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// This file was extracted from the TCG Published
// Trusted Platform Module Library
// Part 4: Supporting Routines
// Family "2.0"
// Level 00 Revision 01.16
// October 30, 2014
#include <string.h>
#include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
#ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
//
//
// Local Functions
//
// RsaPrivateExponent()
//
// This function computes the private exponent de = 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1) The inputs are the public modulus
// and one of the primes.
// The results are returned in the key->private structure. The size of that structure is expanded to hold the
// private exponent. If the computed value is smaller than the public modulus, the private exponent is de-
// normalized.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS private exponent computed
// CRYPT_PARAMETER prime is not half the size of the modulus, or the modulus is not evenly
// divisible by the prime, or no private exponent could be computed
// from the input parameters
//
CRYPT_RESULT
RsaPrivateExponent(
RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key to augment with the private
// exponent
)
{
BN_CTX *context;
BIGNUM *bnD;
BIGNUM *bnN;
BIGNUM *bnP;
BIGNUM *bnE;
BIGNUM *bnPhi;
BIGNUM *bnQ;
BIGNUM *bnQr;
UINT32 fill;
CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Assume success
pAssert(key != NULL && key->privateKey != NULL && key->publicKey != NULL);
context = BN_CTX_new();
if(context == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
BN_CTX_start(context);
bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnPhi = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnQr = BN_CTX_get(context);
if(bnQr == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
// Assume the size of the public key value is within range
pAssert(key->publicKey->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
if( BN_bin2bn(key->publicKey->buffer, key->publicKey->size, bnN) == NULL
|| BN_bin2bn(key->privateKey->buffer, key->privateKey->size, bnP) == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// If P size is not 1/2 of n size, then this is not a valid value for this
// implementation. This will also catch the case were P is input as zero.
// This generates a return rather than an assert because the key being loaded
// might be SW generated and wrong.
if(BN_num_bits(bnP) < BN_num_bits(bnN)/2)
{
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
// Get q = n/p;
if (BN_div(bnQ, bnQr, bnN, bnP, context) != 1)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// If there is a remainder, then this is not a valid n
if(BN_num_bytes(bnQr) != 0 || BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP))
{
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; // problem may be recoverable
goto Cleanup;
}
// Get compute Phi = (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - p - q + 1 = n - p - q + 1
if( BN_copy(bnPhi, bnN) == NULL
|| !BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnP)
|| !BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnQ)
|| !BN_add_word(bnPhi, 1))
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// Compute the multiplicative inverse
BN_set_word(bnE, key->exponent);
if(BN_mod_inverse(bnD, bnE, bnPhi, context) == NULL)
{
// Going to assume that the error is caused by a bad
// set of parameters. Specifically, an exponent that is
// not compatible with the primes. In an implementation that
// has better visibility to the error codes, this might be
// refined so that failures in the library would return
// a more informative value. Should not assume here that
// the error codes will remain unchanged.
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
fill = key->publicKey->size - BN_num_bytes(bnD);
BN_bn2bin(bnD, &key->privateKey->buffer[fill]);
memset(key->privateKey->buffer, 0, fill);
// Change the size of the private key so that it is known to contain
// a private exponent rather than a prime.
key->privateKey->size = key->publicKey->size;
Cleanup:
BN_CTX_end(context);
BN_CTX_free(context);
return retVal;
}
//
//
// _cpri__TestKeyRSA()
//
// This function computes the private exponent de = 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1) The inputs are the public modulus
// and one of the primes or two primes.
// If both primes are provided, the public modulus is computed. If only one prime is provided, the second
// prime is computed. In either case, a private exponent is produced and placed in d.
// If no modular inverse exists, then CRYPT_PARAMETER is returned.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS private exponent (d) was generated
// CRYPT_PARAMETER one or more parameters are invalid
//
LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
_cpri__TestKeyRSA(
TPM2B *d, // OUT: the address to receive the private
// exponent
UINT32 exponent, // IN: the public modulu
TPM2B *publicKey, // IN/OUT: an input if only one prime is
// provided. an output if both primes are
// provided
TPM2B *prime1, // IN: a first prime
TPM2B *prime2 // IN: an optional second prime
)
{
BN_CTX *context;
BIGNUM *bnD;
BIGNUM *bnN;
BIGNUM *bnP;
BIGNUM *bnE;
BIGNUM *bnPhi;
BIGNUM *bnQ;
BIGNUM *bnQr;
UINT32 fill;
CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Assume success
pAssert(publicKey != NULL && prime1 != NULL);
// Make sure that the sizes are within range
pAssert( prime1->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2
&& publicKey->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
pAssert( prime2 == NULL || prime2->size < MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2);
if(publicKey->size/2 != prime1->size)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
context = BN_CTX_new();
if(context == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
BN_CTX_start(context);
bnE = BN_CTX_get(context); // public exponent (e)
bnD = BN_CTX_get(context); // private exponent (d)
bnN = BN_CTX_get(context); // public modulus (n)
bnP = BN_CTX_get(context); // prime1 (p)
bnPhi = BN_CTX_get(context); // (p-1)(q-1)
bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context); // prime2 (q)
bnQr = BN_CTX_get(context); // n mod p
if(bnQr == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
if(BN_bin2bn(prime1->buffer, prime1->size, bnP) == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// If prime2 is provided, then compute n
if(prime2 != NULL)
{
// Two primes provided so use them to compute n
if(BN_bin2bn(prime2->buffer, prime2->size, bnQ) == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// Make sure that the sizes of the primes are compatible
if(BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP))
{
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
// Multiply the primes to get the public modulus
if(BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context) != 1)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// if the space provided for the public modulus is large enough,
// save the created value
if(BN_num_bits(bnN) != (publicKey->size * 8))
{
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
BN_bn2bin(bnN, publicKey->buffer);
}
else
{
if (BN_is_zero(bnP))
{
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
// One prime provided so find the second prime by division
BN_bin2bn(publicKey->buffer, publicKey->size, bnN);
// Get q = n/p;
if(BN_div(bnQ, bnQr, bnN, bnP, context) != 1)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// If there is a remainder, then this is not a valid n
if(BN_num_bytes(bnQr) != 0 || BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP))
{
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; // problem may be recoverable
goto Cleanup;
}
}
// Get compute Phi = (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - p - q + 1 = n - p - q + 1
BN_copy(bnPhi, bnN);
BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnP);
BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnQ);
BN_add_word(bnPhi, 1);
// Compute the multiplicative inverse
BN_set_word(bnE, exponent);
if(BN_mod_inverse(bnD, bnE, bnPhi, context) == NULL)
{
// Going to assume that the error is caused by a bad set of parameters.
