blob: ff4d77a033963c4f17cb6b905e9d4707177f3564 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "cryptohome/service.h"
#if USE_TPM2
#include "cryptohome/bootlockbox/boot_lockbox_client.h"
#include "cryptohome/service_distributed.h"
#endif // USE_TPM2
#include "cryptohome/service_monolithic.h"
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <map>
#include <memory>
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
#include <base/bind.h>
#include <base/callback.h>
#include <base/command_line.h>
#include <base/json/json_writer.h>
#include <base/logging.h>
#include <base/strings/string_number_conversions.h>
#include <base/strings/string_util.h>
#include <base/strings/stringprintf.h>
#include <base/strings/sys_string_conversions.h>
#include <base/time/time.h>
#include <base/values.h>
#include <brillo/cryptohome.h>
#include <brillo/glib/dbus.h>
#include <brillo/secure_blob.h>
#include <chaps/isolate.h>
#include <chaps/token_manager_client.h>
#include "cryptohome/bootlockbox/boot_attributes.h"
#include "cryptohome/bootlockbox/boot_lockbox.h"
#include "cryptohome/crypto.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptohome_event_source.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptohome_metrics.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptolib.h"
#include "cryptohome/dbus_transition.h"
#include "cryptohome/firmware_management_parameters.h"
#include "cryptohome/glib_transition.h"
#include "cryptohome/install_attributes.h"
#include "cryptohome/interface.h"
#include "cryptohome/mount.h"
#include "cryptohome/obfuscated_username.h"
#include "cryptohome/platform.h"
#include "cryptohome/stateful_recovery.h"
#include "cryptohome/tpm.h"
#include "cryptohome/username_passkey.h"
#include "key.pb.h" // NOLINT(build/include)
#include "rpc.pb.h" // NOLINT(build/include)
#include "vault_keyset.pb.h" // NOLINT(build/include)
using base::FilePath;
using brillo::SecureBlob;
// Forcibly namespace the dbus-bindings generated server bindings instead of
// modifying the files afterward.
namespace cryptohome {
namespace gobject {
#include "bindings/cryptohome.dbusserver.h" // NOLINT(build/include_alpha)
} // namespace gobject
} // namespace cryptohome
namespace cryptohome {
namespace {
const std::string& GetAccountId(const AccountIdentifier& id) {
if (id.has_account_id()) {
return id.account_id();
}
return id.email();
}
bool KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(const Key& k) {
for (const KeyAuthorizationData& auth_data : k.data().authorization_data()) {
for (const KeyAuthorizationSecret& secret : auth_data.secrets()) {
// If wrapping becomes richer in the future, this may change.
if (secret.wrapped())
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void AddTaskObserverToThread(base::Thread* thread,
base::MessageLoop::TaskObserver* task_observer) {
// Since MessageLoop::AddTaskObserver need to be executed in the same thread
// of that message loop. So we need to wrap it and post as a task.
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner =
thread->task_runner();
if (task_runner == nullptr) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": The thread doesn't have task runner.";
return;
}
task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
[](base::MessageLoop::TaskObserver* task_observer) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->AddTaskObserver(task_observer);
},
base::Unretained(task_observer)));
}
} // anonymous namespace
const char kPublicMountSaltFilePath[] = "/var/lib/public_mount_salt";
const char kChapsSystemToken[] = "/var/lib/chaps";
const int kAutoCleanupPeriodMS = 1000 * 60 * 60; // 1 hour
const int kUpdateUserActivityPeriodHours = 24; // daily
const int kLowDiskNotificationPeriodMS = 1000 * 60 * 1; // 1 minute
const int kUploadAlertsPeriodMS = 1000 * 60 * 60 * 6; // 6 hours
const int64_t kNotifyDiskSpaceThreshold = 1 << 30; // 1GB
const int kDefaultRandomSeedLength = 64;
const char kMountThreadName[] = "MountThread";
const char kTpmInitStatusEventType[] = "TpmInitStatus";
const char kDircryptoMigrationProgressEventType[] =
"DircryptoMigrationProgress";
// The default entropy source to seed with random data from the TPM on startup.
const FilePath kDefaultEntropySource("/dev/urandom");
#if USE_TPM2
const bool kUseInternalAttestationModeByDefault = false;
const char kAttestationMode[] = "attestation_mode";
#endif
const char kAutoInitializeTpmSwitch[] = "auto_initialize_tpm";
const char kHome[] = "/home";
class TpmInitStatus : public CryptohomeEventBase {
public:
TpmInitStatus(bool took_ownership, bool status)
: took_ownership_(took_ownership), status_(status) {}
~TpmInitStatus() override = default;
const char* GetEventName() const override {
return kTpmInitStatusEventType;
}
bool get_took_ownership() {
return took_ownership_;
}
bool get_status() {
return status_;
}
private:
bool took_ownership_;
bool status_;
};
class DircryptoMigrationProgress : public CryptohomeEventBase {
public:
DircryptoMigrationProgress(DircryptoMigrationStatus status,
uint64_t current_bytes,
uint64_t total_bytes)
: status_(status),
current_bytes_(current_bytes),
total_bytes_(total_bytes) { }
~DircryptoMigrationProgress() override = default;
const char* GetEventName() const override {
return kDircryptoMigrationProgressEventType;
}
DircryptoMigrationStatus status() const { return status_; }
uint64_t current_bytes() const { return current_bytes_; }
uint64_t total_bytes() const { return total_bytes_; }
private:
DircryptoMigrationStatus status_;
uint64_t current_bytes_;
uint64_t total_bytes_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(DircryptoMigrationProgress);
};
void MountThreadObserver::PostTask() {
parallel_task_count_ += 1;
}
void MountThreadObserver::WillProcessTask(
const base::PendingTask& pending_task) {
// Task name will be equal to the task handler name
std::string task_name = pending_task.posted_from.function_name();
ReportAsyncDbusRequestInqueueTime(
task_name,
tracked_objects::TrackedTime::Now() - pending_task.time_posted);
}
void MountThreadObserver::DidProcessTask(
const base::PendingTask& pending_task) {
parallel_task_count_ -= 1;
}
int MountThreadObserver::GetParallelTaskCount() const {
return parallel_task_count_;
}
Service::Service()
: use_tpm_(true),
loop_(NULL),
cryptohome_(NULL),
system_salt_(),
default_platform_(new Platform()),
platform_(default_platform_.get()),
default_crypto_(new Crypto(platform_)),
crypto_(default_crypto_.get()),
tpm_(nullptr),
tpm_init_(nullptr),
default_pkcs11_init_(new Pkcs11Init()),
pkcs11_init_(default_pkcs11_init_.get()),
initialize_tpm_(true),
mount_thread_(kMountThreadName),
async_complete_signal_(-1),
async_data_complete_signal_(-1),
tpm_init_signal_(-1),
low_disk_space_signal_(-1),
dircrypto_migration_progress_signal_(-1),
low_disk_space_signal_was_emitted_(false),
event_source_(),
event_source_sink_(this),
default_install_attrs_(new cryptohome::InstallAttributes(NULL)),
install_attrs_(default_install_attrs_.get()),
reported_pkcs11_init_fail_(false),
enterprise_owned_(false),
user_timestamp_cache_(new UserOldestActivityTimestampCache()),
default_mount_factory_(new cryptohome::MountFactory()),
mount_factory_(default_mount_factory_.get()),
default_homedirs_(new cryptohome::HomeDirs()),
homedirs_(default_homedirs_.get()),
default_arc_disk_quota_(new cryptohome::ArcDiskQuota(
homedirs_, platform_, base::FilePath(kHome))),
arc_disk_quota_(default_arc_disk_quota_.get()),
guest_user_(brillo::cryptohome::home::kGuestUserName),
force_ecryptfs_(true),
legacy_mount_(true),
public_mount_salt_(),
default_chaps_client_(new chaps::TokenManagerClient()),
chaps_client_(default_chaps_client_.get()),
boot_lockbox_(nullptr),
boot_attributes_(nullptr),
firmware_management_parameters_(nullptr),
low_disk_notification_period_ms_(kLowDiskNotificationPeriodMS),
upload_alerts_period_ms_(kUploadAlertsPeriodMS) {}
Service::~Service() {
mount_thread_.Stop();
if (loop_) {
g_main_loop_unref(loop_);
}
if (cryptohome_) {
g_object_unref(cryptohome_);
}
}
void Service::StopTasks() {
LOG(INFO) << "Stopping cryptohome task processing.";
if (loop_) {
g_main_loop_quit(loop_);
}
// It is safe to call Stop() multiple times
mount_thread_.Stop();
}
Service* Service::CreateDefault(const std::string& abe_data) {
#if USE_TPM2
bool use_monolithic = kUseInternalAttestationModeByDefault;
base::CommandLine* cmd_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(kAttestationMode)) {
std::string name = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(kAttestationMode);
if (name == "internal")
use_monolithic = true;
else if (name == "dbus")
use_monolithic = false;
}
if (use_monolithic)
return new ServiceMonolithic(abe_data);
else
return new ServiceDistributed();
#else
return new ServiceMonolithic(abe_data);
#endif
}
static bool PrefixPresent(const std::vector<FilePath>& prefixes,
const std::string path) {
for (const auto& prefix : prefixes)
if (base::StartsWith(path, prefix.value(),
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII))
return true;
return false;
}
bool Service::UnloadPkcs11Tokens(const std::vector<FilePath>& exclude) {
SecureBlob isolate =
chaps::IsolateCredentialManager::GetDefaultIsolateCredential();
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
if (!chaps_client_->GetTokenList(isolate, &tokens))
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tokens.size(); ++i) {
if (tokens[i] != kChapsSystemToken && !PrefixPresent(exclude, tokens[i])) {
LOG(INFO) << "Cleaning up PKCS #11 token: " << tokens[i];
chaps_client_->UnloadToken(isolate, FilePath(tokens[i]));
}
}
return true;
}
CryptohomeErrorCode Service::MountErrorToCryptohomeError(
const MountError code) const {
switch (code) {
case MOUNT_ERROR_FATAL:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
case MOUNT_ERROR_KEY_FAILURE:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED;
case MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY;
case MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR;
case MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_DEFEND_LOCK:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_DEFEND_LOCK;
case MOUNT_ERROR_USER_DOES_NOT_EXIST:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
case MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_NEEDS_REBOOT:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_NEEDS_REBOOT;
case MOUNT_ERROR_OLD_ENCRYPTION:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_OLD_ENCRYPTION;
case MOUNT_ERROR_PREVIOUS_MIGRATION_INCOMPLETE:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_PREVIOUS_MIGRATION_INCOMPLETE;
case MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED:
default:
return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
}
void Service::PostTask(const tracked_objects::Location& from_here,
base::OnceClosure task) {
int task_count = mount_thread_observer_.GetParallelTaskCount();
if (task_count > 1) {
ReportParallelTasks(task_count);
}
mount_thread_observer_.PostTask();
mount_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(from_here, std::move(task));
}
void Service::SendReply(DBusGMethodInvocation* context,
const BaseReply& reply) {
// DBusBlobReply will take ownership of the |reply_str|.
