Merge changes from topic "uart_segregation" into integration

* changes:
  feat(sgi): add page table translation entry for secure uart
  feat(sgi): route TF-A logs via secure uart
  feat(sgi): deviate from arm css common uart related definitions
diff --git a/include/arch/aarch64/arch_helpers.h b/include/arch/aarch64/arch_helpers.h
index 009eb90..10b0a0b 100644
--- a/include/arch/aarch64/arch_helpers.h
+++ b/include/arch/aarch64/arch_helpers.h
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@
 DEFINE_SYSOP_PARAM_FUNC(xpaci)
 
 void flush_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
+void flush_dcache_to_popa_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
 void clean_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
 void inv_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size);
 bool is_dcache_enabled(void);
@@ -274,8 +275,10 @@
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, st)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, ld)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, ish)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, osh)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, nsh)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, ishst)
+DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dsb, oshst)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, oshld)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, oshst)
 DEFINE_SYSOP_TYPE_FUNC(dmb, osh)
@@ -610,14 +613,13 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Invalidate cached copies of GPT entries
- * from TLBs by physical address
+ * Invalidate TLBs of GPT entries by Physical address, last level.
  *
  * @pa: the starting address for the range
  *      of invalidation
  * @size: size of the range of invalidation
  */
-void gpt_tlbi_by_pa(uint64_t pa, size_t size);
+void gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll(uint64_t pa, size_t size);
 
 
 /* Previously defined accessor functions with incomplete register names  */
diff --git a/include/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h b/include/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h
index 379b915..94a88b0 100644
--- a/include/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h
+++ b/include/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@
 #define GPT_GPI_ANY			U(0xF)
 #define GPT_GPI_VAL_MASK		UL(0xF)
 
+#define GPT_NSE_SECURE			U(0b00)
+#define GPT_NSE_ROOT			U(0b01)
+#define GPT_NSE_NS			U(0b10)
+#define GPT_NSE_REALM			U(0b11)
+
+#define GPT_NSE_SHIFT                   U(62)
+
 /* PAS attribute GPI definitions. */
 #define GPT_PAS_ATTR_GPI_SHIFT		U(0)
 #define GPT_PAS_ATTR_GPI_MASK		U(0xF)
@@ -262,15 +269,12 @@
  *   base: Base address of the region to transition, must be aligned to granule
  *         size.
  *   size: Size of region to transition, must be aligned to granule size.
- *   src_sec_state: Security state of the caller.
- *   target_pas: Target PAS of the specified memory region.
+ *   src_sec_state: Security state of the originating SMC invoking the API.
  *
  * Return
  *    Negative Linux error code in the event of a failure, 0 for success.
  */
-int gpt_transition_pas(uint64_t base,
-		       size_t size,
-		       unsigned int src_sec_state,
-		       unsigned int target_pas);
+int gpt_delegate_pas(uint64_t base, size_t size, unsigned int src_sec_state);
+int gpt_undelegate_pas(uint64_t base, size_t size, unsigned int src_sec_state);
 
 #endif /* GPT_RME_H */
diff --git a/lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S b/lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S
index d1f3847..6faf545 100644
--- a/lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S
+++ b/lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2013-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <asm_macros.S>
 
 	.globl	flush_dcache_range
+	.globl	flush_dcache_to_popa_range
 	.globl	clean_dcache_range
 	.globl	inv_dcache_range
 	.globl	dcsw_op_louis
@@ -63,6 +64,35 @@
 endfunc inv_dcache_range
 