// Specifically, an exponent that is not compatible with the primes.
// In an implementation that has better visibility to the error codes,
// this might be refined so that failures in the library would return
// a more informative value.
// Do not assume that the error codes will remain unchanged.
retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
// Return the private exponent.
// Make sure it is normalized to have the correct size.
d->size = publicKey->size;
fill = d->size - BN_num_bytes(bnD);
BN_bn2bin(bnD, &d->buffer[fill]);
memset(d->buffer, 0, fill);
Cleanup:
BN_CTX_end(context);
BN_CTX_free(context);
return retVal;
}
//
//
// RSAEP()
//
// This function performs the RSAEP operation defined in PKCS#1v2.1. It is an exponentiation of a value
// (m) with the public exponent (e), modulo the public (n).
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS encryption complete
// CRYPT_PARAMETER number to exponentiate is larger than the modulus
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
RSAEP (
UINT32 dInOutSize, // OUT size of the encrypted block
BYTE *dInOut, // OUT: the encrypted data
RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key to use
)
{
UINT32 e;
BYTE exponent[4];
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
e = key->exponent;
if(e == 0)
e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(e, exponent);
//!!! Can put check for test of RSA here
retVal = _math__ModExp(dInOutSize, dInOut, dInOutSize, dInOut, 4, exponent,
key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer);
// Exponentiation result is stored in-place, thus no space shortage is possible.
pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_UNDERFLOW);
return retVal;
}
//
//
// RSADP()
//
// This function performs the RSADP operation defined in PKCS#1v2.1. It is an exponentiation of a value (c)
// with the private exponent (d), modulo the public modulus (n). The decryption is in place.
//
// This function also checks the size of the private key. If the size indicates that only a prime value is
// present, the key is converted to being a private exponent.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS decryption succeeded
// CRYPT_PARAMETER the value to decrypt is larger than the modulus
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
RSADP (
UINT32 dInOutSize, // IN/OUT: size of decrypted data
BYTE *dInOut, // IN/OUT: the decrypted data
RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key
)
{
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
//!!! Can put check for RSA tested here
// Make sure that the pointers are provided and that the private key is present
// If the private key is present it is assumed to have been created by
// so is presumed good _cpri__PrivateExponent
pAssert(key != NULL && dInOut != NULL &&
key->publicKey->size == key->publicKey->size);
// make sure that the value to be decrypted is smaller than the modulus
// note: this check is redundant as is also performed by _math__ModExp()
// which is optimized for use in RSA operations
if(_math__uComp(key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer,
dInOutSize, dInOut) <= 0)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
// _math__ModExp can return CRYPT_PARAMTER or CRYPT_UNDERFLOW but actual
// underflow is not possible because everything is in the same buffer.
retVal = _math__ModExp(dInOutSize, dInOut, dInOutSize, dInOut,
key->privateKey->size, key->privateKey->buffer,
key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer);
// Exponentiation result is stored in-place, thus no space shortage is possible.
pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_UNDERFLOW);
return retVal;
}
//
//
// OaepEncode()
//
// This function performs OAEP padding. The size of the buffer to receive the OAEP padded data must
// equal the size of the modulus
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS encode successful
// CRYPT_PARAMETER hashAlg is not valid
// CRYPT_FAIL message size is too large
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
OaepEncode(
UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: pad value size
BYTE *padded, // OUT: the pad data
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for padding
const char *label, // IN: null-terminated string (may be NULL)
UINT32 messageSize, // IN: the message size
BYTE *message // IN: the message being padded
#ifdef TEST_RSA //
, BYTE *testSeed // IN: optional seed used for testing.