std::unique_ptr<std::string> reply_str(new std::string);
reply.SerializeToString(reply_str.get());
event_source_.AddEvent(
std::make_unique<DBusBlobReply>(context, reply_str.release()));
}
void Service::SendDBusErrorReply(DBusGMethodInvocation* context,
GQuark domain,
gint code,
const gchar* message) {
GError* error = g_error_new_literal(domain, code, message);
event_source_.AddEvent(std::make_unique<DBusErrorReply>(context, error));
}
bool Service::FilterActiveMounts(
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath>* mounts,
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath>* active_mounts,
bool force) {
bool skipped = false;
for (auto match = mounts->begin(); match != mounts->end(); ) {
auto curr = match;
bool keep = false;
// Walk each set of sources as one group since multimaps are key ordered.
for (; match != mounts->end() && match->first == curr->first; ++match) {
// Ignore known mounts.
{
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
if (mount_pair.second->OwnsMountPoint(match->second)) {
keep = true;
break;
}
}
}
// Optionally, ignore mounts with open files.
if (!force) {
std::vector<ProcessInformation> processes;
platform_->GetProcessesWithOpenFiles(match->second, &processes);
if (processes.size()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Stale mount " << match->second.value()
<< " from " << match->first.value()
<< " has active holders.";
keep = true;
skipped = true;
}
}
}
// Delete anything that shouldn't be unmounted.
if (keep) {
active_mounts->insert(curr, match);
mounts->erase(curr, match);
}
}
return skipped;
}
void Service::GetEphemeralLoopDevicesMounts(
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath>* mounts) {
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> loop_mounts;
platform_->GetLoopDeviceMounts(&loop_mounts);
const FilePath sparse_path = FilePath(kEphemeralCryptohomeDir)
.Append(kSparseFileDir);
for (const auto& device : platform_->GetAttachedLoopDevices()) {
// Ephemeral mounts are mounts from a loop device with ephemeral sparse
// backing file.
if (sparse_path.IsParent(device.backing_file)) {
auto range = loop_mounts.equal_range(device.device);
mounts->insert(range.first, range.second);
}
}
}
bool Service::CleanUpStaleMounts(bool force) {
// This function is meant to aid in a clean recovery from a crashed or
// manually restarted cryptohomed. Cryptohomed may restart:
// 1. Before any mounts occur
// 2. While mounts are active
// 3. During an unmount
// In case #1, there should be no special work to be done.
// The best way to disambiguate #2 and #3 is to determine if there are
// any active open files on any stale mounts. If there are open files,
// then we've likely(*) resumed an active session. If there are not,
// the last cryptohome should have been unmounted.
// It's worth noting that a restart during active use doesn't impair
// other user session behavior, like CheckKey, because it doesn't rely
// exclusively on mount state.
//
// In the future, it may make sense to attempt to keep the MountMap
// persisted to disk which would make resumption much easier.
//
// (*) Relies on the expectation that all processes have been killed off.
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> shadow_mounts;
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> ephemeral_mounts;
platform_->GetMountsBySourcePrefix(homedirs_->shadow_root(), &shadow_mounts);
GetEphemeralLoopDevicesMounts(&ephemeral_mounts);
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> excluded;
bool skipped = FilterActiveMounts(&shadow_mounts, &excluded, force);
skipped |= FilterActiveMounts(&ephemeral_mounts, &excluded, force);
std::vector<FilePath> excluded_mount_points;
for (const auto& mount : excluded)
excluded_mount_points.push_back(mount.second);
UnloadPkcs11Tokens(excluded_mount_points);
// Unmount anything left.
for (const auto& match : shadow_mounts) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Lazily unmounting stale shadow mount: "
<< match.second.value() << " from " << match.first.value();
platform_->Unmount(match.second, true, nullptr);
}
for (const auto& match : ephemeral_mounts) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Lazily unmounting stale ephemeral mount: "
<< match.second.value() << " from " << match.first.value();
platform_->Unmount(match.second, true, nullptr);
// Clean up destination directory for ephemeral mounts under ephemeral
// cryptohome dir.
if (base::StartsWith(match.first.value(), kLoopPrefix,
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) &&
FilePath(kEphemeralCryptohomeDir).IsParent(match.second)) {
platform_->DeleteFile(match.second, true /* recursive */);
}
}
// TODO(chromium:781821): Add autotests for this case.
std::vector<Platform::LoopDevice> loop_devices =
platform_->GetAttachedLoopDevices();
const FilePath sparse_dir = FilePath(kEphemeralCryptohomeDir)
.Append(kSparseFileDir);
std::vector<FilePath> stale_sparse_files;
platform_->EnumerateDirectoryEntries(sparse_dir, false /* is_recursive */,
&stale_sparse_files);
for (const auto& device : loop_devices) {
// Check whether it's created from an ephemeral sparse file.
if (!sparse_dir.IsParent(device.backing_file))
continue;
if (excluded.count(device.device) == 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Detaching stale loop device: "
<< device.device.value();
if (!platform_->DetachLoop(device.device)) {
ReportCryptohomeError(kEphemeralCleanUpFailed);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Can't detach stale loop: " << device.device.value();
}
} else {
// Remove if it's a non-stale loop device.