 
+	/*
+	 * On implementations with FEAT_MTE2,
+	 * Root firmware must issue DC_CIGDPAPA instead of DC_CIPAPA ,
+	 * in order to additionally clean and invalidate Allocation Tags
+	 * associated with the affected locations.
+	 *
+	 * ------------------------------------------
+	 * Clean+Invalidate by PA to POPA
+	 * from base address till size.
+	 * 'x0' = addr, 'x1' = size
+	 * ------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func flush_dcache_to_popa_range
+	/* Exit early if size is zero */
+	cbz	x1, exit_loop_dc_cipapa
+	dcache_line_size x2, x3
+	sub	x3, x2, #1
+	bic	x0, x0, x3
+	add	x1, x1, x0
+loop_dc_cipapa:
+	sys	#6, c7, c14, #1, x0 /* DC CIPAPA,<Xt> */
+	add	x0, x0, x2
+	cmp	x0, x1
+	b.lo	loop_dc_cipapa
+	dsb	osh
+exit_loop_dc_cipapa:
+	ret
+endfunc	flush_dcache_to_popa_range
+
 	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------
 	 * Data cache operations by set/way to the level specified
 	 *
diff --git a/lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S b/lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S
index 01531ca..e8110b0 100644
--- a/lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S
+++ b/lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2013-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 	.globl	zero_normalmem
 	.globl	zeromem
 	.globl	memcpy16
-	.globl	gpt_tlbi_by_pa
+	.globl	gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll
 
 	.globl	disable_mmu_el1
 	.globl	disable_mmu_el3
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
  * TODO: Currently only supports size of 4KB,
  * support other sizes as well.
  */
-func gpt_tlbi_by_pa
+func gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll
 #if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
 	cmp	x1, #PAGE_SIZE_4KB
 	ASM_ASSERT(eq)
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@
 	ASM_ASSERT(eq)
 #endif
 	lsr	x0, x0, #FOUR_KB_SHIFT	/* 4KB size encoding is zero */
-	sys	#6, c8, c4, #3, x0 	/* TLBI RPAOS, <Xt> */
+	sys	#6, c8, c4, #7, x0 	/* TLBI RPALOS, <Xt> */
 	dsb	sy
 	ret
-endfunc gpt_tlbi_by_pa
+endfunc gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll
diff --git a/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.c b/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.c
index e424fe2..d6fbc04 100644
--- a/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.c
+++ b/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -95,9 +95,8 @@
 	if ((gpi == GPT_GPI_NO_ACCESS) || (gpi == GPT_GPI_ANY) ||
 	    ((gpi >= GPT_GPI_SECURE) && (gpi <= GPT_GPI_REALM))) {
 		return true;
-	} else {
-		return false;
 	}
+	return false;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -117,9 +116,8 @@
 {
 	if (((base_1 + size_1) > base_2) && ((base_2 + size_2) > base_1)) {
 		return true;
-	} else {
-		return false;
 	}
+	return false;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -434,14 +432,14 @@
 	gpt_desc = GPT_L0_BLK_DESC(GPT_PAS_ATTR_GPI(pas->attrs));
 
 	/* Start index of this region in L0 GPTs */
-	idx = pas->base_pa >> GPT_L0_IDX_SHIFT;
+	idx = GPT_L0_IDX(pas->base_pa);
 
 	/*
 	 * Determine number of L0 GPT descriptors covered by
 	 * this PAS region and use the count to populate these
 	 * descriptors.
 	 */
-	end_idx = (pas->base_pa + pas->size) >> GPT_L0_IDX_SHIFT;
+	end_idx = GPT_L0_IDX(pas->base_pa + pas->size);
 
 	/* Generate the needed block descriptors. */
 	for (; idx < end_idx; idx++) {
@@ -471,8 +469,8 @@
 	uintptr_t cur_idx;
 	uintptr_t end_idx;
 
-	cur_idx = cur_pa >> GPT_L0_IDX_SHIFT;
-	end_idx = end_pa >> GPT_L0_IDX_SHIFT;
+	cur_idx = GPT_L0_IDX(cur_pa);
+	end_idx = GPT_L0_IDX(end_pa);
 
 	assert(cur_idx <= end_idx);
 
@@ -770,7 +768,7 @@
 
 	/* Validate other parameters. */
 	ret = gpt_validate_l0_params(pps, l0_mem_base, l0_mem_size);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (ret != 0) {
 		return ret;
 	}
 
