Chrome OS security review HOWTO

The security review process

Chrome OS development is structured around six-week cycles called milestones. Every six weeks a new release branch is created, based off our main development branch (also known as trunk or tip-of-tree). Accordingly, a new milestone is pushed to Chrome OS devices every six weeks. It takes seven to eight weeks from the time a branch is cut to the time a new software image built from that branch is pushed to devices on the stable channel.

A feature targeting a given milestone will be reviewed during that milestone's development cycle, or shortly after the branch is cut. The Chrome OS security team tracks features by looking at Launch bugs filed in, which are also mirrored in As long as the feature has an associated launch bug, the security team will track it. The new launch bug template allows feature owners to initiate a security review by flipping the Launch-Security flag to Review-Requested. The security team tracks this flag as well.

In order to streamline the process as much as possible, make sure that the launch bug links to a design doc that includes a section covering the security implications of the feature. The rest of this document describes what questions such a “Security implications” section should answer and what concerns it should address.

Launch bugs include a set of cross-functional review flags, which includes the Launch-Security flag mentioned above. The security team will flip this flag to Yes after the feature owner has successfully engaged the security team to understand (and address or mitigate) the security implications of the feature. Don't think of the security review process as an arbitrary bar set by the security team that you have to pass no matter what. Instead, think of it as the process by which you take ownership of the security implications of the feature, so that you are shipping something that doesn't detract from the overall security posture of the product.

Even if you consider that the feature is trivial, or has no security implications, please refrain from flipping the security flag in the launch bug to NA or Yes yourself. In most cases, features are not as trivial as they initially appear. More importantly, the security team uses these flags to track features and work on our side. We will flip the security flag to Yes when the feature is ready.

If the feature is big or complex, or if you find yourself implementing something that needs to go against the recommendations in this document, please reach out to the security team as soon as possible. Send email to, and try to include a design doc, even if it's just an early draft. When in doubt, just reach out. We are always happy to discuss feature design.

The Chrome OS security team will normally not look at the implementation details of a feature -- there is just not enough time to read through thousands of lines of code each milestone. Instead, we prefer to focus on ensuring that the design of the feature is contributing to, rather than detracting from, the overall security posture of the system. The reason for this is two-fold: first, the time constraints mentioned before. Second is the fact that even with careful review bugs will likely slip through, and a sound, defensive design will ensure that these bugs don't end up being catastrophic. For particularly risky code we can always contract out a security audit.

The expectation is that the feature will be security-complete (e.g. the new system service will be fully sandboxed) by the time the branch is cut. Merging CLs that implement security features to release branches is risky, so we avoid it.

If the feature is enabled by default, the security flag in the launch bug tracking the feature must be flipped before the milestone containing the feature is promoted to the beta channel. This means that all the relevant information (e.g. a design doc with a “Security considerations” section) must be available before the milestone reaches the beta channel. Ideally, however, the design doc will be finalized before the branch point.

If the feature is kept behind a flag, the security bit in the launch bug must be flipped before the flag is enabled by default. This means that the feature must be security-complete by the time the flag is enabled by default. Even in this case we strongly recommend tackling security work earlier rather than later. It‘s normally not possible to address security concerns in a feature that’s complete without requiring costly refactoring or rearchitecting.

In general, a feature that properly addresses the questions and recommendations in this document can expect to have its security flag flipped by branch point.

Life of a security review

Chrome OS security team members will use the following process when handling a feature launch bug for the upcoming milestone:

  1. Look at the launch bug. Is the Launch-Security flag set to Review-Requested? If not, the feature might not be ready for review. Feel free to point out in the launch bug that a design doc with a “Security considerations” section filled out will speed up the review process.
  2. If the Launch-Security flag is set to Review-Requested, check for a design doc. If there isn't one, ask for one. Flip the Launch-Security flag to Needs-Info. The feature owner should flip the flag back to Review-Requested when the design doc is ready for review.
  3. If the design doc doesn't have a Security Considerations section, ask for one. Offer a link to the review framework as a guide for how to write that section. Flip the Launch-Security flag to Needs-Info. The feature owner should flip the flag back to Review-Requested when the design doc is ready for re-review.
  4. Use the review framework to evaluate if the feature is respecting security boundaries, handles sensitive data appropriately, etc. It's often also a good idea to consider existing features, in particular their security design and trade-off decisions made in previous reviews.
  5. If any security-relevant aspects are unclear or if there are concerns, communicate this back to the feature owner via design doc comments and comment on the launch bug to clarify the security review status. Flip the Launch-Security flag back to Needs-Info.
  6. Surface controversial design/implementation choices or aspects you're unsure about in the weekly Chrome OS security team meeting. Rely on the rest of the team to suggest useful alternative angles and to provide historic context and high-level guidance on Chrome OS security philosophy.
  7. If necessary, iterate with the feature owner to resolve any questions or concerns. Use whatever means of communication seems most appropriate to make progress. For simple questions, document comments or email threads will work. For in-depth discussion of product requirements, design choices, and implications on security assessment, it‘s usually better to ask for a meeting. Note that it is generally the responsibility of the feature owner to drive the review process to a conclusion. However, the security reviewer should strive for clear communication on what remains to be addressed at any point in the process. As you have probably realized by now, the Launch-Security flag gets flipped between Needs-Info and Review-Requested as the review progresses, always keeping track of who’s responsible for the next action.
  8. We‘re aiming to acknowledge a Review-Requested flag within seven days. This doesn’t mean the review needs to be completed in seven days. Review-Requested means “the feature team has done everything they thought they had to, and now they need input from the security team”. It doesn‘t mean “we solemnly swear the feature is 100% complete”. Therefore, what we’re aiming to do within seven days is to unblock the feature team by letting them know what the next step is. As explained in this list, the next step could be more documentation, or an updated or more robust implementation. In any of those cases, or if the feature is not really ready for review, flip the review flag to Needs-Info and explain what's missing.
  9. Once everything looks good, flip the review flag to Launch-Security-Yes. Document conclusions and aspects that were specifically evaluated in the security review in a bug comment. You can use the review framework to structure this. The information in the comment is useful for future reference when consulting previous security review decisions for guidance. Also, in case aspects of a feature are later found to cause security issues, it's useful to understand whether these aspects surfaced in the security review and the reasoning behind review conclusions. Note that the purpose is not to blame reviewers in case they have missed problems, but to help our future selves understand how we can improve the process as needed (for example by adding specific items to watch out for to the review framework).
  10. In case the review reaches an impasse, don‘t just mark Launch-Security-No as we’re committed to engage productively as much as we can. Instead, surface the current state of things and bring in relevant leads to figure out a way forward.

Review framework - things to look at

Security boundaries

Does the feature poke holes in existing security boundaries? This is not a good idea. Existing boundaries include:

  • Chrome renderer process to Chrome browser process: this boundary is traversed only with Chrome IPC or Mojo. It should not be trivial for a Chrome renderer process to directly manipulate or control the Chrome browser process. For browser-specific guidelines, check out How To Do Chrome Security Reviews.
  • Chrome browser process (running as user chronos) to system services: this boundary is traversed with D-Bus. It should not be possible for the Chrome browser process to directly manipulate a system service or directly access system resources (e.g. firewall rules or USB devices).
  • ARC++ container to Chrome browser or Chrome OS system: this boundary is traversed with Mojo IPC. It should not be possible for the container to directly manipulate resources outside of the container. Trust decisions should always be made outside of the container.
  • Userspace processes to kernel: this boundary is traversed by system calls. It should not be possible for userspace to gain untrusted kernel code execution (this includes loading untrusted kernel modules). Seccomp (see the sandboxing guide for details) should be used to secure this boundary.
  • Kernel to firmware: it should not be possible for a kernel compromise to result in persistent, undetectable firwmare manipulation. This is enforced by Verified boot.

Are security boundaries still robust after the feature has been implemented? For example, a feature might be in theory respecting a boundary by implementing IPC, but if the IPC interface is designed so that the higher-privilege side implicitly trusts and blindly carries out what the lower-privileged side requests, then the security boundary has been weakened.

Does the feature require adding new boundaries? For example, ARC++ was a feature that required adding a new security boundary: the ARC++ container. A new security boundary, while sometimes necessary to restrict what untrusted code can do, also adds a layer that will need to be enforced and maintained going forward.


  • Implement the principle of least privilege: give code only the permissions it needs to do its job, and nothing else. E.g. if code doesn‘t need to be root, it shouldn’t run as root. If it doesn‘t need to access the network, it shouldn’t have access to the network.
  • See the sandboxing guide for more details.