stale_sparse_files.erase(std::remove(stale_sparse_files.begin(),
stale_sparse_files.end(),
device.backing_file),
stale_sparse_files.end());
}
}
for (const auto& file : stale_sparse_files) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Deleting stale ephemeral backing sparse file: "
<< file.value();
if (!platform_->DeleteFile(file, false /* recursive */)) {
ReportCryptohomeError(kEphemeralCleanUpFailed);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to clean up ephemeral sparse file: "
<< file.value();
}
}
return skipped;
}
bool Service::CleanUpHiddenMounts() {
bool ok = true;
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (auto it = mounts_.begin(); it != mounts_.end();) {
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> mount = it->second;
if (mount->IsMounted() && mount->IsShadowOnly()) {
ok = ok && mount->UnmountCryptohome();
it = mounts_.erase(it);
} else {
++it;
}
}
return ok;
}
bool Service::Initialize() {
bool result = true;
if (!tpm_ && use_tpm_) {
tpm_ = Tpm::GetSingleton();
}
if (!tpm_init_ && initialize_tpm_) {
default_tpm_init_.reset(new TpmInit(tpm_, platform_));
tpm_init_ = default_tpm_init_.get();
}
if (!boot_lockbox_) {
default_boot_lockbox_.reset(new BootLockbox(tpm_, platform_, crypto_));
boot_lockbox_ = default_boot_lockbox_.get();
}
if (!boot_attributes_) {
default_boot_attributes_.reset(
new BootAttributes(boot_lockbox_, platform_));
boot_attributes_ = default_boot_attributes_.get();
}
if (!firmware_management_parameters_) {
default_firmware_management_params_.reset(
new FirmwareManagementParameters(tpm_));
firmware_management_parameters_ = default_firmware_management_params_.get();
}
crypto_->set_use_tpm(use_tpm_);
if (!crypto_->Init(tpm_init_))
return false;
if (!homedirs_->Init(platform_, crypto_, user_timestamp_cache_.get()))
return false;
if (!homedirs_->GetSystemSalt(&system_salt_))
return false;
arc_disk_quota_->Initialize();
// Install the type-info for the service with dbus.
dbus_g_object_type_install_info(gobject::cryptohome_get_type(),
&gobject::dbus_glib_cryptohome_object_info);
if (!Reset()) {
result = false;
}
// This ownership taken signal registration should be done before any
// Tpm::IsOwned() call so that Tpm can cache and update the ownership state
// correctly without keeping requesting for the TPM status.
ConnectOwnershipTakenSignal();
// If the TPM is unowned or doesn't exist, it's safe for
// this function to be called again. However, it shouldn't
// be called across multiple threads in parallel.
InitializeInstallAttributes();
// Clean up any unreferenced mountpoints at startup.
CleanUpStaleMounts(false);
AttestationInitialize();
async_complete_signal_ = g_signal_lookup("async_call_status",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type());
if (!async_complete_signal_) {
async_complete_signal_ = g_signal_new("async_call_status",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type(),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
nullptr,
G_TYPE_NONE,
3,
G_TYPE_INT,
G_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
G_TYPE_INT);
}
async_data_complete_signal_ = g_signal_lookup("async_call_status_with_data",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type());
if (!async_data_complete_signal_) {
async_data_complete_signal_ = g_signal_new(
"async_call_status_with_data",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type(),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
nullptr,
G_TYPE_NONE,
3,
G_TYPE_INT,
G_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
DBUS_TYPE_G_UCHAR_ARRAY);
}
tpm_init_signal_ = g_signal_lookup("tpm_init_status",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type());
if (!tpm_init_signal_) {
tpm_init_signal_ = g_signal_new("tpm_init_status",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type(),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
nullptr,
G_TYPE_NONE,
3,
G_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
G_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
G_TYPE_BOOLEAN);
}
low_disk_space_signal_ = g_signal_lookup("low_disk_space",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type());
if (!low_disk_space_signal_) {
low_disk_space_signal_ = g_signal_new("low_disk_space",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type(),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
nullptr,
G_TYPE_NONE,
1,
G_TYPE_UINT64);
}
dircrypto_migration_progress_signal_ = g_signal_lookup(
"dircrypto_migration_progress",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type());
if (!dircrypto_migration_progress_signal_) {
dircrypto_migration_progress_signal_ = g_signal_new(
"dircrypto_migration_progress",
gobject::cryptohome_get_type(),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
nullptr,
G_TYPE_NONE,
3,
G_TYPE_INT,
G_TYPE_UINT64,
G_TYPE_UINT64);
}
mount_thread_.Start();
// Add task observer, message_loop is only availible after the thread start.
// We can only add observer inside the thread.
AddTaskObserverToThread(&mount_thread_, &mount_thread_observer_);
// TODO(wad) Determine if this should only be called if
// tpm->IsEnabled() is true.
if (tpm_ && initialize_tpm_) {
tpm_init_->Init(
base::Bind(&Service::OwnershipCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
if (!SeedUrandom()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "FAILED TO SEED /dev/urandom AT START";
}
AttestationInitializeTpm();
if (tpm_init_->ShallInitialize() ||
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
kAutoInitializeTpmSwitch)) {
tpm_init_->AsyncTakeOwnership();
}
}
last_auto_cleanup_time_ = platform_->GetCurrentTime();
last_user_activity_timestamp_time_ = platform_->GetCurrentTime();
// Clean up space on start (once).
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoAutoCleanup, base::Unretained(this)));
// Start scheduling periodic check for low-disk space and cleanup events.
// Subsequent events are scheduled by the callback itself.
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::LowDiskCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
// Start scheduling periodic TPM alerts upload to UMA. Subsequent events are
// scheduled by the callback itself.
PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::UploadAlertsDataCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
// TODO(keescook,ellyjones) Make this mock-able.
StatefulRecovery recovery(platform_, this);
if (recovery.Requested()) {
if (recovery.Recover())
LOG(INFO) << "A stateful recovery was performed successfully.";
recovery.PerformReboot();
}
boot_attributes_->Load();
return result;
}
bool Service::IsOwner(const std::string &userid) {
std::string owner;
if (homedirs_->GetPlainOwner(&owner) && userid.length() && userid == owner)
return true;
return false;
}
void Service::InitializeInstallAttributes() {
// The TPM owning instance may have changed since initialization.
// InstallAttributes can handle a NULL or !IsEnabled Tpm object.
install_attrs_->SetTpm(tpm_);
install_attrs_->Init(tpm_init_);
// Check if the machine is enterprise owned and report to mount_ then.
DetectEnterpriseOwnership();
}
void Service::DoInitializePkcs11(cryptohome::Mount* mount) {
bool still_mounted = false;
{
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
if (mount_pair.second.get() == mount) {
still_mounted = true;
}
}
}
if (!still_mounted) {
LOG(INFO) << "PKCS#11 initialization cancelled";
return;
}
if (mount->IsMounted() &&
mount->pkcs11_state() == cryptohome::Mount::kIsBeingInitialized) {
mount->InsertPkcs11Token();
}
LOG(INFO) << "PKCS#11 initialization succeeded.";
mount->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kIsInitialized);
}
void Service::InitializePkcs11(cryptohome::Mount* mount) {
if (!mount) {
LOG(ERROR) << "InitializePkcs11 called with NULL mount!";
return;
}
// Wait for ownership if there is a working TPM.
if (tpm_ && tpm_->IsEnabled() && !tpm_->IsOwned()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "TPM was not owned. TPM initialization call back will"
<< " handle PKCS#11 initialization.";
mount->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kIsWaitingOnTPM);
return;
}
// Ok, so the TPM is owned. Time to request asynchronous initialization of
// PKCS#11.
// Make sure cryptohome is mounted, otherwise all of this is for naught.
if (!mount->IsMounted()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "PKCS#11 initialization requested but cryptohome is"
<< " not mounted.";
return;
}
// Reset PKCS#11 initialization status. A successful completion of
// MountTaskPkcs11_Init would set it in the service thread via NotifyEvent().
ReportTimerStart(kPkcs11InitTimer);
mount->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kIsBeingInitialized);
mount_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&Service::DoInitializePkcs11, base::Unretained(this),
base::Unretained(mount)));
}
bool Service::SeedUrandom() {
brillo::Blob random;
if (!tpm_->GetRandomDataBlob(kDefaultRandomSeedLength, &random)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not get random data from the TPM";
return false;
}
if (!platform_->WriteFile(kDefaultEntropySource, random)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error writing data to " << kDefaultEntropySource.value();
return false;
}
return true;
}
void Service::UploadAlertsDataCallback() {
Tpm::AlertsData alerts;
if (!use_tpm_) {
LOG(WARNING) << "TPM is not enabled. Disabling TPM alert metrics";
return;
}
if (tpm_) {
bool supported = tpm_->GetAlertsData(&alerts);
if (!supported) {
// success return code and unknown chip family means that chip does not
// support GetAlerts information. Return here as no need to reschedule
// the delayed task.