@@ -849,7 +847,7 @@
 	if (l1_gpt_cnt > 0) {
 		ret = gpt_validate_l1_params(l1_mem_base, l1_mem_size,
 		      l1_gpt_cnt);
-		if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret != 0) {
 			return ret;
 		}
 
@@ -958,55 +956,170 @@
 static spinlock_t gpt_lock;
 
 /*
- * Check if caller is allowed to transition a PAS.
+ * A helper to write the value (target_pas << gpi_shift) to the index of
+ * the gpt_l1_addr
+ */
+static inline void write_gpt(uint64_t *gpt_l1_desc, uint64_t *gpt_l1_addr,
+			     unsigned int gpi_shift, unsigned int idx,
+			     unsigned int target_pas)
+{
+	*gpt_l1_desc &= ~(GPT_L1_GRAN_DESC_GPI_MASK << gpi_shift);
+	*gpt_l1_desc |= ((uint64_t)target_pas << gpi_shift);
+	gpt_l1_addr[idx] = *gpt_l1_desc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to retrieve the gpt_l1_* information from the base address
+ * returned in gpi_info
+ */
+static int get_gpi_params(uint64_t base, gpi_info_t *gpi_info)
+{
+	uint64_t gpt_l0_desc, *gpt_l0_base;
+
+	gpt_l0_base = (uint64_t *)gpt_config.plat_gpt_l0_base;
+	gpt_l0_desc = gpt_l0_base[GPT_L0_IDX(base)];
+	if (GPT_L0_TYPE(gpt_l0_desc) != GPT_L0_TYPE_TBL_DESC) {
+		VERBOSE("[GPT] Granule is not covered by a table descriptor!\n");
+		VERBOSE("      Base=0x%" PRIx64 "\n", base);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the table index and GPI shift from PA. */
+	gpi_info->gpt_l1_addr = GPT_L0_TBLD_ADDR(gpt_l0_desc);
+	gpi_info->idx = GPT_L1_IDX(gpt_config.p, base);
+	gpi_info->gpi_shift = GPT_L1_GPI_IDX(gpt_config.p, base) << 2;
+
+	gpi_info->gpt_l1_desc = (gpi_info->gpt_l1_addr)[gpi_info->idx];
+	gpi_info->gpi = (gpi_info->gpt_l1_desc >> gpi_info->gpi_shift) &
+		GPT_L1_GRAN_DESC_GPI_MASK;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is the granule transition delegate service. When a granule
+ * transition request occurs it is routed to this function to have the request,
+ * if valid, fulfilled following A1.1.1 Delegate of RME supplement
  *
- * - Secure world caller can only request S <-> NS transitions on a
- *   granule that is already in either S or NS PAS.
- *
- * - Realm world caller can only request R <-> NS transitions on a
- *   granule that is already in either R or NS PAS.
+ * TODO: implement support for transitioning multiple granules at once.
  *
  * Parameters
+ *   base		Base address of the region to transition, must be
+ *			aligned to granule size.
+ *   size		Size of region to transition, must be aligned to granule
+ *			size.
  *   src_sec_state	Security state of the caller.
- *   current_gpi	Current GPI of the granule.
- *   target_gpi		Requested new GPI for the granule.
  *
  * Return
  *   Negative Linux error code in the event of a failure, 0 for success.
  */
-static int gpt_check_transition_gpi(unsigned int src_sec_state,
-				    unsigned int current_gpi,
-				    unsigned int target_gpi)
+int gpt_delegate_pas(uint64_t base, size_t size, unsigned int src_sec_state)
 {
-	unsigned int check_gpi;
+	gpi_info_t gpi_info;
+	uint64_t nse;
+	int res;
+	unsigned int target_pas;
 