#endif // TEST_RSA //
)
{
UINT32 padLen;
UINT32 dbSize;
UINT32 i;
BYTE mySeed[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
BYTE *seed = mySeed;
INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES];
BYTE *pp;
BYTE *pm;
UINT32 lSize = 0;
CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
pAssert(padded != NULL && message != NULL);
// A value of zero is not allowed because the KDF can't produce a result
// if the digest size is zero.
if(hLen <= 0)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
// If a label is provided, get the length of the string, including the
// terminator
if(label != NULL)
lSize = (UINT32)strlen(label) + 1;
// Basic size check
// messageSize <= k 2hLen 2
if(messageSize > paddedSize - 2 * hLen - 2)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
// Hash L even if it is null
// Offset into padded leaving room for masked seed and byte of zero
pp = &padded[hLen + 1];
retVal = _cpri__HashBlock(hashAlg, lSize, (BYTE *)label, hLen, pp);
// concatenate PS of k mLen 2hLen 2
padLen = paddedSize - messageSize - (2 * hLen) - 2;
memset(&pp[hLen], 0, padLen);
pp[hLen+padLen] = 0x01;
padLen += 1;
memcpy(&pp[hLen+padLen], message, messageSize);
// The total size of db = hLen + pad + mSize;
dbSize = hLen+padLen+messageSize;
// If testing, then use the provided seed. Otherwise, use values
// from the RNG
#ifdef TEST_RSA
if(testSeed != NULL)
seed = testSeed;
else
#endif // TEST_RSA
_cpri__GenerateRandom(hLen, mySeed);
// mask = MGF1 (seed, nSize hLen 1)
if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(dbSize, mask, hashAlg, hLen, seed)) < 0)
return retVal; // Don't expect an error because hash size is not zero
// was detected in the call to _cpri__HashBlock() above.
// Create the masked db
pm = mask;
for(i = dbSize; i > 0; i--)
*pp++ ^= *pm++;
pp = &padded[hLen + 1];
// Run the masked data through MGF1
if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(hLen, &padded[1], hashAlg, dbSize, pp)) < 0)
return retVal; // Don't expect zero here as the only case for zero
// was detected in the call to _cpri__HashBlock() above.
// Now XOR the seed to create masked seed
pp = &padded[1];
pm = seed;
for(i = hLen; i > 0; i--)
*pp++ ^= *pm++;
// Set the first byte to zero
*padded = 0x00;
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// OaepDecode()
//
// This function performs OAEP padding checking. The size of the buffer to receive the recovered data. If
// the padding is not valid, the dSize size is set to zero and the function returns CRYPT_NO_RESULTS.
// The dSize parameter is used as an input to indicate the size available in the buffer. If insufficient space is
// available, the size is not changed and the return code is CRYPT_FAIL.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS decode complete
// CRYPT_PARAMETER the value to decode was larger than the modulus
// CRYPT_FAIL the padding is wrong or the buffer to receive the results is too small
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
OaepDecode(
UINT32 *dataOutSize, // IN/OUT: the recovered data size
BYTE *dataOut, // OUT: the recovered data
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for padding
const char *label, // IN: null-terminated string (may be NULL)
UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: the size of the padded data
BYTE *padded // IN: the padded data
)
{
UINT32 dSizeSave;
UINT32 i;
BYTE seedMask[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES];
BYTE *pp;
BYTE *pm;
UINT32 lSize = 0;
CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
// Unknown hash
pAssert(hLen > 0 && dataOutSize != NULL && dataOut != NULL && padded != NULL);
// If there is a label, get its size including the terminating 0x00
if(label != NULL)
lSize = (UINT32)strlen(label) + 1;
// Set the return size to zero so that it doesn't have to be done on each
// failure
dSizeSave = *dataOutSize;
*dataOutSize = 0;
// Strange size (anything smaller can't be an OAEP padded block)
// Also check for no leading 0
if(paddedSize < (unsigned)((2 * hLen) + 2) || *padded != 0)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
// Use the hash size to determine what to put through MGF1 in order
// to recover the seedMask
if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(hLen, seedMask, hashAlg,
paddedSize-hLen-1, &padded[hLen+1])) < 0)
return retVal;
// Recover the seed into seedMask
pp = &padded[1];
pm = seedMask;
for(i = hLen; i > 0; i--)
*pm++ ^= *pp++;
// Use the seed to generate the data mask
if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(paddedSize-hLen-1, mask, hashAlg,
hLen, seedMask)) < 0)
return retVal;
// Use the mask generated from seed to recover the padded data
pp = &padded[hLen+1];
pm = mask;
for(i = paddedSize-hLen-1; i > 0; i--)
*pm++ ^= *pp++;
// Make sure that the recovered data has the hash of the label
// Put trial value in the seed mask
if((retVal=_cpri__HashBlock(hashAlg, lSize,(BYTE *)label, hLen, seedMask)) < 0)
return retVal;
if(memcmp(seedMask, mask, hLen) != 0)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
// find the start of the data
pm = &mask[hLen];
for(i = paddedSize-(2*hLen)-1; i > 0; i--)
{
if(*pm++ != 0)
break;
}
// Magic value in the end of the fill area must be 1, anything else must be
// rejected.