LOG(INFO) << "The TPM chip does not support GetAlertsData. "
<< "Stop UploadAlertsData task.";
return;
}
ReportAlertsData(alerts);
}
mount_thread_.task_runner()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::UploadAlertsDataCallback, base::Unretained(this)),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(upload_alerts_period_ms_));
}
bool Service::Reset() {
if (cryptohome_)
g_object_unref(cryptohome_);
cryptohome_ = reinterpret_cast<gobject::Cryptohome*>(
g_object_new(gobject::cryptohome_get_type(), NULL));
// Allow references to this instance.
cryptohome_->service = this;
if (loop_) {
::g_main_loop_unref(loop_);
}
loop_ = g_main_loop_new(NULL, false);
if (!loop_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create main loop";
return false;
}
// Install the local event source for handling async results
event_source_.Reset(event_source_sink_, g_main_loop_get_context(loop_));
return true;
}
void Service::NotifyEvent(CryptohomeEventBase* event) {
if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(), kMountTaskResultEventType)) {
MountTaskResult* result = static_cast<MountTaskResult*>(event);
if (!result->return_data()) {
g_signal_emit(cryptohome_,
async_complete_signal_,
0,
result->sequence_id(),
result->return_status(),
result->return_code());
// TODO(wad) are there any non-mount uses of this type?
if (!result->return_status()) {
RemoveMount(result->mount().get());
}
SendAsyncIdInfoToUma(result->sequence_id(), base::Time::Now());
} else {
brillo::glib::ScopedArray tmp_array(g_array_new(FALSE, FALSE, 1));
g_array_append_vals(tmp_array.get(),
result->return_data()->data(),
result->return_data()->size());
g_signal_emit(cryptohome_,
async_data_complete_signal_,
0,
result->sequence_id(),
result->return_status(),
tmp_array.get());
brillo::SecureMemset(tmp_array.get()->data, 0, tmp_array.get()->len);
SendAsyncIdInfoToUma(result->sequence_id(), base::Time::Now());
}
if (result->pkcs11_init()) {
LOG(INFO) << "An asynchronous mount request with sequence id: "
<< result->sequence_id()
<< " finished; doing PKCS11 init...";
// We only report and init PKCS#11 for successful mounts.
if (result->return_status()) {
InitializePkcs11(result->mount().get());
}
} else if (result->guest()) {
if (!result->return_status()) {
DLOG(INFO) << "Dropping MountMap entry for failed Guest mount.";
RemoveMountForUser(guest_user_);
}
if (result->return_status() && !result->return_code()) {
ReportTimerStop(kAsyncGuestMountTimer);
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(), kTpmInitStatusEventType)) {
TpmInitStatus* result = static_cast<TpmInitStatus*>(event);
g_signal_emit(cryptohome_, tpm_init_signal_, 0, tpm_init_->IsTpmReady(),
tpm_init_->IsTpmEnabled(), result->get_took_ownership());
// TODO(wad) should we package up a InstallAttributes status here too?
} else if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(), kDBusErrorReplyEventType)) {
DBusErrorReply* result = static_cast<DBusErrorReply*>(event);
result->Run();
} else if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(), kDBusBlobReplyEventType)) {
DBusBlobReply* result = static_cast<DBusBlobReply*>(event);
result->Run();
} else if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(), kDBusReplyEventType)) {
DBusReply* result = static_cast<DBusReply*>(event);
result->Run();
} else if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(),
kDircryptoMigrationProgressEventType)) {
auto* progress = static_cast<DircryptoMigrationProgress*>(event);
g_signal_emit(cryptohome_, dircrypto_migration_progress_signal_,
0 /* signal detail (not used) */,
static_cast<int32_t>(progress->status()),
progress->current_bytes(), progress->total_bytes());
} else if (!strcmp(event->GetEventName(), kClosureEventType)) {
ClosureEvent* closure_event = static_cast<ClosureEvent*>(event);
closure_event->Run();
}
}
void Service::OwnershipCallback(bool status, bool took_ownership) {
if (took_ownership) {
ReportTimerStop(kTpmTakeOwnershipTimer);
// When TPM initialization finishes, we need to tell every Mount to
// reinitialize its TPM context, since the TPM is now useable, and we might
// need to kick off their PKCS11 initialization if they were blocked before.
{
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
scoped_refptr<MountTaskResetTpmContext> mount_task =
new MountTaskResetTpmContext(NULL, mount_pair.second.get(),
NextSequence());
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&MountTaskResetTpmContext::Run, mount_task.get()));
}
}
}
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::ConfigureOwnedTpm, base::Unretained(this),
status, took_ownership));
}
void Service::ConfigureOwnedTpm(bool status, bool took_ownership) {
LOG(INFO) << "Configuring TPM, ownership taken: " << took_ownership << ".";
if (took_ownership) {
// Check if we have pending pkcs11 init tasks due to tpm ownership
// not being done earlier. Trigger initialization if so.
{
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
cryptohome::Mount* mount = mount_pair.second.get();
if (mount->pkcs11_state() == cryptohome::Mount::kIsWaitingOnTPM) {
InitializePkcs11(mount);
}
}
}
// Initialize the install-time locked attributes since we
// can't do it prior to ownership.
InitializeInstallAttributes();
}
event_source_.AddEvent(
std::make_unique<TpmInitStatus>(took_ownership, status));
// Do attestation work after AddEvent because it may take long.
AttestationInitializeTpmComplete();
// If we mounted before the TPM finished initialization, we must
// finalize the install attributes now too, otherwise it takes a
// full re-login cycle to finalize.
gboolean mounted = FALSE;
bool is_mounted = (IsMounted(&mounted, NULL) && mounted);
if (is_mounted && took_ownership &&
install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kFirstInstall) {
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> guest_mount = GetMountForUser(guest_user_);
bool guest_mounted = guest_mount.get() && guest_mount->IsMounted();
if (!guest_mounted)
install_attrs_->Finalize();
}
}
void Service::DoCheckKeyEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
AuthorizationRequest* authorization,
CheckKeyRequest* check_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !check_key_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
if (GetAccountId(*identifier).empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
// An AuthorizationRequest key without a label will test against
// all VaultKeysets of a compatible key().data().type().
if (authorization->key().secret().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No key secret supplied");
return;
}
UsernamePasskey credentials(GetAccountId(*identifier).c_str(),
SecureBlob(authorization->key().secret().begin(),
authorization->key().secret().end()));
credentials.set_key_data(authorization->key().data());
BaseReply reply;
bool found_valid_credentials = false;
{
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
if (mount_pair.second->AreSameUser(credentials)) {
found_valid_credentials = mount_pair.second->AreValid(credentials);
break;
}
}
}
if (found_valid_credentials) {
// Entered the right creds, so reset LE credentials.
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(credentials);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
// Fallthrough to HomeDirs to cover different keys for the same user.
if (homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
if (homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(credentials)) {
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(credentials);
} else {
// TODO(wad) Should this pass along KEY_NOT_FOUND too?
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED);
}
} else {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::CheckKeyEx(GArray* account_id,
GArray* authorization_request,
GArray* check_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<CheckKeyRequest> request(new CheckKeyRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len))
authorization.reset(NULL);
if (!request->ParseFromArray(check_key_request->data, check_key_request->len))
request.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::DoCheckKeyEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Owned(authorization.release()),
base::Owned(request.release()),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoRemoveKeyEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
AuthorizationRequest* authorization,
RemoveKeyRequest* remove_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !remove_key_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
if (GetAccountId(*identifier).empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
// An AuthorizationRequest key without a label will test against
// all VaultKeysets of a compatible key().data().type().
if (authorization->key().secret().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No key secret supplied");
return;
}
if (remove_key_request->key().data().label().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No label provided for target key");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
UsernamePasskey credentials(GetAccountId(*identifier).c_str(),
SecureBlob(authorization->key().secret().begin(),
authorization->key().secret().end()));
credentials.set_key_data(authorization->key().data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
reply.set_error(homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(credentials,
remove_key_request->key().data()));
if (reply.error() == CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET) {
// Don't set the error if there wasn't one.
reply.clear_error();
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::RemoveKeyEx(GArray* account_id,
GArray* authorization_request,
GArray* remove_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<RemoveKeyRequest> request(new RemoveKeyRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len))
authorization.reset(NULL);
if (!request->ParseFromArray(remove_key_request->data,
remove_key_request->len))
request.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoRemoveKeyEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Owned(authorization.release()),
base::Owned(request.release()), base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoListKeysEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
AuthorizationRequest* authorization,
ListKeysRequest* list_keys_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !list_keys_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
const std::string username = GetAccountId(*identifier);
if (username.empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
const std::string obfuscated_username =
BuildObfuscatedUsername(username, system_salt_);
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
std::vector<std::string> labels;
if (!homedirs_->GetVaultKeysetLabels(obfuscated_username, &labels)) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
}
ListKeysReply* list_keys_reply = reply.MutableExtension(ListKeysReply::reply);
for (const auto& label : labels)
list_keys_reply->add_labels(label);
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::ListKeysEx(GArray* account_id,
GArray* authorization_request,
GArray* list_keys_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<ListKeysRequest> request(new ListKeysRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len))
authorization.reset(NULL);
if (!request->ParseFromArray(list_keys_request->data,
list_keys_request->len))
request.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::DoListKeysEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Owned(authorization.release()),
base::Owned(request.release()),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoGetKeyDataEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
AuthorizationRequest* authorization,
GetKeyDataRequest* get_key_data_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !get_key_data_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
if (GetAccountId(*identifier).empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
if (!get_key_data_request->has_key()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No key attributes provided");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
const std::string obfuscated_username =
BuildObfuscatedUsername(GetAccountId(*identifier), system_salt_);
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
GetKeyDataReply* sub_reply = reply.MutableExtension(GetKeyDataReply::reply);
// Requests only support using the key label at present.
