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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<glsa id="200504-20">
<title>openMosixview: Insecure temporary file creation</title>
openMosixview and the openMosixcollector daemon are vulnerable to symlink
attacks, potentially allowing a local user to overwrite arbitrary files.
<product type="ebuild">openMosixview</product>
<announced>April 21, 2005</announced>
<revised>April 21, 2005: 01</revised>
<package name="sys-cluster/openmosixview" auto="yes" arch="*">
<unaffected range="ge">1.5-r1</unaffected>
<vulnerable range="lt">1.5-r1</vulnerable>
The openMosixview package contains several tools used to manage
openMosix clusters, including openMosixview (the main monitoring and
administration application) and openMosixcollector (a daemon collecting
cluster and node information).
Gangstuck and Psirac from Rexotec discovered that openMosixview
insecurely creates several temporary files with predictable filenames.
<impact type="normal">
A local attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary
files directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem.
When openMosixView or the openMosixcollector daemon runs, this would
result in the file being overwritten with the rights of the user
running the utility, which could be the root user.
There is no known workaround at this time.
All openMosixview users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose &quot;&gt;=sys-cluster/openmosixview-1.5-r1&quot;</code>
<uri link="">CAN-2005-0894</uri>
<metadata tag="submitter" timestamp="Wed, 20 Apr 2005 11:45:51 +0000">
<metadata tag="bugReady" timestamp="Wed, 20 Apr 2005 11:46:46 +0000">