if (pm[-1] != 1)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
if(i == 0)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
// pm should be pointing at the first part of the data
// and i is one greater than the number of bytes to move
i--;
if(i > dSizeSave)
{
// Restore dSize
*dataOutSize = dSizeSave;
return CRYPT_FAIL;
}
memcpy(dataOut, pm, i);
*dataOutSize = i;
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// PKSC1v1_5Encode()
//
// This function performs the encoding for RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT as defined in PKCS#1V2.1
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS data encoded
// CRYPT_PARAMETER message size is too large
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
RSAES_PKSC1v1_5Encode(
UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: pad value size
BYTE *padded, // OUT: the pad data
UINT32 messageSize, // IN: the message size
BYTE *message // IN: the message being padded
)
{
UINT32 ps = paddedSize - messageSize - 3;
if(messageSize > paddedSize - 11)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
// move the message to the end of the buffer
memcpy(&padded[paddedSize - messageSize], message, messageSize);
// Set the first byte to 0x00 and the second to 0x02
*padded = 0;
padded[1] = 2;
// Fill with random bytes
_cpri__GenerateRandom(ps, &padded[2]);
// Set the delimiter for the random field to 0
padded[2+ps] = 0;
// Now, the only messy part. Make sure that all the ps bytes are non-zero
// In this implementation, use the value of the current index
for(ps++; ps > 1; ps--)
{
if(padded[ps] == 0)
padded[ps] = 0x55; // In the < 0.5% of the cases that the random
// value is 0, just pick a value to put into
// the spot.
}
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// RSAES_Decode()
//
// This function performs the decoding for RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT as defined in PKCS#1V2.1
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful
// CRYPT_FAIL decoding error or results would no fit into provided buffer
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
RSAES_Decode(
UINT32 *messageSize, // IN/OUT: recovered message size
BYTE *message, // OUT: the recovered message
UINT32 codedSize, // IN: the encoded message size
BYTE *coded // IN: the encoded message
)
{
BOOL fail = FALSE;
UINT32 ps;
fail = (codedSize < 11);
fail |= (coded[0] != 0x00) || (coded[1] != 0x02);
for(ps = 2; ps < codedSize; ps++)
{
if(coded[ps] == 0)
break;
}
ps++;
// Make sure that ps has not gone over the end and that there are at least 8
// bytes of pad data.
fail |= ((ps >= codedSize) || ((ps-2) < 8));
if((*messageSize < codedSize - ps) || fail)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
*messageSize = codedSize - ps;
memcpy(message, &coded[ps], codedSize - ps);
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// PssEncode()
//
// This function creates an encoded block of data that is the size of modulus. The function uses the
// maximum salt size that will fit in the encoded block.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS encode successful
// CRYPT_PARAMETER hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
PssEncode (
UINT32 eOutSize, // IN: size of the encode data buffer
BYTE *eOut, // OUT: encoded data buffer
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding
UINT32 hashInSize, // IN: size of digest to encode
BYTE *hashIn // IN: the digest
#ifdef TEST_RSA //
, BYTE *saltIn // IN: optional parameter for testing
#endif // TEST_RSA //
)
{
INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
BYTE salt[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES - 1];
UINT16 saltSize;
BYTE *ps = salt;
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
UINT16 mLen;
CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
// These are fatal errors indicating bad TPM firmware
pAssert(eOut != NULL && hLen > 0 && hashIn != NULL );
// Get the size of the mask
mLen = (UINT16)(eOutSize - hLen - 1);
// Maximum possible salt size is mask length - 1
saltSize = mLen - 1;
// Use the maximum salt size allowed by FIPS 186-4
if(saltSize > hLen)
saltSize = (UINT16)hLen;
//using eOut for scratch space
// Set the first 8 bytes to zero
memset(eOut, 0, 8);
// Get set the salt
#ifdef TEST_RSA
if(saltIn != NULL)
{
saltSize = hLen;
memcpy(salt, saltIn, hLen);
}
else
#endif // TEST_RSA
_cpri__GenerateRandom(saltSize, salt);
// Create the hash of the pad || input hash || salt
_cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 8, eOut);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, hashInSize, hashIn);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, saltSize, salt);
_cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, hLen, &eOut[eOutSize - hLen - 1]);
// Create a mask
if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(mLen, eOut, hashAlg, hLen, &eOut[mLen])) < 0)
{
// Currently _cpri__MGF1 is not expected to return a CRYPT_RESULT error.
pAssert(0);
}
// Since this implementation uses key sizes that are all even multiples of
// 8, just need to make sure that the most significant bit is CLEAR
eOut[0] &= 0x7f;
// Before we mess up the eOut value, set the last byte to 0xbc
eOut[eOutSize - 1] = 0xbc;
// XOR a byte of 0x01 at the position just before where the salt will be XOR'ed
eOut = &eOut[mLen - saltSize - 1];
*eOut++ ^= 0x01;
// XOR the salt data into the buffer
for(; saltSize > 0; saltSize--)
*eOut++ ^= *ps++;
// and we are done
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// PssDecode()
//
// This function checks that the PSS encoded block was built from the provided digest. If the check is
// successful, CRYPT_SUCCESS is returned. Any other value indicates an error.
// This implementation of PSS decoding is intended for the reference TPM implementation and is not at all
// generalized. It is used to check signatures over hashes and assumptions are made about the sizes of
// values. Those assumptions are enforce by this implementation. This implementation does allow for a
// variable size salt value to have been used by the creator of the signature.