std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(homedirs_->GetVaultKeyset(
obfuscated_username, get_key_data_request->key().data().label()));
if (vk) {
KeyData* new_kd = sub_reply->add_key_data();
*new_kd = vk->serialized().key_data();
// Clear any symmetric KeyAuthorizationSecrets even if they are wrapped.
for (int a = 0; a < new_kd->authorization_data_size(); ++a) {
KeyAuthorizationData *auth_data = new_kd->mutable_authorization_data(a);
for (int s = 0; s < auth_data->secrets_size(); ++s) {
auth_data->mutable_secrets(s)->clear_symmetric_key();
auth_data->mutable_secrets(s)->set_wrapped(false);
}
}
}
// No error is thrown if there is no match.
reply.clear_error();
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::GetKeyDataEx(GArray* account_id,
GArray* authorization_request,
GArray* get_key_data_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<GetKeyDataRequest> request(new GetKeyDataRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len)) {
identifier.reset(NULL);
}
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len)) {
authorization.reset(NULL);
}
if (!request->ParseFromArray(get_key_data_request->data,
get_key_data_request->len)) {
request.reset(NULL);
}
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoGetKeyDataEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Owned(authorization.release()),
base::Owned(request.release()), base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoMigrateKeyEx(AccountIdentifier* account,
AuthorizationRequest* auth_request,
MigrateKeyRequest* migrate_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!account || !auth_request || !migrate_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
// Setup a reply to use during error handling.
BaseReply reply;
if (account->account_id().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Must supply account_id.");
return;
}
UsernamePasskey credentials(account->account_id().c_str(),
SecureBlob(migrate_request->secret()));
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> mount =
GetMountForUser(GetAccountId(*account));
if (!homedirs_->Migrate(credentials,
SecureBlob(auth_request->key().secret()), mount)) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MIGRATE_KEY_FAILED);
} else {
reply.clear_error();
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::MigrateKeyEx(GArray* account_ary,
GArray* auth_request_ary,
GArray* migrate_request_ary,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
auto account = std::make_unique<AccountIdentifier>();
auto auth_request = std::make_unique<AuthorizationRequest>();
auto migrate_request = std::make_unique<MigrateKeyRequest>();
// On parsing failure, pass along a nullptr.
if (!account->ParseFromArray(account_ary->data, account_ary->len))
account.reset(nullptr);
if (!auth_request->ParseFromArray(auth_request_ary->data,
auth_request_ary->len)) {
auth_request.reset(nullptr);
}
if (!migrate_request->ParseFromArray(migrate_request_ary->data,
migrate_request_ary->len)) {
migrate_request.reset(nullptr);
}
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoMigrateKeyEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(account.release()),
base::Owned(auth_request.release()),
base::Owned(migrate_request.release()),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoAddKeyEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
AuthorizationRequest* authorization,
AddKeyRequest* add_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !add_key_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
BaseReply reply;
if (GetAccountId(*identifier).empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
// An AuthorizationRequest key without a label will test against
// all VaultKeysets of a compatible key().data().type().
if (authorization->key().secret().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No key secret supplied");
return;
}
if (!add_key_request->has_key() || add_key_request->key().secret().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No new key supplied");
return;
}
if (add_key_request->key().data().label().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No new key label supplied");
return;
}
// Ensure any new keys do not contain a wrapped authorization key.
if (KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(add_key_request->key())) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context,
"KeyAuthorizationSecrets may not be wrapped");
return;
}
UsernamePasskey credentials(GetAccountId(*identifier).c_str(),
SecureBlob(authorization->key().secret().begin(),
authorization->key().secret().end()));
credentials.set_key_data(authorization->key().data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
int index = -1;
SecureBlob new_secret(add_key_request->key().secret().begin(),
add_key_request->key().secret().end());
reply.set_error(homedirs_->AddKeyset(credentials,
new_secret,
&add_key_request->key().data(),
add_key_request->clobber_if_exists(),
&index));
if (reply.error() == CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET) {
// Don't set the error if there wasn't one.
reply.clear_error();
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::AddKeyEx(GArray* account_id,
GArray* authorization_request,
GArray* add_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<AddKeyRequest> request(new AddKeyRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len))
authorization.reset(NULL);
if (!request->ParseFromArray(add_key_request->data, add_key_request->len))
request.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::DoAddKeyEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Owned(authorization.release()),
base::Owned(request.release()),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoUpdateKeyEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
AuthorizationRequest* authorization,
UpdateKeyRequest* update_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !update_key_request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
BaseReply reply;
if (GetAccountId(*identifier).empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
// An AuthorizationRequest key without a label will test against
// all VaultKeysets of a compatible key().data().type().
if (authorization->key().secret().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No key secret supplied");
return;
}
// Any undefined field in changes() will be left as it is.
if (!update_key_request->has_changes()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No updates requested");
return;
}
if (KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(update_key_request->changes())) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context,
"KeyAuthorizationSecrets may not be wrapped");
return;
}
UsernamePasskey credentials(GetAccountId(*identifier).c_str(),
SecureBlob(authorization->key().secret().begin(),
authorization->key().secret().end()));
credentials.set_key_data(authorization->key().data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
reply.set_error(homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(
credentials,
&update_key_request->changes(),
update_key_request->authorization_signature()));
if (reply.error() == CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET) {
// Don't set the error if there wasn't one.
reply.clear_error();
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::UpdateKeyEx(GArray* account_id,
GArray* authorization_request,
GArray* update_key_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<UpdateKeyRequest> request(new UpdateKeyRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len))
authorization.reset(NULL);
if (!request->ParseFromArray(update_key_request->data,
update_key_request->len))
request.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoUpdateKeyEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Owned(authorization.release()),
base::Owned(request.release()), base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoRemoveEx(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
if (GetAccountId(*identifier).empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Empty account_id.");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
if (!homedirs_->Remove(identifier->account_id()))
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_REMOVE_FAILED);
else
reply.clear_error();
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::RemoveEx(GArray* account_id, DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::DoRemoveEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::RenameCryptohome(const GArray* account_id_from,
const GArray* account_id_to,
DBusGMethodInvocation* response) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> id_from(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> id_to(new AccountIdentifier);
if (!id_from->ParseFromArray(account_id_from->data, account_id_from->len)) {
id_from.reset(NULL);
}
if (!id_to->ParseFromArray(account_id_to->data, account_id_to->len)) {
id_to.reset(NULL);
}
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoRenameCryptohome, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(id_from.release()), base::Owned(id_to.release()),
base::Unretained(response)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoRenameCryptohome(AccountIdentifier* id_from,
AccountIdentifier* id_to,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!id_from || !id_to) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> mount =
GetMountForUser(GetAccountId(*id_from));
const bool is_mounted = mount.get() && mount->IsMounted();
BaseReply reply;
if (is_mounted) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenameCryptohome('" << GetAccountId(*id_from) << "','"
<< GetAccountId(*id_to)
<< "'): Unable to rename mounted cryptohome.";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
} else if (!homedirs_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenameCryptohome('" << GetAccountId(*id_from) << "','"
<< GetAccountId(*id_to) << "'): Homedirs not initialized.";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
} else if (!homedirs_->Rename(GetAccountId(*id_from), GetAccountId(*id_to))) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::GetAccountDiskUsage(const GArray* account_id,
DBusGMethodInvocation* response) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len)) {
identifier.reset(NULL);
}
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoGetAccountDiskUsage, base::Unretained(this),
base::Owned(identifier.release()),
base::Unretained(response)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoGetAccountDiskUsage(AccountIdentifier* identifier,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
reply.MutableExtension(GetAccountDiskUsageReply::reply)->set_size(
homedirs_->ComputeSize(GetAccountId(*identifier)));
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::GetSystemSalt(GArray **OUT_salt, GError **error) {
*OUT_salt = g_array_new(false, false, 1);
g_array_append_vals(*OUT_salt, system_salt_.data(), system_salt_.size());
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::GetSanitizedUsername(gchar *username,
gchar **OUT_sanitized,
GError **error) {
// UsernamePasskey::GetObfuscatedUsername() returns an uppercase hex encoding,
// while SanitizeUserName() returns a lowercase hex encoding. They should
// return the same value, but login_manager is already relying on
// SanitizeUserName() and that's the value that chrome should see.
std::string sanitized =
brillo::cryptohome::home::SanitizeUserName(username);
if (sanitized.empty())
return FALSE;
*OUT_sanitized = g_strndup(sanitized.data(), sanitized.size());
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::IsMounted(gboolean *OUT_is_mounted, GError **error) {
// We consider "the cryptohome" to be mounted if any existing cryptohome is
// mounted.
