| // |
| // Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| // |
| |
| #include "update_engine/omaha_response_handler_action.h" |
| |
| #include <limits> |
| #include <string> |
| |
| #include <base/logging.h> |
| #include <base/strings/string_number_conversions.h> |
| #include <policy/device_policy.h> |
| |
| #include "update_engine/common/constants.h" |
| #include "update_engine/common/hardware_interface.h" |
| #include "update_engine/common/prefs_interface.h" |
| #include "update_engine/common/utils.h" |
| #include "update_engine/connection_manager_interface.h" |
| #include "update_engine/omaha_request_params.h" |
| #include "update_engine/payload_consumer/delta_performer.h" |
| #include "update_engine/payload_state_interface.h" |
| #include "update_engine/update_manager/policy.h" |
| #include "update_engine/update_manager/update_manager.h" |
| |
| using chromeos_update_manager::kRollforwardInfinity; |
| using chromeos_update_manager::Policy; |
| using chromeos_update_manager::UpdateManager; |
| using std::numeric_limits; |
| using std::string; |
| |
| namespace chromeos_update_engine { |
| |
| OmahaResponseHandlerAction::OmahaResponseHandlerAction( |
| SystemState* system_state) |
| : system_state_(system_state), |
| deadline_file_(constants::kOmahaResponseDeadlineFile) {} |
| |
| void OmahaResponseHandlerAction::PerformAction() { |
| CHECK(HasInputObject()); |
| ScopedActionCompleter completer(processor_, this); |
| const OmahaResponse& response = GetInputObject(); |
| if (!response.update_exists) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "There are no updates. Aborting."; |
| completer.set_code(ErrorCode::kNoUpdate); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // All decisions as to which URL should be used have already been done. So, |
| // make the current URL as the download URL. |
| string current_url = system_state_->payload_state()->GetCurrentUrl(); |
| if (current_url.empty()) { |
| // This shouldn't happen as we should always supply the HTTPS backup URL. |
| // Handling this anyway, just in case. |
| LOG(ERROR) << "There are no suitable URLs in the response to use."; |
| completer.set_code(ErrorCode::kOmahaResponseInvalid); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // This is the url to the first package, not all packages. |
| install_plan_.download_url = current_url; |
| install_plan_.version = response.version; |
| install_plan_.system_version = response.system_version; |
| |
| OmahaRequestParams* const params = system_state_->request_params(); |
| PayloadStateInterface* const payload_state = system_state_->payload_state(); |
| |
| // If we're using p2p to download and there is a local peer, use it. |
| if (payload_state->GetUsingP2PForDownloading() && |
| !payload_state->GetP2PUrl().empty()) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Replacing URL " << install_plan_.download_url |
| << " with local URL " << payload_state->GetP2PUrl() |
| << " since p2p is enabled."; |
| install_plan_.download_url = payload_state->GetP2PUrl(); |
| payload_state->SetUsingP2PForDownloading(true); |
| } |
| |
| // Fill up the other properties based on the response. |
| string update_check_response_hash; |
| for (const auto& package : response.packages) { |
| brillo::Blob raw_hash; |
| if (!base::HexStringToBytes(package.hash, &raw_hash)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to convert payload hash from hex string to bytes: " |
| << package.hash; |
| completer.set_code(ErrorCode::kOmahaResponseInvalid); |
| return; |
| } |
| install_plan_.payloads.push_back( |
| {.size = package.size, |
| .metadata_size = package.metadata_size, |
| .metadata_signature = package.metadata_signature, |
| .hash = raw_hash, |
| .type = package.is_delta ? InstallPayloadType::kDelta |
| : InstallPayloadType::kFull}); |
| update_check_response_hash += package.hash + ":"; |
| } |
| install_plan_.public_key_rsa = response.public_key_rsa; |
| install_plan_.hash_checks_mandatory = AreHashChecksMandatory(response); |
| install_plan_.is_resume = DeltaPerformer::CanResumeUpdate( |
| system_state_->prefs(), update_check_response_hash); |
| if (install_plan_.is_resume) { |
| payload_state->UpdateResumed(); |
| } else { |
| payload_state->UpdateRestarted(); |
| LOG_IF(WARNING, |
| !DeltaPerformer::ResetUpdateProgress(system_state_->prefs(), false)) |
| << "Unable to reset the update progress."; |
| LOG_IF(WARNING, |
| !system_state_->prefs()->SetString(kPrefsUpdateCheckResponseHash, |
| update_check_response_hash)) |
| << "Unable to save the update check response hash."; |
| } |
| |
| if (params->is_install()) { |
| install_plan_.target_slot = system_state_->boot_control()->GetCurrentSlot(); |
| install_plan_.source_slot = BootControlInterface::kInvalidSlot; |
| } else { |
| install_plan_.source_slot = system_state_->boot_control()->GetCurrentSlot(); |
| install_plan_.target_slot = install_plan_.source_slot == 0 ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| // The Omaha response doesn't include the channel name for this image, so we |