//
//
//
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful
// CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm
// CRYPT_FAIL decode operation failed
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
PssDecode(
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding
UINT32 dInSize, // IN: size of the digest to compare
BYTE *dIn, // In: the digest to compare
UINT32 eInSize, // IN: size of the encoded data
BYTE *eIn, // IN: the encoded data
UINT32 saltSize // IN: the expected size of the salt
)
{
INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES];
BYTE *pm = mask;
BYTE pad[8] = {0};
UINT32 i;
UINT32 mLen;
BOOL fail = FALSE;
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
// These errors are indicative of failures due to programmer error
pAssert(dIn != NULL && eIn != NULL);
// check the hash scheme
if(hLen == 0)
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
// most significant bit must be zero
fail = ((eIn[0] & 0x80) != 0);
// last byte must be 0xbc
fail |= (eIn[eInSize - 1] != 0xbc);
// Use the hLen bytes at the end of the buffer to generate a mask
// Doesn't start at the end which is a flag byte
mLen = eInSize - hLen - 1;
if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(mLen, mask, hashAlg, hLen, &eIn[mLen])) < 0)
return retVal;
if(retVal == 0)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
// Clear the MSO of the mask to make it consistent with the encoding.
mask[0] &= 0x7F;
// XOR the data into the mask to recover the salt. This sequence
// advances eIn so that it will end up pointing to the seed data
// which is the hash of the signature data
for(i = mLen; i > 0; i--)
*pm++ ^= *eIn++;
// Find the first byte of 0x01 after a string of all 0x00
for(pm = mask, i = mLen; i > 0; i--)
{
if(*pm == 0x01)
break;
else
fail |= (*pm++ != 0);
}
fail |= (i == 0);
// if we have failed, will continue using the entire mask as the salt value so
// that the timing attacks will not disclose anything (I don't think that this
// is a problem for TPM applications but, usually, we don't fail so this
// doesn't cost anything).
if(fail)
{
i = mLen;
pm = mask;
}
else
{
pm++;
i--;
}
// If the salt size was provided, then the recovered size must match
fail |= (saltSize != 0 && i != saltSize);
// i contains the salt size and pm points to the salt. Going to use the input
// hash and the seed to recreate the hash in the lower portion of eIn.
_cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState);
// add the pad of 8 zeros
_cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 8, pad);
// add the provided digest value
_cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, dInSize, dIn);
// and the salt
_cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, i, pm);
// get the result
retVal = _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, mask);
// retVal will be the size of the digest or zero. If not equal to the indicated
// digest size, then the signature doesn't match
fail |= (retVal != hLen);
fail |= (memcmp(mask, eIn, hLen) != 0);
if(fail)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
else
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// PKSC1v1_5SignEncode()
//
// Encode a message using PKCS1v1().5 method.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS encode complete
// CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm
// CRYPT_PARAMETER eOutSize is not large enough or hInSize does not match the digest
// size of hashAlg
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
RSASSA_Encode(
UINT32 eOutSize, // IN: the size of the resulting block
BYTE *eOut, // OUT: the encoded block
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for PKSC1v1_5
UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of hash to be signed
BYTE *hIn // IN: hash buffer
)
{
const BYTE *der;
INT32 derSize = _cpri__GetHashDER(hashAlg, &der);
INT32 fillSize;
pAssert(eOut != NULL && hIn != NULL);
// Can't use this scheme if the algorithm doesn't have a DER string defined.
if(derSize == 0 )
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
// If the digest size of 'hashAl' doesn't match the input digest size, then
// the DER will misidentify the digest so return an error
if((unsigned)_cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg) != hInSize)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
fillSize = eOutSize - derSize - hInSize - 3;
// Make sure that this combination will fit in the provided space
if(fillSize < 8)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
// Start filling
*eOut++ = 0; // initial byte of zero
*eOut++ = 1; // byte of 0x01
for(; fillSize > 0; fillSize--)
*eOut++ = 0xff; // bunch of 0xff
*eOut++ = 0; // another 0
for(; derSize > 0; derSize--)
*eOut++ = *der++; // copy the DER
for(; hInSize > 0; hInSize--)
*eOut++ = *hIn++; // copy the hash
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// RSASSA_Decode()
//
// This function performs the RSASSA decoding of a signature.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful
// CRYPT_FAIL decode unsuccessful
// CRYPT_SCHEME haslAlg is not supported
//
static CRYPT_RESULT
RSASSA_Decode(
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding
UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of the digest to compare
BYTE *hIn, // In: the digest to compare
UINT32 eInSize, // IN: size of the encoded data
BYTE *eIn // IN: the encoded data
)
{
BOOL fail = FALSE;
const BYTE *der;
INT32 derSize = _cpri__GetHashDER(hashAlg, &der);
INT32 hashSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
INT32 fillSize;
pAssert(hIn != NULL && eIn != NULL);
// Can't use this scheme if the algorithm doesn't have a DER string
// defined or if the provided hash isn't the right size
if(derSize == 0 || (unsigned)hashSize != hInSize)
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
// Make sure that this combination will fit in the provided space
// Since no data movement takes place, can just walk though this
// and accept nearly random values. This can only be called from
// _cpri__ValidateSignature() so eInSize is known to be in range.
fillSize = eInSize - derSize - hashSize - 3;
// Start checking
fail |= (*eIn++ != 0); // initial byte of zero
fail |= (*eIn++ != 1); // byte of 0x01
for(; fillSize > 0; fillSize--)
fail |= (*eIn++ != 0xff); // bunch of 0xff
fail |= (*eIn++ != 0); // another 0
for(; derSize > 0; derSize--)
fail |= (*eIn++ != *der++); // match the DER
for(; hInSize > 0; hInSize--)
fail |= (*eIn++ != *hIn++); // match the hash
if(fail)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
}
//
//
// Externally Accessible Functions
//
// _cpri__RsaStartup()
//
// Function that is called to initialize the hash service. In this implementation, this function does nothing but
// it is called by the CryptUtilStartup() function and must be present.