*OUT_is_mounted = FALSE;
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
if (mount_pair.second->IsMounted()) {
*OUT_is_mounted = TRUE;
break;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::IsMountedForUser(gchar *userid,
gboolean *OUT_is_mounted,
gboolean *OUT_is_ephemeral_mount,
GError **error) {
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> mount = GetMountForUser(userid);
*OUT_is_mounted = false;
*OUT_is_ephemeral_mount = false;
if (!mount.get())
return TRUE;
if (mount->IsNonEphemeralMounted()) {
*OUT_is_mounted = true;
*OUT_is_ephemeral_mount = false;
} else if (mount->IsMounted()) {
*OUT_is_mounted = true;
*OUT_is_ephemeral_mount = true;
}
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoUpdateTimestamp(scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> mount) {
mount->UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp(0);
}
void Service::DoMount(scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> mount,
const UsernamePasskey& credentials,
const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args,
base::WaitableEvent* event,
MountError* return_code,
bool* return_status) {
*return_status = mount->MountCryptohome(credentials, mount_args, return_code);
event->Signal();
}
gboolean Service::Mount(const gchar *userid,
const gchar *key,
gboolean create_if_missing,
gboolean ensure_ephemeral,
gint *OUT_error_code,
gboolean *OUT_result,
GError **error) {
CleanUpHiddenMounts();
// This is safe even if cryptohomed restarts during a multi-mount
// session and a new mount is added because cleanup is not forced.
// An existing process will keep the mount alive. On the next
// Unmount() it'll be forcibly cleaned up. In the case that
// cryptohomed crashes and misses the Unmount call, the stale
// mountpoints should still be cleaned up on the next daemon
// interaction.
//
// As we introduce multiple mounts, we can consider API changes to
// make it clearer what the UI expectations are (AddMount, etc).
if (mounts_.size() == 0)
// This could run on every interaction to catch any unused mounts.
CleanUpStaleMounts(false);
UsernamePasskey credentials(userid, SecureBlob(key, key + strlen(key)));
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> guest_mount = GetMountForUser(guest_user_);
bool guest_mounted = guest_mount.get() && guest_mount->IsMounted();
if (guest_mounted && !guest_mount->UnmountCryptohome()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount cryptohome from Guest session";
*OUT_error_code = MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY;
*OUT_result = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
// Determine whether the mount should be ephemeral.
bool is_ephemeral = false;
MountError mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE;
if (!GetShouldMountAsEphemeral(userid, ensure_ephemeral, create_if_missing,
&is_ephemeral, &mount_error)) {
*OUT_error_code = mount_error;
*OUT_result = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
// If a cryptohome is mounted for the user already, reuse that mount unless
// the |is_ephemeral| flag prevents it: When |is_ephemeral| is
// |true|, a cryptohome backed by tmpfs is required. If the currently
// mounted cryptohome is backed by a vault, it must be unmounted and
// remounted with a tmpfs backend.
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> user_mount = GetOrCreateMountForUser(userid);
if (is_ephemeral && user_mount->IsNonEphemeralMounted()) {
// TODO(wad,ellyjones) Change this behavior to return failure even
// on a succesful unmount to tell chrome MOUNT_ERROR_NEEDS_RESTART.
if (!user_mount->UnmountCryptohome()) {
// The MountMap entry is kept since the Unmount failed.
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount vault before an ephemeral mount.";
*OUT_error_code = MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY;
*OUT_result = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
}
// TODO(wad) A case we haven't handled is mount-over of a non-ephemeral user.
// This is the case where there were 2 mount requests for a given user
// without any intervening unmount requests. This should only be able to
// happen if Chrome acts pathologically and re-requests a Mount. If,
// for instance, cryptohomed crashed, the MountMap would not contain the
// entry.
// TODO(wad) Can we get rid of this code path?
if (user_mount->IsMounted()) {
// TODO(wad) This tests against the stored credentials, not the TPM.
// If mounts are "repopulated", then a trip through the TPM would be needed.
LOG(INFO) << "Mount exists. Rechecking credentials.";
if (!user_mount->AreSameUser(credentials) ||
!user_mount->AreValid(credentials)) {
// Need to take a trip through the TPM.
if (!homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(credentials)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to reauthenticate against the existing mount!";
// TODO(wad) Should we teardown all the mounts if this happens?
// RemoveAllMounts();
*OUT_error_code = MOUNT_ERROR_KEY_FAILURE;
*OUT_result = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
}
// As far as PKCS#11 initialization goes, we treat this as a brand new
// mount request. InitializePkcs11() will detect and re-initialize if
// necessary except if the mount point is ephemeral as there is no PKCS#11
// data.
InitializePkcs11(user_mount.get());
*OUT_error_code = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE;
*OUT_result = TRUE;
return TRUE;
}
// Any non-guest mount attempt triggers InstallAttributes finalization.
// The return value is ignored as it is possible we're pre-ownership.
// The next login will assure finalization if possible.
if (install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kFirstInstall)
install_attrs_->Finalize();
ReportTimerStart(kSyncMountTimer);
Mount::MountArgs mount_args;
mount_args.create_if_missing = create_if_missing;
mount_args.is_ephemeral = is_ephemeral;
mount_args.create_as_ecryptfs = force_ecryptfs_;
// TODO(kinaba): Currently Mount is not used for type of accounts that
// we need to force dircrypto. Add an option when it becomes necessary.
mount_args.force_dircrypto = false;
MountError return_code = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE;
bool return_status = false;
base::WaitableEvent event(base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoMount, base::Unretained(this),
base::RetainedRef(user_mount),
base::ConstRef(credentials), base::ConstRef(mount_args),
base::Unretained(&event), base::Unretained(&return_code),
base::Unretained(&return_status)));
event.Wait();
// Update the timestamp for old user detection in the background.
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoUpdateTimestamp, base::Unretained(this),
base::RetainedRef(user_mount)));
// We only report successful mounts.
if (return_status && !return_code)
ReportTimerStop(kSyncMountTimer);
user_mount->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kUninitialized);
if (return_status) {
InitializePkcs11(user_mount.get());
} else {
RemoveMount(user_mount.get());
}
*OUT_error_code = return_code;
*OUT_result = return_status;
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoMountEx(std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier,
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization,
std::unique_ptr<MountRequest> request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!identifier || !authorization || !request) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Failed to parse parameters.");
return;
}
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
BaseReply reply;
// Needed to pass along |recreated|
MountReply* mount_reply = reply.MutableExtension(MountReply::reply);
mount_reply->set_recreated(false);
// At present, we only enforce non-empty email addresses.
// In the future, we may wish to canonicalize if we don't move
// to requiring a IdP-unique identifier.
const std::string& account_id = GetAccountId(*identifier);
if (account_id.empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No email supplied");
return;
}
if (request->public_mount()) {
std::string public_mount_passkey;
if (!GetPublicMountPassKey(account_id, &public_mount_passkey)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not get public mount passkey.";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
// Set the secret as the key for cryptohome authorization/creation.
authorization->mutable_key()->set_secret(public_mount_passkey);
if (request->has_create()) {
request->mutable_create()->mutable_keys(0)->set_secret(
public_mount_passkey);
}
}
// An AuthorizationRequest key without a label will test against
// all VaultKeysets of a compatible key().data().type().
if (authorization->key().secret().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "No key secret supplied");
return;
}
if (request->has_create()) {
if (request->create().copy_authorization_key()) {
Key *auth_key = request->mutable_create()->add_keys();
*auth_key = authorization->key();
// Don't allow a key creation and mount if the key lacks
// the privileges.
if (!auth_key->data().privileges().mount()) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
}
int keys_size = request->create().keys_size();
if (keys_size == 0) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "CreateRequest supplied with no keys");
return;
} else if (keys_size > 1) {
LOG(INFO) << "MountEx: unimplemented CreateRequest with multiple keys";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
} else {
const Key key = request->create().keys(0);
// TODO(wad) Ensure the labels are all unique.
if (key.secret().empty() || !key.has_data() ||
key.data().label().empty()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context,
"CreateRequest Keys are not fully specified");
return;
}
if (KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(key)) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context,
"KeyAuthorizationSecrets may not be wrapped");
return;
}
}
}
auto username_passkey = std::make_unique<UsernamePasskey>(
account_id.c_str(), SecureBlob(authorization->key().secret().begin(),
authorization->key().secret().end()));
// Everything else can be the default.