Untrusted input

  • Prefer robust parsers, e.g. protobuf. Avoid implementing your own serialization and deserialization routines: buggy (de)serialization code is routinely the source of security bugs. These bugs are dangerous because they can occur on the trusted side of an IPC boundary, allowing a less privileged process to possibly get code execution in a more privileged process. If you absolutely must write custom code, the requirement for new serialization code is for the code to be thoroughly fuzzed (see the fuzzing documentation) or written in a memory-safe language like Rust.
  • Don't reimplement IPC using pipes or sockets, use Mojo or D-Bus. The concern is the same as in the previous case: hand-written IPC is brittle, and bugs in IPC mechanisms could allow a less privileged process to subvert the execution of a more privileged process, which is the definition of a privilege escalation bug. Refer to the Mojo IPC security guidelines for more details.
  • Any code handling non-trivial untrusted data must be fuzzed to ensure its robustness. See our fuzzing documentation for more information.

Sensitive data

  • Does the feature handle sensitive user data? Maintain Chrome OS‘s guarantee: user data is never exposed at rest (i.e. when the user is not logged in or when the device is off), and different users on the same device cannot access each other’s data.
  • User data stored by the Chrome browser in the user‘s home directory is protected by Chrome OS’s user data encryption. If the feature accesses this data from outside a Chrome session (e.g. not running as the chronos) user, how is it making sure that the data will not be saved to disk unencrypted?
  • Does the feature expose existing sensitive data to less privileged contexts? This is dangerous, and should be avoided. If necessary, consider filtering the data that is made available, allowing only reading the minimum amount of data required, disallowing modifications, and take care to not allow cross-user modification of user data.

Attack surface

  • What can an attacker gain by triggering the code added for the feature? For example, new code might be calling a previously unused system call with parameters received directly from another process over IPC. If that other process is compromised, and the new code doesn't validate these parameters, the feature just added that system call as attack surface exposed to all processes that can access the IPC endpoint.
  • Are new libraries being used? If so, how confident are we about the quality of the code in the library? Do the upstream maintainers patch security bugs? Will the team adding the feature be responsible for updating the library when security bugs get discovered? Library code is subject to the same (or arguably more) scrutiny than code written by Chrome OS engineers: is it robust against malformed or malicious input? Can it be fuzzed?
  • Is the code accessible to remote attackers? Is it exposed directly over the network? If so, consider whether this is really necessary, and whether it can be mitigated with firewall rules or other restrictions.

Implementation robustness

  • Does the code use threads? Are you confident there are no race conditions? Consider using the most straightforward threading or multi-process constructs you can (like libbrillo's BaseMessageLoop).
  • Does the code implement a state machine or a protocol? Will an attacker sending packets in the wrong order break things? Write the code in a defensive way, to be robust in the face of malicious input and to fail closed, this is, to fail by denying access or by refusing to carry out a request, instead of the opposite.
  • Are there other assumptions prone to accidentally breaking in the future? This can include assuming an IPC is only ever called with certain parameters, or assuming a certain process is always present on the system, or that the state on disk for a file or a directory is always the same. If so, add a test to enforce the assumption, and revisit your code to be robust in the event of a broken expectation.


  • If the feature is using cryptography for integrity, confidentiality, or authentication, reach out to the security team. You can always find us at We can put you in contact with crypto experts to make sure that your use of cryptography is correct.
  • There should be no need for features to roll their own crypto. Use well-established cryptographic libraries like BoringSSL or OpenSSL.
  • Prefer to use high-level primitives. E.g. don't take an AES-CBC implementation and add your own padding, use a high-level primitive that simply encrypts and decrypts data provided a key.
  • If you're using keys, what is the key management story? Where are keys kept? Do they need to be hardware-protected?
  • Should key management tie in with our signing infrastructure? This is important if the keys are being used to sign code or other artifacts.
  • Do we know how to rotate keys in case there's a compromise? If the feature is using cryptographic keys extensively, you must write a key rotation doc as part of the feature.
  • For a quick primer on cryptography best practices, check out this newer list of cryptographic right answers, as well as this older reference of cryptographic right answers; but remember to reach out to the security team to validate your design.