//
LIB_EXPORT BOOL
_cpri__RsaStartup(
void
)
{
return TRUE;
}
//
//
// _cpri__EncryptRSA()
//
// This is the entry point for encryption using RSA. Encryption is use of the public exponent. The padding
// parameter determines what padding will be used.
// The cOutSize parameter must be at least as large as the size of the key.
// If the padding is RSA_PAD_NONE, dIn is treaded as a number. It must be lower in value than the key
// modulus.
//
//
//
// NOTE: If dIn has fewer bytes than cOut, then we don't add low-order zeros to dIn to make it the size of the RSA key for
// the call to RSAEP. This is because the high order bytes of dIn might have a numeric value that is greater than
// the value of the key modulus. If this had low-order zeros added, it would have a numeric value larger than the
// modulus even though it started out with a lower numeric value.
//
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS encryption complete
// CRYPT_PARAMETER cOutSize is too small (must be the size of the modulus)
// CRYPT_SCHEME padType is not a supported scheme
//
LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
_cpri__EncryptRSA(
UINT32 *cOutSize, // OUT: the size of the encrypted data
BYTE *cOut, // OUT: the encrypted data
RSA_KEY *key, // IN: the key to use for encryption
TPM_ALG_ID padType, // IN: the type of padding
UINT32 dInSize, // IN: the amount of data to encrypt
BYTE *dIn, // IN: the data to encrypt
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: in case this is needed
const char *label // IN: in case it is needed
)
{
CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
pAssert(cOutSize != NULL);
// All encryption schemes return the same size of data
if(*cOutSize < key->publicKey->size)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
*cOutSize = key->publicKey->size;
switch (padType)
{
case TPM_ALG_NULL: // 'raw' encryption
{
// dIn can have more bytes than cOut as long as the extra bytes
// are zero
for(; dInSize > *cOutSize; dInSize--)
{
if(*dIn++ != 0)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
}
// If dIn is smaller than cOut, fill cOut with zeros
if(dInSize < *cOutSize)
memset(cOut, 0, *cOutSize - dInSize);
// Copy the rest of the value
memcpy(&cOut[*cOutSize-dInSize], dIn, dInSize);
// If the size of dIn is the same as cOut dIn could be larger than
// the modulus. If it is, then RSAEP() will catch it.
}
break;
case TPM_ALG_RSAES:
retVal = RSAES_PKSC1v1_5Encode(*cOutSize, cOut, dInSize, dIn);
break;
case TPM_ALG_OAEP:
retVal = OaepEncode(*cOutSize, cOut, hashAlg, label, dInSize, dIn
#ifdef TEST_RSA
,NULL
#endif
);
break;
default:
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
}
// All the schemes that do padding will come here for the encryption step
// Check that the Encoding worked
if(retVal != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
return retVal;
// Padding OK so do the encryption
return RSAEP(*cOutSize, cOut, key);
}
//
//
// _cpri__DecryptRSA()
//
// This is the entry point for decryption using RSA. Decryption is use of the private exponent. The padType
// parameter determines what padding was used.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS successful completion
// CRYPT_PARAMETER cInSize is not the same as the size of the public modulus of key; or
// numeric value of the encrypted data is greater than the modulus
// CRYPT_FAIL dOutSize is not large enough for the result
// CRYPT_SCHEME padType is not supported
//
LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
_cpri__DecryptRSA(
UINT32 *dOutSize, // OUT: the size of the decrypted data
BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data
RSA_KEY *key, // IN: the key to use for decryption
TPM_ALG_ID padType, // IN: the type of padding
UINT32 cInSize, // IN: the amount of data to decrypt
BYTE *cIn, // IN: the data to decrypt
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: in case this is needed for the scheme
const char *label // IN: in case it is needed for the scheme
)
{
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
// Make sure that the necessary parameters are provided
pAssert(cIn != NULL && dOut != NULL && dOutSize != NULL && key != NULL);
// Size is checked to make sure that the decryption works properly
if(cInSize != key->publicKey->size)
return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
// For others that do padding, do the decryption in place and then
// go handle the decoding.