-	/* Cannot transition a granule to the state it is already in. */
-	if (current_gpi == target_gpi) {
+	/* Ensure that the tables have been set up before taking requests. */
+	assert(gpt_config.plat_gpt_l0_base != 0UL);
+
+	/* Ensure that caches are enabled. */
+	assert((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_C_BIT) != 0UL);
+
+	/* Delegate request can only come from REALM or SECURE */
+	assert(src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_REALM ||
+	       src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE);
+
+	/* See if this is a single or a range of granule transition. */
+	if (size != GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p)) {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* Check security state, only secure and realm can transition. */
-	if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_REALM) {
-		check_gpi = GPT_GPI_REALM;
-	} else if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
-		check_gpi = GPT_GPI_SECURE;
+	/* Check that base and size are valid */
+	if ((ULONG_MAX - base) < size) {
+		VERBOSE("[GPT] Transition request address overflow!\n");
+		VERBOSE("      Base=0x%" PRIx64 "\n", base);
+		VERBOSE("      Size=0x%lx\n", size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Make sure base and size are valid. */
+	if (((base & (GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p) - 1)) != 0UL) ||
+	    ((size & (GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p) - 1)) != 0UL) ||
+	    (size == 0UL) ||
+	    ((base + size) >= GPT_PPS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.t))) {
+		VERBOSE("[GPT] Invalid granule transition address range!\n");
+		VERBOSE("      Base=0x%" PRIx64 "\n", base);
+		VERBOSE("      Size=0x%lx\n", size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	target_pas = GPT_GPI_REALM;
+	if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
+		target_pas = GPT_GPI_SECURE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Access to L1 tables is controlled by a global lock to ensure
+	 * that no more than one CPU is allowed to make changes at any
+	 * given time.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&gpt_lock);
+	res = get_gpi_params(base, &gpi_info);
+	if (res != 0) {
+		spin_unlock(&gpt_lock);
+		return res;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that the current address is in NS state */
+	if (gpi_info.gpi != GPT_GPI_NS) {
+		VERBOSE("[GPT] Only Granule in NS state can be delegated.\n");
+		VERBOSE("      Caller: %u, Current GPI: %u\n", src_sec_state,
+			gpi_info.gpi);
+		spin_unlock(&gpt_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
+		nse = (uint64_t)GPT_NSE_SECURE << GPT_NSE_SHIFT;
 	} else {
-		return -EINVAL;
+		nse = (uint64_t)GPT_NSE_REALM << GPT_NSE_SHIFT;
 	}
 
-	/* Make sure security state is allowed to make the transition. */
-	if ((target_gpi != check_gpi) && (target_gpi != GPT_GPI_NS)) {
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if ((current_gpi != check_gpi) && (current_gpi != GPT_GPI_NS)) {
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	/*
+	 * In order to maintain mutual distrust between Realm and Secure
+	 * states, remove any data speculatively fetched into the target
+	 * physical address space. Issue DC CIPAPA over address range
+	 */
+	flush_dcache_to_popa_range(nse | base,
+				   GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+
+	write_gpt(&gpi_info.gpt_l1_desc, gpi_info.gpt_l1_addr,
+		  gpi_info.gpi_shift, gpi_info.idx, target_pas);
+	dsboshst();
+
+	gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll(base, GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+	dsbosh();
+
+	nse = (uint64_t)GPT_NSE_NS << GPT_NSE_SHIFT;
+
+	flush_dcache_to_popa_range(nse | base,
+				   GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+
+	/* Unlock access to the L1 tables. */
+	spin_unlock(&gpt_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * The isb() will be done as part of context
+	 * synchronization when returning to lower EL
+	 */
+	VERBOSE("[GPT] Granule 0x%" PRIx64 ", GPI 0x%x->0x%x\n",
+		base, gpi_info.gpi, target_pas);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * This function is the core of the granule transition service. When a granule
+ * This function is the granule transition undelegate service. When a granule
  * transition request occurs it is routed to this function where the request is
  * validated then fulfilled if possible.
  *
@@ -1018,29 +1131,32 @@
  *   size		Size of region to transition, must be aligned to granule
  *			size.
  *   src_sec_state	Security state of the caller.
- *   target_pas		Target PAS of the specified memory region.
  *
  * Return
  *    Negative Linux error code in the event of a failure, 0 for success.
  */
-int gpt_transition_pas(uint64_t base, size_t size, unsigned int src_sec_state,
-	unsigned int target_pas)
+int gpt_undelegate_pas(uint64_t base, size_t size, unsigned int src_sec_state)
 {
-	int idx;
-	unsigned int gpi_shift;
-	unsigned int gpi;
-	uint64_t gpt_l0_desc;
-	uint64_t gpt_l1_desc;
-	uint64_t *gpt_l1_addr;
-	uint64_t *gpt_l0_base;
+	gpi_info_t gpi_info;
+	uint64_t nse;
+	int res;
 
