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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<glsa id="200804-11">
<title>policyd-weight: Insecure temporary file creation</title>
policyd-weight uses temporary files in an insecure manner, allowing for a
symlink attack.
<product type="ebuild">policyd-weight</product>
<announced>April 11, 2008</announced>
<revised>April 11, 2008: 01</revised>
<package name="mail-filter/policyd-weight" auto="yes" arch="*">
<unaffected range="ge"></unaffected>
<vulnerable range="lt"></vulnerable>
policyd-weight is a Perl policy daemon for the Postfix MTA intended to
eliminate forged envelope senders and HELOs.
Chris Howells reported that policyd-weight creates and uses the
"/tmp/.policyd-weight/" directory in an insecure manner.
<impact type="normal">
A local attacker could exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary
files or change the ownership to the "polw" user via symlink attacks.
Set "<i>$LOCKPATH = '/var/run/policyd-weight/'</i>" manually in
All policyd-weight users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose &quot;&gt;=mail-filter/policyd-weight-;</code>
This version changes the default path for sockets to
"/var/run/policyd-weight", which is only writable by a privileged user.
Users need to restart policyd-weight immediately after the upgrade due
to this change.
<uri link="">CVE-2008-1569</uri>
<metadata tag="requester" timestamp="Sat, 29 Mar 2008 20:06:42 +0000">
<metadata tag="submitter" timestamp="Mon, 07 Apr 2008 07:47:13 +0000">
<metadata tag="bugReady" timestamp="Mon, 07 Apr 2008 07:47:40 +0000">