if((retVal = RSADP(cInSize, cIn, key)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
return retVal; // Decryption failed
// Remove padding
switch (padType)
{
case TPM_ALG_NULL:
if(*dOutSize < key->publicKey->size)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
*dOutSize = key->publicKey->size;
memcpy(dOut, cIn, *dOutSize);
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
case TPM_ALG_RSAES:
return RSAES_Decode(dOutSize, dOut, cInSize, cIn);
break;
case TPM_ALG_OAEP:
return OaepDecode(dOutSize, dOut, hashAlg, label, cInSize, cIn);
break;
default:
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
break;
}
}
//
//
// _cpri__SignRSA()
//
// This function is used to generate an RSA signature of the type indicated in scheme.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS sign operation completed normally
// CRYPT_SCHEME scheme or hashAlg are not supported
// CRYPT_PARAMETER hInSize does not match hashAlg (for RSASSA)
//
LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
_cpri__SignRSA(
UINT32 *sigOutSize, // OUT: size of signature
BYTE *sigOut, // OUT: signature
RSA_KEY *key, // IN: key to use
TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme to use
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for PKSC1v1_5
UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of digest to be signed
BYTE *hIn // IN: digest buffer
)
{
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
// Parameter checks
pAssert(sigOutSize != NULL && sigOut != NULL && key != NULL && hIn != NULL);
// For all signatures the size is the size of the key modulus
*sigOutSize = key->publicKey->size;
switch (scheme)
{
case TPM_ALG_NULL:
*sigOutSize = 0;
return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS:
// PssEncode can return CRYPT_PARAMETER
retVal = PssEncode(*sigOutSize, sigOut, hashAlg, hInSize, hIn
#ifdef TEST_RSA
, NULL
#endif
);
break;
case TPM_ALG_RSASSA:
// RSASSA_Encode can return CRYPT_PARAMETER or CRYPT_SCHEME
retVal = RSASSA_Encode(*sigOutSize, sigOut, hashAlg, hInSize, hIn);
break;
default:
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
}
if(retVal != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
return retVal;
// Do the encryption using the private key
// RSADP can return CRYPT_PARAMETR
return RSADP(*sigOutSize,sigOut, key);
}
//
//
// _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA()
//
// This function is used to validate an RSA signature. If the signature is valid CRYPT_SUCCESS is
// returned. If the signature is not valid, CRYPT_FAIL is returned. Other return codes indicate either
// parameter problems or fatal errors.
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_SUCCESS the signature checks
// CRYPT_FAIL the signature does not check
// CRYPT_SCHEME unsupported scheme or hash algorithm
//
LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
_cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA(
RSA_KEY *key, // IN: key to use
TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme to use
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of digest to be checked
BYTE *hIn, // IN: digest buffer
UINT32 sigInSize, // IN: size of signature
BYTE *sigIn, // IN: signature
UINT16 saltSize // IN: salt size for PSS
)
{
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
// Fatal programming errors
pAssert(key != NULL && sigIn != NULL && hIn != NULL);
// Errors that might be caused by calling parameters
if(sigInSize != key->publicKey->size)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
// Decrypt the block
if((retVal = RSAEP(sigInSize, sigIn, key)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
return CRYPT_FAIL;
switch (scheme)
{
case TPM_ALG_NULL:
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
break;
case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS:
return PssDecode(hashAlg, hInSize, hIn, sigInSize, sigIn, saltSize);
break;
case TPM_ALG_RSASSA:
return RSASSA_Decode(hashAlg, hInSize, hIn, sigInSize, sigIn);
break;
default:
break;
}
return CRYPT_SCHEME;
}
#ifndef RSA_KEY_SIEVE
//
//
// _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA()
//
// Generate an RSA key from a provided seed
//
//
//
//
// Return Value Meaning
//
// CRYPT_FAIL exponent is not prime or is less than 3; or could not find a prime using
// the provided parameters
// CRYPT_CANCEL operation was canceled
//
LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
_cpri__GenerateKeyRSA(
TPM2B *n, // OUT: The public modulu
TPM2B *p, // OUT: One of the prime factors of n
UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: Size of the public modulus in bit
UINT32 e, // IN: The public exponent
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use in the key
// generation proce
TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed to use
const char *label, // IN: A label for the generation process.
TPM2B *extra, // IN: Party 1 data for the KDF
UINT32 *counter // IN/OUT: Counter value to allow KFD iteration
// to be propagated across multiple routine
)
{
UINT32 lLen; // length of the label
// (counting the terminating 0);
UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
TPM2B_HASH_BLOCK oPadKey;
UINT32 outer;
UINT32 inner;
BYTE swapped[4];
CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
int i, fill;
const static char defaultLabel[] = "RSA key";
BYTE *pb;
CPRI_HASH_STATE h1; // contains the hash of the
// HMAC key w/ iPad
CPRI_HASH_STATE h2; // contains the hash of the
// HMAC key w/ oPad
CPRI_HASH_STATE h; // the working hash context
BIGNUM *bnP;
BIGNUM *bnQ;
BIGNUM *bnT;
BIGNUM *bnE;
BIGNUM *bnN;
BN_CTX *context;
UINT32 rem;
// Make sure that hashAlg is valid hash
pAssert(digestSize != 0);
// if present, use externally provided counter
if(counter != NULL)
outer = *counter;
else
outer = 1;
// Validate exponent
UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(e, swapped);
// Need to check that the exponent is prime and not less than 3
if( e != 0 && (e < 3 || !_math__IsPrime(e)))
return CRYPT_FAIL;
// Get structures for the big number representations
context = BN_CTX_new();
if(context == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
BN_CTX_start(context);
bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
if(bnN == NULL)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// Set Q to zero. This is used as a flag. The prime is computed in P. When a
// new prime is found, Q is checked to see if it is zero. If so, P is copied
// to Q and a new P is found. When both P and Q are non-zero, the modulus and
// private exponent are computed and a trial encryption/decryption is
// performed. If the encrypt/decrypt fails, assume that at least one of the
// primes is composite. Since we don't know which one, set Q to zero and start
// over and find a new pair of primes.
