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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<glsa id="200711-32">
<title>Feynmf: Insecure temporary file creation</title>
A vulnerability has been discovered in Feynmf allowing local users to
overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack.
<product type="ebuild">feynmf</product>
<announced>November 20, 2007</announced>
<revised>November 20, 2007: 01</revised>
<package name="dev-tex/feynmf" auto="yes" arch="*">
<unaffected range="ge">1.08-r2</unaffected>
<vulnerable range="lt">1.08-r2</vulnerable>
Feynmf is a combined LaTeX and Metafont package for easy drawing of
professional quality Feynman (and maybe other) diagrams.
Kevin B. McCarty discovered that the script creates a
temporary "properly list" file at the location "$TMPDIR/feynmf$",
where $PID is the process ID.
<impact type="normal">
A local attacker could create symbolic links in the directory where the
temporary files are written, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the
filesystem that is writable by the user running Feynmf. When Feynmf
writes the temporary file, the target valid file would then be
overwritten with the contents of the Feynmf temporary file.
There is no known workaround at this time.
All Feynmf users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose &quot;&gt;=dev-tex/feynmf-1.08-r2&quot;</code>
<uri link="">CVE-2007-5940</uri>
<metadata tag="requester" timestamp="Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:43:28 +0000">
<metadata tag="bugReady" timestamp="Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:44:51 +0000">
<metadata tag="submitter" timestamp="Tue, 20 Nov 2007 00:07:40 +0000">