username_passkey->set_key_data(authorization->key().data());
// Determine whether the mount should be ephemeral.
bool is_ephemeral = false;
MountError mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE;
if (!GetShouldMountAsEphemeral(account_id, request->require_ephemeral(),
request->has_create(), &is_ephemeral,
&mount_error)) {
reply.set_error(MountErrorToCryptohomeError(mount_error));
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
Mount::MountArgs mount_args;
mount_args.create_if_missing = request->has_create();
mount_args.is_ephemeral = is_ephemeral;
mount_args.create_as_ecryptfs =
force_ecryptfs_ ||
(request->has_create() && request->create().force_ecryptfs());
mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs = request->to_migrate_from_ecryptfs();
// Force_ecryptfs_ wins.
mount_args.force_dircrypto =
!force_ecryptfs_ && request->force_dircrypto_if_available();
mount_args.shadow_only = request->hidden_mount();
ContinueMountExWithCredentials(
std::move(identifier), std::move(authorization), std::move(request),
std::unique_ptr<Credentials>(std::move(username_passkey)), mount_args,
context);
}
void Service::ContinueMountExWithCredentials(
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier,
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization,
std::unique_ptr<MountRequest> request,
std::unique_ptr<Credentials> credentials,
const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
CleanUpHiddenMounts();
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
BaseReply reply;
// Needed to pass along |recreated|
MountReply* mount_reply = reply.MutableExtension(MountReply::reply);
mount_reply->set_recreated(false);
// See ::Mount for detailed commentary.
bool other_mounts_active = true;
if (mounts_.size() == 0)
other_mounts_active = CleanUpStaleMounts(false);
if (!request->has_create() &&
!homedirs_->Exists(credentials->GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
// Provide an authoritative filesystem-sanitized username.
mount_reply->set_sanitized_username(
brillo::cryptohome::home::SanitizeUserName(GetAccountId(*identifier)));
// While it would be cleaner to implement the privilege enforcement
// here, that can only be done if a label was supplied. If a wildcard
// was supplied, then we can only perform the enforcement after the
// matching key is identified.
//
// See Mount::MountCryptohome for privilege checking.
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> guest_mount = GetMountForUser(guest_user_);
bool guest_mounted = guest_mount.get() && guest_mount->IsMounted();
// TODO(wad,ellyjones) Change this behavior to return failure even
// on a succesful unmount to tell chrome MOUNT_ERROR_NEEDS_RESTART.
if (guest_mounted && !guest_mount->UnmountCryptohome()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount cryptohome from Guest session";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> user_mount =
GetOrCreateMountForUser(GetAccountId(*identifier));
if (request->hidden_mount() && user_mount->IsMounted()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Hidden mount requested, but mount already exists.";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
// For public mount, don't proceed if there is any existing mount or stale
// mount. Exceptionally, it is normal and ok to have a failed previous mount
// attempt for the same user.
const bool only_self_unmounted_attempt =
mounts_.size() == 1 && !user_mount->IsMounted();
if (request->public_mount() && other_mounts_active &&
!only_self_unmounted_attempt) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Public mount requested with other mounts active.";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
// Don't overlay an ephemeral mount over a file-backed one.
if (mount_args.is_ephemeral && user_mount->IsNonEphemeralMounted()) {
// TODO(wad,ellyjones) Change this behavior to return failure even
// on a succesful unmount to tell chrome MOUNT_ERROR_NEEDS_RESTART.
if (!user_mount->UnmountCryptohome()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount vault before an ephemeral mount.";
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
}
if (user_mount->IsMounted()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Mount exists. Rechecking credentials.";
// Attempt a short-circuited credential test.
if (user_mount->AreSameUser(*credentials) &&
user_mount->AreValid(*credentials)) {
SendReply(context, reply);
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
return;
}
// If the Mount has invalid credentials (repopulated from system state)
// this will ensure a user can still sign-in with the right ones.
// TODO(wad) Should we unmount on a failed re-mount attempt?
if (!user_mount->AreValid(*credentials) &&
!homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(*credentials)) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED);
} else {
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
}
SendReply(context, reply);
return;
}
// See Mount for a relevant comment.
if (install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kFirstInstall) {
install_attrs_->Finalize();
}
// As per the other timers, this really only tracks time spent in
// MountCryptohome() not in the other areas prior.
ReportTimerStart(kMountExTimer);
MountError code = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE;
bool status = user_mount->MountCryptohome(*credentials, mount_args, &code);
user_mount->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kUninitialized);
// Mark the timer as done.
ReportTimerStop(kMountExTimer);
if (!status) {
reply.set_error(MountErrorToCryptohomeError(code));
}
if (code == MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED) {
mount_reply->set_recreated(true);
}
if (status) {
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
}
SendReply(context, reply);
if (!request->hidden_mount()) {
// Update user activity timestamp to be able to detect old users.
// This action is not mandatory, so we perform it after
// CryptohomeMount() returns, in background.
user_mount->UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp(0);
// Time to push the task for PKCS#11 initialization.
// TODO(wad) This call will PostTask back to the same thread. It is safe,
// but it seems pointless.
InitializePkcs11(user_mount.get());
}
}
gboolean Service::MountEx(const GArray *account_id,
const GArray *authorization_request,
const GArray *mount_request,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context) {
std::unique_ptr<AccountIdentifier> identifier(new AccountIdentifier);
std::unique_ptr<AuthorizationRequest> authorization(new AuthorizationRequest);
std::unique_ptr<MountRequest> request(new MountRequest);
// On parsing failure, pass along a NULL.
if (!identifier->ParseFromArray(account_id->data, account_id->len))
identifier.reset(NULL);
if (!authorization->ParseFromArray(authorization_request->data,
authorization_request->len))
authorization.reset(NULL);
if (!request->ParseFromArray(mount_request->data, mount_request->len))
request.reset(NULL);
// If PBs don't parse, the validation in the handler will catch it.
PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::DoMountEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Passed(std::move(identifier)),
base::Passed(std::move(authorization)),
base::Passed(std::move(request)),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::SendDircryptoMigrationProgressSignal(
DircryptoMigrationStatus status,
uint64_t current_bytes,
uint64_t total_bytes) {
event_source_.AddEvent(std::make_unique<DircryptoMigrationProgress>(
status, current_bytes, total_bytes));
}
void Service::DoMountGuestEx(scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> guest_mount,
std::unique_ptr<MountGuestRequest> request_pb,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!request_pb) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Bad MountGuestRequest");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
if (!guest_mount->MountGuestCryptohome())
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
else
reply.clear_error();
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::MountGuestEx(GArray* request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
auto request_pb = std::make_unique<MountGuestRequest>();
if (!request_pb->ParseFromArray(request->data, request->len))
request_pb.reset(nullptr);
if (mounts_.size() != 0)
LOG(WARNING) << "Guest mount requested with other mounts active.";
// Rather than make it safe to check the size, then clean up, just always
// clean up.
bool ok = RemoveAllMounts(true);
// Create a ref-counted guest mount for async use and then throw it away.
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> guest_mount =
GetOrCreateMountForUser(guest_user_);
BaseReply reply;
if (!ok) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount cryptohomes for Guest use";
if (!RemoveMountForUser(guest_user_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpectedly cannot drop unused Guest mount from map.";
}
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
return TRUE;
}
ReportTimerStart(kAsyncGuestMountTimer);
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoMountGuestEx, base::Unretained(this),
guest_mount, base::Passed(std::move(request_pb)),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
// Unmount all mounted cryptohomes.
gboolean Service::Unmount(gboolean *OUT_result, GError **error) {
*OUT_result = RemoveAllMounts(true);
// If there are any unexpected mounts lingering from a crash/restart,
// clean them up now.
CleanUpStaleMounts(true);
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoUnmountEx(std::unique_ptr<UnmountRequest> request_pb,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
if (!request_pb) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Bad UnmountRequest");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
if (!RemoveAllMounts(true))
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
else
reply.clear_error();
// If there are any unexpected mounts lingering from a crash/restart,
// clean them up now.
