Merge pull request #2 from neverware/pauln-shim-15.4

CloudReady shim 15.4 submission
diff --git a/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md b/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md
index 85a7711..bc94809 100644
--- a/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md
+++ b/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md
@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@
  - [ ] link to your code branch cloned from rhboot/shim-review in the form user/repo@tag
  - [ ] completed README.md file with the necessary information
  - [ ] shim.efi to be signed
- - [ ] public portion of your certificate embedded in shim (the file passed to VENDOR_CERT_FILE)
+ - [ ] public portion of your certificate(s) embedded in shim (the file passed to VENDOR_CERT_FILE)
+ - [ ] binaries, for which hashes are added do vendor_db ( if you use vendor_db and have hashes allow-listed )
  - [ ] any extra patches to shim via your own git tree or as files
  - [ ] any extra patches to grub via your own git tree or as files
  - [ ] build logs
+ - [ ] a Dockerfile to reproduce the build of the provided shim EFI binaries
 
 
 ###### What organization or people are asking to have this signed:
@@ -15,7 +17,11 @@
 ###### What product or service is this for:
 `[your text here]`
 
-###### What is the origin and full version number of your shim?
+###### Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file:
+###### https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
+###### This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains
+###### the appropriate gnu-efi source.
+###### Please confirm this as the origin your shim.
 `[your text here]`
 
 ###### What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
@@ -27,12 +33,57 @@
 ###### Do you use EV certificates as embedded certificates in the SHIM?
 `[your text here]`
 
+###### If you use new vendor_db functionality, are any hashes allow-listed, and if yes: for what binaries ?
+`[your text here]`
+
+###### Is kernel upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 present in your kernel, if you boot chain includes a Linux kernel ?
+`[your text here]`
+
+###### if SHIM is loading GRUB2 bootloader, are CVEs CVE-2020-14372,
+###### CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779,
+###### CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308,
+###### CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,
+###### ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
+###### and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
+###### fixed ?
+`[your text here]`
+
+###### "Please specifically confirm that you add a vendor specific SBAT entry for SBAT header in each binary that supports SBAT metadata
+###### ( grub2, fwupd, fwupdate, shim + all child shim binaries )" to shim review doc ?
+###### Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim
+`[your text here]`
+
+##### Were your old SHIM hashes provided to Microsoft ?
+`[your text here]`
+
+##### Did you change your certificate strategy, so that affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
+##### CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,
+##### CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
+##### grub2 bootloaders can not be verified ?
+`[your text here]`
+
+##### What exact implementation of Secureboot in grub2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?
+##### * Upstream grub2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
+`[your text here]`
+
 ###### What is the origin and full version number of your bootloader (GRUB or other)?
 `[your text here]`
 
 ###### If your SHIM launches any other components, please provide further details on what is launched
 `[your text here]`
 
+###### If your GRUB2 launches any other binaries that are not Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode,
+###### please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown
+`[your text here]`
+
+###### If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you
+###### will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries
+###### exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent
+###### GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If
+###### you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not
+###### apply. Please describe your strategy.
+`[your text here]`
+
 ###### How do the launched components prevent execution of unauthenticated code?
 `[your text here]`
 
@@ -45,5 +96,5 @@
 ###### What changes were made since your SHIM was last signed?
 `[your text here]`
 
-###### What is the hash of your final SHIM binary?
+###### What is the SHA256 hash of your final SHIM binary?
 `[your text here]`
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1888fb4..6f5479e 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -4,12 +4,14 @@
 - edit the template below
 - add the shim.efi to be signed
 - add build logs
+- add any additional binaries/certificates/SHA256 hashes that may be needed
 - commit all of that
 - tag it with a tag of the form "myorg-shim-arch-YYYYMMDD"
 - push that to github
-- file an issue at https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues with a link to your tag
+- file an issue at https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues with a link to your branch
+- approval is ready when you have accepted tag
 
-Note that we really only have experience with using grub2 on Linux, so asking
+Note that we really only have experience with using GRUB2 on Linux, so asking
 us to endorse anything else for signing is going to require some convincing on
 your part.
 