BN_zero(bnQ);
// Need to have some label
if(label == NULL)
label = (const char *)&defaultLabel;
// Get the label size
for(lLen = 0; label[lLen++] != 0;);
// Start the hash using the seed and get the intermediate hash value
_cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg, FALSE, &h1, seed->size, seed->buffer, &oPadKey.b);
_cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &h2);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h2, oPadKey.b.size, oPadKey.b.buffer);
n->size = (keySizeInBits +7)/8;
pAssert(n->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
p->size = n->size / 2;
if(e == 0)
e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
BN_set_word(bnE, e);
// The first test will increment the counter from zero.
for(outer += 1; outer != 0; outer++)
{
if(_plat__IsCanceled())
{
retVal = CRYPT_CANCEL;
goto Cleanup;
}
// Need to fill in the candidate with the hash
fill = digestSize;
pb = p->buffer;
// Reset the inner counter
inner = 0;
for(i = p->size; i > 0; i -= digestSize)
{
inner++;
// Initialize the HMAC with saved state
_cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &h1);
// Hash the inner counter (the one that changes on each HMAC iteration)
UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(inner, swapped);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h, lLen, (BYTE *)label);
// Is there any party 1 data
if(extra != NULL)
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h, extra->size, extra->buffer);
// Include the outer counter (the one that changes on each prime
// prime candidate generation
UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(outer, swapped);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped);
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 2, (BYTE *)&keySizeInBits);
if(i < fill)
fill = i;
_cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb);
// Restart the oPad hash
_cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &h2);
// Add the last hashed data
_cpri__UpdateHash(&h, fill, pb);
// gives a completed HMAC
_cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb);
pb += fill;
}
// Set the Most significant 2 bits and the low bit of the candidate
p->buffer[0] |= 0xC0;
p->buffer[p->size - 1] |= 1;
// Convert the candidate to a BN
BN_bin2bn(p->buffer, p->size, bnP);
// If this is the second prime, make sure that it differs from the
// first prime by at least 2^100
if(!BN_is_zero(bnQ))
{
// bnQ is non-zero if we already found it
if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) < 0)
BN_sub(bnT, bnQ, bnP);
else
BN_sub(bnT, bnP, bnQ);
if(BN_num_bits(bnT) < 100) // Difference has to be at least 100 bits
continue;
}
// Make sure that the prime candidate (p) is not divisible by the exponent
// and that (p-1) is not divisible by the exponent
// Get the remainder after dividing by the modulus
rem = BN_mod_word(bnP, e);
if(rem == 0) // evenly divisible so add two keeping the number odd and
// making sure that 1 != p mod e
BN_add_word(bnP, 2);
else if(rem == 1) // leaves a remainder of 1 so subtract two keeping the
// number odd and making (e-1) = p mod e
BN_sub_word(bnP, 2);
// Have a candidate, check for primality
if((retVal = (CRYPT_RESULT)BN_is_prime_ex(bnP,
BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL)) < 0)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
if(retVal != 1)
continue;
// Found a prime, is this the first or second.
if(BN_is_zero(bnQ))
{
// copy p to q and compute another prime in p
BN_copy(bnQ, bnP);
continue;
}
//Form the public modulus
BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context);
if(BN_num_bits(bnN) != keySizeInBits)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// Save the public modulus
BnTo2B(n, bnN, n->size); // Will pad the buffer to the correct size
pAssert((n->buffer[0] & 0x80) != 0);
// And one prime
BnTo2B(p, bnP, p->size);
pAssert((p->buffer[0] & 0x80) != 0);
// Finish by making sure that we can form the modular inverse of PHI
// with respect to the public exponent
// Compute PHI = (p - 1)(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1
// Make sure that we can form the modular inverse
BN_sub(bnT, bnN, bnP);
BN_sub(bnT, bnT, bnQ);
BN_add_word(bnT, 1);
// find d such that (Phi * d) mod e ==1
// If there isn't then we are broken because we took the step
// of making sure that the prime != 1 mod e so the modular inverse
// must exist
if(BN_mod_inverse(bnT, bnE, bnT, context) == NULL || BN_is_zero(bnT))
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// And, finally, do a trial encryption decryption
{
TPM2B_TYPE(RSA_KEY, MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
TPM2B_RSA_KEY r;
r.t.size = sizeof(n->size);
// If we are using a seed, then results must be reproducible on each
// call. Otherwise, just get a random number
if(seed == NULL)
_cpri__GenerateRandom(n->size, r.t.buffer);
else
{
// this this version does not have a deterministic RNG, XOR the
// public key and private exponent to get a deterministic value
// for testing.
int i;
// Generate a random-ish number starting with the public modulus
// XORed with the MSO of the seed
for(i = 0; i < n->size; i++)
r.t.buffer[i] = n->buffer[i] ^ seed->buffer[0];
}
// Make sure that the number is smaller than the public modulus
r.t.buffer[0] &= 0x7F;
// Convert
if( BN_bin2bn(r.t.buffer, r.t.size, bnP) == NULL
// Encrypt with the public exponent
|| BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnP, bnE, bnN, context) != 1
// Decrypt with the private exponent
|| BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnQ, bnT, bnN, context) != 1)
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// If the starting and ending values are not the same, start over )-;
if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) != 0)
{
BN_zero(bnQ);
continue;
}
}
retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
goto Cleanup;
}
retVal = CRYPT_FAIL;
Cleanup:
// Close out the hash sessions
_cpri__CompleteHash(&h2, 0, NULL);
_cpri__CompleteHash(&h1, 0, NULL);
// Free up allocated BN values
BN_CTX_end(context);
BN_CTX_free(context);
if(counter != NULL)
*counter = outer;
return retVal;
}
#endif // RSA_KEY_SIEVE
#endif // TPM_ALG_RSA