 	/* Ensure that the tables have been set up before taking requests. */
-	assert(gpt_config.plat_gpt_l0_base != 0U);
+	assert(gpt_config.plat_gpt_l0_base != 0UL);
 
-	/* Ensure that MMU and data caches are enabled. */
-	assert((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_C_BIT) != 0U);
+	/* Ensure that MMU and caches are enabled. */
+	assert((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_C_BIT) != 0UL);
 
-	/* Check for address range overflow. */
+	/* Delegate request can only come from REALM or SECURE */
+	assert(src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_REALM ||
+	       src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE);
+
+	/* See if this is a single or a range of granule transition. */
+	if (size != GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p)) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that base and size are valid */
 	if ((ULONG_MAX - base) < size) {
 		VERBOSE("[GPT] Transition request address overflow!\n");
 		VERBOSE("      Base=0x%" PRIx64 "\n", base);
@@ -1049,9 +1165,9 @@
 	}
 
 	/* Make sure base and size are valid. */
-	if (((base & (GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p) - 1)) != 0U) ||
-	    ((size & (GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p) - 1)) != 0U) ||
-	    (size == 0U) ||
+	if (((base & (GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p) - 1)) != 0UL) ||
+	    ((size & (GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p) - 1)) != 0UL) ||
+	    (size == 0UL) ||
 	    ((base + size) >= GPT_PPS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.t))) {
 		VERBOSE("[GPT] Invalid granule transition address range!\n");
 		VERBOSE("      Base=0x%" PRIx64 "\n", base);
@@ -1059,66 +1175,81 @@
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* See if this is a single granule transition or a range of granules. */
-	if (size != GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p)) {
-		/*
-		 * TODO: Add support for transitioning multiple granules with a
-		 * single call to this function.
-		 */
-		panic();
-	}
-
-	/* Get the L0 descriptor and make sure it is for a table. */
-	gpt_l0_base = (uint64_t *)gpt_config.plat_gpt_l0_base;
-	gpt_l0_desc = gpt_l0_base[GPT_L0_IDX(base)];
-	if (GPT_L0_TYPE(gpt_l0_desc) != GPT_L0_TYPE_TBL_DESC) {
-		VERBOSE("[GPT] Granule is not covered by a table descriptor!\n");
-		VERBOSE("      Base=0x%" PRIx64 "\n", base);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Get the table index and GPI shift from PA. */
-	gpt_l1_addr = GPT_L0_TBLD_ADDR(gpt_l0_desc);
-	idx = GPT_L1_IDX(gpt_config.p, base);
-	gpi_shift = GPT_L1_GPI_IDX(gpt_config.p, base) << 2;
-
 	/*
 	 * Access to L1 tables is controlled by a global lock to ensure
 	 * that no more than one CPU is allowed to make changes at any
 	 * given time.
 	 */
 	spin_lock(&gpt_lock);
-	gpt_l1_desc = gpt_l1_addr[idx];
-	gpi = (gpt_l1_desc >> gpi_shift) & GPT_L1_GRAN_DESC_GPI_MASK;
 
