
| private: |
| bool canned_is_valid_; |
| bool canned_contains_response_; |
| }; |
| |
| const char kGoogleAviatorLogID[] = |
| "\x68\xf6\x98\xf8\x1f\x64\x82\xbe\x3a\x8c\xee\xb9\x28\x1d\x4c\xfc\x71\x51" |
| "\x5d\x67\x93\xd4\x44\xd1\x0a\x67\xac\xbb\x4f\x4f\xfb\xc4"; |
| static_assert(arraysize(kGoogleAviatorLogID) - 1 == crypto::kSHA256Length, |
| "Incorrect log ID length."); |
| |
| class CTPolicyEnforcerTest : public ::testing::Test { |
| public: |
| void SetUp() override { |
| policy_enforcer_.reset(new CTPolicyEnforcer); |
| |
| std::string der_test_cert(ct::GetDerEncodedX509Cert()); |
| chain_ = X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(der_test_cert.data(), |
| der_test_cert.size()); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(chain_.get()); |
| google_log_id_ = std::string(kGoogleAviatorLogID, crypto::kSHA256Length); |
| non_google_log_id_.assign(crypto::kSHA256Length, 'A'); |
| } |
| |
| void FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin( |
| ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin desired_origin, |
| size_t num_scts, |
| const std::vector<std::string>& desired_log_keys, |
| bool timestamp_past_enforcement_date, |
| ct::CTVerifyResult* result) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_scts; ++i) { |
| scoped_refptr<ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp> sct( |
| new ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp()); |
| sct->origin = desired_origin; |
| if (i < desired_log_keys.size()) |
| sct->log_id = desired_log_keys[i]; |
| else |
| sct->log_id = non_google_log_id_; |
| |
| if (timestamp_past_enforcement_date) |
| sct->timestamp = |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 8, 0, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0}); |
| else |
| sct->timestamp = |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 6, 0, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0}); |
| |
| result->verified_scts.push_back(sct); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin( |
| ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin desired_origin, |
| size_t num_scts, |
| ct::CTVerifyResult* result) { |
| std::vector<std::string> desired_log_ids; |
| desired_log_ids.push_back(google_log_id_); |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(desired_origin, num_scts, desired_log_ids, true, |
| result); |
| } |
| |
| void FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(const std::string& desired_id, |
| size_t num_scts, |
| bool timestamp_past_enforcement_date, |
| ct::CTVerifyResult* result) { |
| std::vector<std::string> desired_log_ids(num_scts, desired_id); |
| |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin( |
| ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, num_scts, |
| desired_log_ids, timestamp_past_enforcement_date, result); |
| } |
| |
| void CheckCertificateCompliesWithExactNumberOfEmbeddedSCTs( |
| const base::Time& start, |
| const base::Time& end, |
| size_t required_scts) { |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert( |
| new X509Certificate("subject", "issuer", start, end)); |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < required_scts - 1; ++i) { |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, |
| 1, std::vector<std::string>(), false, &result); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| cert.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog())) |
| << " for: " << (end - start).InDays() << " and " << required_scts |
| << " scts=" << result.verified_scts.size() << " i=" << i; |
| } |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1, |
| std::vector<std::string>(), false, &result); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| cert.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog())) |
| << " for: " << (end - start).InDays() << " and " << required_scts |
| << " scts=" << result.verified_scts.size(); |
| } |
| |
| protected: |
| scoped_ptr<CTPolicyEnforcer> policy_enforcer_; |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain_; |
| std::string google_log_id_; |
| std::string non_google_log_id_; |
| }; |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, |
| DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughDiverseSCTsAllGoogle) { |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(google_log_id_, 2, true, &result); |
| |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, |
| DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughDiverseSCTsAllNonGoogle) { |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(non_google_log_id_, 2, true, &result); |
| |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyIfSCTBeforeEnforcementDate) { |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(non_google_log_id_, 2, false, &result); |
| |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), nullptr, |
| result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyWithNonEmbeddedSCTs) { |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin( |
| ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, 2, &result); |
| |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), nullptr, |
| result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyWithEmbeddedSCTs) { |
| // This chain_ is valid for 10 years - over 121 months - so requires 5 SCTs. |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 5, |
| &result); |
| |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), nullptr, |
| result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughSCTs) { |
| scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> non_including_whitelist( |
| new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, false)); |
| // This chain_ is valid for 10 years - over 121 months - so requires 5 SCTs. |
| // However, as there are only two logs, two SCTs will be required - supply one |
| // to guarantee the test fails. |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1, |
| &result); |
| |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), non_including_whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog())); |
| |
| // ... but should be OK if whitelisted. |
| scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist( |
| new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, true)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotConformToPolicyInvalidDates) { |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> no_valid_dates_cert(new X509Certificate( |
| "subject", "issuer", base::Time(), base::Time::Now())); |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 5, |
| &result); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| no_valid_dates_cert.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog())); |
| // ... but should be OK if whitelisted. |
| scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist( |
| new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, true)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, |
| ConformsToPolicyExactNumberOfSCTsForValidityPeriod) { |
| // Test multiple validity periods |
| const struct TestData { |
| base::Time validity_start; |
| base::Time validity_end; |
| size_t scts_required; |
| } kTestData[] = {{// Cert valid for 14 months, needs 2 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2016, 6, 0, 6, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 2}, |
| {// Cert valid for exactly 15 months, needs 3 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2016, 6, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 3}, |
| {// Cert valid for over 15 months, needs 3 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2016, 6, 0, 27, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 3}, |
| {// Cert valid for exactly 27 months, needs 3 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2017, 6, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 3}, |
| {// Cert valid for over 27 months, needs 4 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2017, 6, 0, 28, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 4}, |
| {// Cert valid for exactly 39 months, needs 4 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2018, 6, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 4}, |
| {// Cert valid for over 39 months, needs 5 SCTs. |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 3, 0, 25, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2018, 6, 0, 27, 11, 25, 0, 0}), |
| 5}}; |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kTestData); ++i) { |
| SCOPED_TRACE(i); |
| CheckCertificateCompliesWithExactNumberOfEmbeddedSCTs( |
| kTestData[i].validity_start, kTestData[i].validity_end, |
| kTestData[i].scts_required); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToPolicyByEVWhitelistPresence) { |
| scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist( |
| new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, true)); |
| |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1, |
| &result); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, IgnoresInvalidEVWhitelist) { |
| scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist( |
| new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(false, true)); |
| |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1, |
| &result); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, IgnoresNullEVWhitelist) { |
| ct::CTVerifyResult result; |
| FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1, |
| &result); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
| chain_.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog())); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| } // namespace net |