@@ -18,64 +20,86 @@
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 What organization or people are asking to have this signed:
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Neverware Inc. (https://www.neverware.com)
+Google
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 What product or service is this for:
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CloudReady
+CloudReady 
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-CloudReady is a Linux distro; we'd like to encourage people to boot our OS with secure boot enabled.
+CloudReady is a Linux distribution, forked from Chromium OS.  We want to enable (and encourage) our user base to boot our OS with secure boot enabled.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Who is the primary contact for security updates, etc.
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 - Name: Nicholas Bishop
-- Position: software developer
-- Email address: nbishop@neverware.com
-- PGP key, signed by the other security contacts, and preferably also with signatures that are reasonably well known in the linux community: https://github.com/neverware/shim-review/blob/master/nbishop.key
+- Position: Software Engineer
+- Email address: nicholasbishop@google.com
+- PGP key, signed by the other security contacts, and preferably also with signatures that are reasonably well known in the Linux community: https://github.com/neverware/shim-review/blob/master/nbishop.key
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Who is the secondary contact for security updates, etc.
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 - Name: Paul Nardini
-- Position: Director of Engineering
-- Email address: pnardini@neverware.com
-- PGP key, signed by the other security contacts, and preferably also with signatures that are reasonably well known in the linux community: https://github.com/neverware/shim-review/blob/master/pnardini.key
+- Position: Engineering Manager
+- Email address: nardini@google.com
+- PGP key, signed by the other security contacts, and preferably also with signatures that are reasonably well known in the Linux community: https://github.com/neverware/shim-review/blob/master/pnardini.key
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-What upstream shim tag is this starting from:
+Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file:
+https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
+
+This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains
+the appropriate gnu-efi source.
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-https://github.com/rhboot/shim/tree/shim-15.1
+We can confirm that all of our shim binaries are built from the referenced tarball.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 URL for a repo that contains the exact code which was built to get this binary:
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-https://github.com/rhboot/shim/tree/shim-15.1
+https://github.com/rhboot/shim/tree/15.4
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 What patches are being applied and why:
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-A patch for a missing '{' in mok.c is applied to the shim-15.1 code base, as the build fails without it:
-https://github.com/neverware/shim-build/blob/v4/build-fix.patch
+No shim patches are applied.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-If bootloader, shim loading is, grub2: is CVE-2020-10713 fixed ?
+If bootloader, shim loading is, GRUB2: is CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632,
+ CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233,
+ CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311,
+ CVE-2020-15705, and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Yes.
+All of the referenced CVEs are fixed in our GRUB2 fork.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-If bootloader, shim loading is, grub2, and previous shims were trusting affected
-by CVE-2020-10713 grub2:
+What exact implementation of Secureboot in GRUB2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?
+* Upstream GRUB2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+If bootloader, shim loading is, GRUB2, and previous shims were trusting affected
+by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
+  CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,
+  CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,
+  and if you were shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
+  ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
+  grub2:
 * were old shims hashes provided to Microsoft for verification
   and to be added to future DBX update ?
-* Does your new chain of trust disallow booting old, affected by CVE-2020-10713,
+* Does your new chain of trust disallow booting old, affected by CVE-2020-14372,
+  CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
+  CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,
+  CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,
+  and if you were shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
+  ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
   grub2 builds ?
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-1) Yes, our old hashes have been sent to Microsoft for verification via email to ueficamanualreview@microsoft.com.
+1) Yes, our old vulnerable hashes have been sent to Microsoft for verification via email to ueficamanualreview@microsoft.com.
 2) Our new chain of trust will utilize our new EV Code Signing certificate for the first time, which expires in 2022.  All vulnerable versions of grub that we have released to date have been signed with our old now-expired certificate (exp. 09/02/2020), so they will not be allowed to boot in our new chain of trust.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -90,17 +114,26 @@
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 If you use vendor_db functionality of providing multiple certificates and/or
-hashes please briefly describe your certificate setup. If there are whitelisted hashes
+hashes please briefly describe your certificate setup. If there are allow-listed hashes
 please provide exact binaries for which hashes are created via file sharing service,
 available in public with anonymous access for verification
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 We do not use this functionality.
 
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you will need
+to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries to vendor_dbx in shim
+in order to prevent GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2
+binaries. If you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not
+apply. Please describe your strategy.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+We are changing to a new certificate.
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 What OS and toolchain must we use to reproduce this build?  Include where to find it, etc.  We're going to try to reproduce your build as close as possible to verify that it's really a build of the source tree you tell us it is, so these need to be fairly thorough. At the very least include the specific versions of gcc, binutils, and gnu-efi which were used, and where to find those binaries.
+If the shim binaries can't be reproduced using the provided Dockerfile, please explain why that's the case and the differences would be.
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-This repo contains the Dockerfile we use to build shim: https://github.com/neverware/shim-build/tree/v4
+All shim binaries can be built using our Dockerfile and instructions in the README.md of https://github.com/neverware/shim-build/tree/v5
 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Which files in this repo are the logs for your build?   This should include logs for creating the buildroots, applying patches, doing the build, creating the archives, etc.
@@ -110,7 +143,4 @@
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Add any additional information you think we may need to validate this shim
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Our shim-15.1 build is largely upstream's 15.1 with our new public certificate embedded.  This build has been tested with our new grub, which is now up-to-date with fedora-33.
-
-
-
+We made our last shim submissions as Neverware.  See https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues/27 and https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues/106.
diff --git a/build.log b/build.log
index a9a2385..6be8a75 100644
--- a/build.log
+++ b/build.log
Binary files differ
diff --git a/shimia32.efi b/shimia32.efi
index 0daab66..1011808 100755
--- a/shimia32.efi
+++ b/shimia32.efi
Binary files differ
diff --git a/shimx64.efi b/shimx64.efi
index df6ce77..2eb95e4 100755
--- a/shimx64.efi
+++ b/shimx64.efi
Binary files differ