CleanUpStaleMounts(true);
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::UnmountEx(GArray* request, DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
auto request_pb = std::make_unique<UnmountRequest>();
if (!request_pb->ParseFromArray(request->data, request->len))
request_pb.reset(nullptr);
mount_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&Service::DoUnmountEx, base::Unretained(this),
base::Passed(std::move(request_pb)),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp(gint time_shift_sec,
GError **error) {
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
mount_pair.second->UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp(time_shift_sec);
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmIsReady(gboolean* OUT_ready, GError** error) {
*OUT_ready = tpm_init_->IsTpmReady();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmIsEnabled(gboolean* OUT_enabled, GError** error) {
*OUT_enabled = tpm_init_->IsTpmEnabled();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmGetPassword(gchar** OUT_password, GError** error) {
SecureBlob password;
if (!tpm_init_->GetTpmPassword(&password)) {
*OUT_password = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
// Convert to UTF-8 for sending over DBus. In case the original string
// contained only ASCII characters, the result will be identical to the
// original password.
SecureBlob utf8_password(
base::SysWideToUTF8(std::wstring(password.begin(), password.end())));
// Make sure we copy and NULL-terminate the entire UTF-8 string, even if
// there are 00 bytes in the middle of it. strndup/g_strndup would have
// stopped at the first 00. Can still be stripped later by DBus code, though.
size_t ret_size = utf8_password.size();
gchar* ret_str = g_new(gchar, ret_size + 1);
if (ret_str) {
memcpy(ret_str, utf8_password.char_data(), ret_size);
ret_str[ret_size] = 0;
}
*OUT_password = ret_str;
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmIsOwned(gboolean* OUT_owned, GError** error) {
*OUT_owned = tpm_init_->IsTpmOwned();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmIsBeingOwned(gboolean* OUT_owning, GError** error) {
*OUT_owning = tpm_init_->IsTpmBeingOwned();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmCanAttemptOwnership(GError** error) {
if (!tpm_init_->OwnershipRequested()) {
ReportTimerStart(kTpmTakeOwnershipTimer);
tpm_init_->AsyncTakeOwnership();
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmClearStoredPassword(GError** error) {
tpm_init_->ClearStoredTpmPassword();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::TpmGetVersionStructured(guint32* OUT_family,
guint64* OUT_spec_level,
guint32* OUT_manufacturer,
guint32* OUT_tpm_model,
guint64* OUT_firmware_version,
gchar** OUT_vendor_specific,
GError** error) {
cryptohome::Tpm::TpmVersionInfo version_info;
if (!tpm_init_->GetVersion(&version_info)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not get TPM version information.";
*OUT_family = 0;
*OUT_spec_level = 0;
*OUT_manufacturer = 0;
*OUT_tpm_model = 0;
*OUT_firmware_version = 0;
*OUT_vendor_specific = nullptr;
return FALSE;
}
*OUT_family = version_info.family;
*OUT_spec_level = version_info.spec_level;
*OUT_manufacturer = version_info.manufacturer;
*OUT_tpm_model = version_info.tpm_model;
*OUT_firmware_version = version_info.firmware_version;
std::string vendor_specific_hex =
base::HexEncode(version_info.vendor_specific.data(),
version_info.vendor_specific.size());
*OUT_vendor_specific = g_strdup(vendor_specific_hex.c_str());
return TRUE;
}
// Returns true if all Pkcs11 tokens are ready.
gboolean Service::Pkcs11IsTpmTokenReady(gboolean* OUT_ready, GError** error) {
*OUT_ready = TRUE;
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_) {
cryptohome::Mount* mount = mount_pair.second.get();
bool ok = (mount->pkcs11_state() == cryptohome::Mount::kIsInitialized);
*OUT_ready = *OUT_ready && ok;
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::Pkcs11GetTpmTokenInfo(gchar** OUT_label,
gchar** OUT_user_pin,
gint* OUT_slot,
GError** error) {
pkcs11_init_->GetTpmTokenInfo(OUT_label, OUT_user_pin);
*OUT_slot = -1;
CK_SLOT_ID slot;
if (pkcs11_init_->GetTpmTokenSlotForPath(FilePath(kChapsSystemToken), &slot))
*OUT_slot = slot;
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::Pkcs11GetTpmTokenInfoForUser(gchar* username,
gchar** OUT_label,
gchar** OUT_user_pin,
gint* OUT_slot,
GError** error) {
pkcs11_init_->GetTpmTokenInfoForUser(username, OUT_label, OUT_user_pin);
*OUT_slot = -1;
CK_SLOT_ID slot;
FilePath token_path = homedirs_->GetChapsTokenDir(username);
if (pkcs11_init_->GetTpmTokenSlotForPath(token_path, &slot))
*OUT_slot = slot;
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::Pkcs11Terminate(gchar* username, GError **error) {
base::AutoLock _lock(mounts_lock_);
for (const auto& mount_pair : mounts_)
mount_pair.second->RemovePkcs11Token();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesGet(gchar* name,
GArray** OUT_value,
gboolean* OUT_successful,
GError** error) {
brillo::Blob value;
*OUT_successful = install_attrs_->Get(name, &value);
// We must set the GArray now because if we return without setting it,
// dbus-glib loops forever.
*OUT_value = g_array_new(false, false, sizeof(value.front()));
if (!(*OUT_value)) {
return FALSE;
}
if (*OUT_successful) {
g_array_append_vals(*OUT_value, value.data(), value.size());
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesSet(gchar* name,
GArray* value,
gboolean* OUT_successful,
GError** error) {
// Convert from GArray to vector
brillo::Blob value_blob;
value_blob.assign(value->data, value->data + value->len);
*OUT_successful = install_attrs_->Set(name, value_blob);
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesFinalize(gboolean* OUT_finalized,
GError** error) {
*OUT_finalized = install_attrs_->Finalize();
// Check if the machine is enterprise owned and report this to mount_.
DetectEnterpriseOwnership();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesCount(gint* OUT_count, GError** error) {
// TODO(wad) for all of these functions return error on uninit.
// Follow the CHROMEOS_LOGIN_ERROR quark example in brillo/dbus/
*OUT_count = install_attrs_->Count();
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesIsReady(gboolean* OUT_ready,
GError** error) {
*OUT_ready =
(install_attrs_->status() != InstallAttributes::Status::kUnknown);
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesIsSecure(gboolean* OUT_is_secure,
GError** error) {
*OUT_is_secure = (install_attrs_->is_secure() == true);
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesIsInvalid(gboolean* OUT_is_invalid,
GError** error) {
// Is true after a failed init or prior to Init().
*OUT_is_invalid =
(install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kInvalid);
return TRUE;
}
gboolean Service::InstallAttributesIsFirstInstall(
gboolean* OUT_is_first_install,
GError** error) {
*OUT_is_first_install =
(install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kFirstInstall);
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoSignBootLockbox(const brillo::Blob& request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
SignBootLockboxRequest request_pb;
if (!request_pb.ParseFromArray(request.data(), request.size()) ||
!request_pb.has_data()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Bad SignBootLockboxRequest");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
SecureBlob signature;
if (!boot_lockbox_->Sign(brillo::BlobFromString(request_pb.data()),
&signature)) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_LOCKBOX_CANNOT_SIGN);
} else {
reply.MutableExtension(SignBootLockboxReply::reply)
->set_signature(signature.to_string());
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::SignBootLockbox(const GArray* request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoSignBootLockbox, base::Unretained(this),
brillo::Blob(request->data, request->data + request->len),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoVerifyBootLockbox(const brillo::Blob& request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
VerifyBootLockboxRequest request_pb;
if (!request_pb.ParseFromArray(request.data(), request.size()) ||
!request_pb.has_data() ||
!request_pb.has_signature()) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Bad VerifyBootLockboxRequest");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
if (!boot_lockbox_->Verify(brillo::BlobFromString(request_pb.data()),
SecureBlob(request_pb.signature()))) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_LOCKBOX_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::VerifyBootLockbox(const GArray* request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoVerifyBootLockbox, base::Unretained(this),
brillo::Blob(request->data, request->data + request->len),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoFinalizeBootLockbox(const brillo::Blob& request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
FinalizeBootLockboxRequest request_pb;
if (!request_pb.ParseFromArray(request.data(), request.size())) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Bad FinalizeBootLockboxRequest");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
if (!boot_lockbox_->FinalizeBoot()) {
reply.set_error(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR);
}
SendReply(context, reply);
}
gboolean Service::FinalizeBootLockbox(const GArray* request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Service::DoFinalizeBootLockbox, base::Unretained(this),
brillo::Blob(request->data, request->data + request->len),
base::Unretained(context)));
return TRUE;
}
void Service::DoGetBootAttribute(const brillo::Blob& request,
DBusGMethodInvocation* context) {
GetBootAttributeRequest request_pb;
if (!request_pb.ParseFromArray(request.data(), request.size())) {
SendInvalidArgsReply(context, "Bad GetBootAttributeRequest");
return;
}
BaseReply reply;
std::string value;
if (!boot_attributes_->Get(request_pb.name(), &value)) {
reply.set_error(