-	/* Make sure caller state and source/target PAS are allowed. */
-	if (gpt_check_transition_gpi(src_sec_state, gpi, target_pas) < 0) {
+	res = get_gpi_params(base, &gpi_info);
+	if (res != 0) {
 		spin_unlock(&gpt_lock);
-			VERBOSE("[GPT] Invalid caller state and PAS combo!\n");
-		VERBOSE("      Caller: %u, Current GPI: %u, Target GPI: %u\n",
-			src_sec_state, gpi, target_pas);
-		return -EPERM;
+		return res;
 	}
 
-	/* Clear existing GPI encoding and transition granule. */
-	gpt_l1_desc &= ~(GPT_L1_GRAN_DESC_GPI_MASK << gpi_shift);
-	gpt_l1_desc |= ((uint64_t)target_pas << gpi_shift);
-	gpt_l1_addr[idx] = gpt_l1_desc;
+	/* Check that the current address is in the delegated state */
+	if ((src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_REALM  &&
+	     gpi_info.gpi != GPT_GPI_REALM) ||
+	    (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE &&
+	     gpi_info.gpi != GPT_GPI_SECURE)) {
+		VERBOSE("[GPT] Only Granule in REALM or SECURE state can be undelegated.\n");
+		VERBOSE("      Caller: %u, Current GPI: %u\n", src_sec_state,
+			gpi_info.gpi);
+		spin_unlock(&gpt_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
-	/* Ensure that the write operation will be observed by GPC */
-	dsbishst();
+
+	/* In order to maintain mutual distrust between Realm and Secure
+	 * states, remove access now, in order to guarantee that writes
+	 * to the currently-accessible physical address space will not
+	 * later become observable.
+	 */
+	write_gpt(&gpi_info.gpt_l1_desc, gpi_info.gpt_l1_addr,
+		  gpi_info.gpi_shift, gpi_info.idx, GPT_GPI_NO_ACCESS);
+	dsboshst();
+
+	gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll(base, GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+	dsbosh();
+
+	if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
+		nse = (uint64_t)GPT_NSE_SECURE << GPT_NSE_SHIFT;
+	} else {
+		nse = (uint64_t)GPT_NSE_REALM << GPT_NSE_SHIFT;
+	}
+
+	/* Ensure that the scrubbed data has made it past the PoPA */
+	flush_dcache_to_popa_range(nse | base,
+				   GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove any data loaded speculatively
+	 * in NS space from before the scrubbing
+	 */
+	nse = (uint64_t)GPT_NSE_NS << GPT_NSE_SHIFT;
+
+	flush_dcache_to_popa_range(nse | base,
+				   GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+
+	/* Clear existing GPI encoding and transition granule. */
+	write_gpt(&gpi_info.gpt_l1_desc, gpi_info.gpt_l1_addr,
+		  gpi_info.gpi_shift, gpi_info.idx, GPT_GPI_NS);
+	dsboshst();
+
+	/* Ensure that all agents observe the new NS configuration */
+	gpt_tlbi_by_pa_ll(base, GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
+	dsbosh();
 
 	/* Unlock access to the L1 tables. */
 	spin_unlock(&gpt_lock);
 
-	gpt_tlbi_by_pa(base, GPT_PGS_ACTUAL_SIZE(gpt_config.p));
-	dsbishst();
 	/*
 	 * The isb() will be done as part of context
 	 * synchronization when returning to lower EL
 	 */
-	VERBOSE("[GPT] Granule 0x%" PRIx64 ", GPI 0x%x->0x%x\n", base, gpi,
-		target_pas);
+	VERBOSE("[GPT] Granule 0x%" PRIx64 ", GPI 0x%x->0x%x\n",
+		base, gpi_info.gpi, GPT_GPI_NS);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme_private.h b/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme_private.h
index 4203bba..3c817f3 100644
--- a/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme_private.h
+++ b/lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme_private.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -106,6 +106,17 @@
 	PGS_64KB_P =	16U
 } gpt_p_val_e;
 
+/*
+ * Internal structure to retrieve the values from get_gpi_info();
+ */
+typedef struct gpi_info {
+	uint64_t gpt_l1_desc;
+	uint64_t *gpt_l1_addr;
+	unsigned int idx;
+	unsigned int gpi_shift;
+	unsigned int gpi;
+} gpi_info_t;
+
 /* Max valid value for PGS. */
 #define GPT_PGS_MAX			(2U)
 
diff --git a/plat/brcm/board/common/board_common.mk b/plat/brcm/board/common/board_common.mk
index 3b3e92d..c0d8711 100644
--- a/plat/brcm/board/common/board_common.mk
+++ b/plat/brcm/board/common/board_common.mk
@@ -220,8 +220,6 @@
 ifneq (${MBEDTLS_CHECK},)
 $(info Found mbedTLS at ${MBEDTLS_DIR})
 PLAT_INCLUDES += -I${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/mbedtls
-# Specify mbedTLS configuration file
-MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE	:=	"<brcm_mbedtls_config.h>"
 
 # By default, use RSA keys
 KEY_ALG := rsa_1_5
diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c
index c4ea706..28d0b01 100644
--- a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c
+++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -325,30 +325,6 @@
 /* Subscribe to PSCI CPU on to initialize RMM on secondary */
 SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_cpu_on_finish, rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler);
 
-static int gtsi_transition_granule(uint64_t pa,
-					unsigned int src_sec_state,
-					unsigned int target_pas)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = gpt_transition_pas(pa, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, src_sec_state, target_pas);
-
-	/* Convert TF-A error codes into GTSI error codes */
-	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
-		ERROR("[GTSI] Transition failed: invalid %s\n", "address");
-		ERROR("       PA: 0x%" PRIx64 ", SRC: %d, PAS: %d\n", pa,
-		      src_sec_state, target_pas);
-		ret = GRAN_TRANS_RET_BAD_ADDR;
-	} else if (ret == -EPERM) {
-		ERROR("[GTSI] Transition failed: invalid %s\n", "caller/PAS");
-		ERROR("       PA: 0x%" PRIx64 ", SRC: %d, PAS: %d\n", pa,
-		      src_sec_state, target_pas);
-		ret = GRAN_TRANS_RET_BAD_PAS;
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
 /*******************************************************************************
  * This function handles all SMCs in the range reserved for GTF.
  ******************************************************************************/
@@ -357,6 +333,7 @@
 				void *handle, uint64_t flags)
 {
 	uint32_t src_sec_state;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
 	src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags);
@@ -368,13 +345,27 @@
 
 	switch (smc_fid) {
 	case SMC_ASC_MARK_REALM:
-		SMC_RET1(handle, gtsi_transition_granule(x1, SMC_FROM_REALM,
-								GPT_GPI_REALM));
+		ret = gpt_delegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM);
+		break;
 	case SMC_ASC_MARK_NONSECURE:
-		SMC_RET1(handle, gtsi_transition_granule(x1, SMC_FROM_REALM,
-								GPT_GPI_NS));
+		ret = gpt_undelegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM);
+		break;
 	default:
 		WARN("RMM: Unsupported GTF call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid);
 		SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
 	}
+
+	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+		ERROR("[GTSI] Transition failed: invalid %s\n", "address");
+		ERROR("       PA: 0x%"PRIx64 ", SRC: %d, PAS: %d\n", x1,
+		      SMC_FROM_REALM, smc_fid);
+		ret = GRAN_TRANS_RET_BAD_ADDR;
+	} else if (ret == -EPERM) {
+		ERROR("[GTSI] Transition failed: invalid %s\n", "caller/PAS");
+		ERROR("       PA: 0x%"PRIx64 ", SRC: %d, PAS: %d\n", x1,
+		      SMC_FROM_REALM, smc_fid);
+		ret = GRAN_TRANS_RET_BAD_PAS;
+	}
+
+	SMC_RET1(handle, ret);
 }