| // use the download_channel we used during the request to tag the target slot. |
| // This will be used in the next boot to know the channel the image was |
| // downloaded from. |
| string current_channel_key = |
| kPrefsChannelOnSlotPrefix + std::to_string(install_plan_.target_slot); |
| system_state_->prefs()->SetString(current_channel_key, |
| params->download_channel()); |
| |
| // Checking whether device is able to boot up the returned rollback image. |
| if (response.is_rollback) { |
| if (!params->rollback_allowed()) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Received rollback image but rollback is not allowed."; |
| completer.set_code(ErrorCode::kOmahaResponseInvalid); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Calculate the values on the version values on current device. |
| auto min_kernel_key_version = static_cast<uint32_t>( |
| system_state_->hardware()->GetMinKernelKeyVersion()); |
| auto min_firmware_key_version = static_cast<uint32_t>( |
| system_state_->hardware()->GetMinFirmwareKeyVersion()); |
| |
| uint32_t kernel_key_version = |
| static_cast<uint32_t>(response.rollback_key_version.kernel_key) << 16 | |
| static_cast<uint32_t>(response.rollback_key_version.kernel); |
| uint32_t firmware_key_version = |
| static_cast<uint32_t>(response.rollback_key_version.firmware_key) |
| << 16 | |
| static_cast<uint32_t>(response.rollback_key_version.firmware); |
| |
| LOG(INFO) << "Rollback image versions:" |
| << " device_kernel_key_version=" << min_kernel_key_version |
| << " image_kernel_key_version=" << kernel_key_version |
| << " device_firmware_key_version=" << min_firmware_key_version |
| << " image_firmware_key_version=" << firmware_key_version; |
| |
| // Don't attempt a rollback if the versions are incompatible or the |
| // target image does not specify the version information. |
| if (kernel_key_version == numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() || |
| firmware_key_version == numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() || |
| kernel_key_version < min_kernel_key_version || |
| firmware_key_version < min_firmware_key_version) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Device won't be able to boot up the rollback image."; |
| completer.set_code(ErrorCode::kRollbackNotPossible); |
| return; |
| } |
| install_plan_.is_rollback = true; |
| install_plan_.rollback_data_save_requested = |
| params->rollback_data_save_requested(); |
| } |
| |
| if (response.powerwash_required || params->ShouldPowerwash()) |
| install_plan_.powerwash_required = true; |
| |
| TEST_AND_RETURN(HasOutputPipe()); |
| if (HasOutputPipe()) |
| SetOutputObject(install_plan_); |
| LOG(INFO) << "Using this install plan:"; |
| install_plan_.Dump(); |
| |
| // Send the deadline data (if any) to Chrome through a file. This is a pretty |
| // hacky solution but should be OK for now. |
| // |
| // TODO(petkov): Re-architect this to avoid communication through a |
| // file. Ideally, we would include this information in D-Bus's GetStatus |
| // method and UpdateStatus signal. A potential issue is that update_engine may |
| // be unresponsive during an update download. |
| if (!deadline_file_.empty()) { |
| if (payload_state->GetRollbackHappened()) { |
| // Don't do forced update if rollback has happened since the last update |
| // check where policy was present. |
| LOG(INFO) << "Not forcing update because a rollback happened."; |
| utils::WriteFile(deadline_file_.c_str(), nullptr, 0); |
| } else { |
| utils::WriteFile(deadline_file_.c_str(), |
| response.deadline.data(), |
| response.deadline.size()); |
| } |
| chmod(deadline_file_.c_str(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH); |
| } |
| |
| // Check the generated install-plan with the Policy to confirm that |
| // it can be applied at this time (or at all). |
| UpdateManager* const update_manager = system_state_->update_manager(); |
| CHECK(update_manager); |
| auto ec = ErrorCode::kSuccess; |
| update_manager->PolicyRequest( |
| &Policy::UpdateCanBeApplied, &ec, &install_plan_); |
| completer.set_code(ec); |
| |
| const auto allowed_milestones = params->rollback_allowed_milestones(); |
| if (allowed_milestones > 0) { |
| auto max_firmware_rollforward = numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max(); |
| auto max_kernel_rollforward = numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max(); |
| |
| // Determine the version to update the max rollforward verified boot |
| // value. |
| OmahaResponse::RollbackKeyVersion version = |
| response.past_rollback_key_version; |
| |
| // Determine the max rollforward values to be set in the TPM. |
| max_firmware_rollforward = static_cast<uint32_t>(version.firmware_key) |
| << 16 | |
| static_cast<uint32_t>(version.firmware); |
| max_kernel_rollforward = static_cast<uint32_t>(version.kernel_key) << 16 | |
| static_cast<uint32_t>(version.kernel); |
| |
| // In the case that the value is 0xffffffff, log a warning because the |
| // device should not be installing a rollback image without having version |
| // information. |
| if (max_firmware_rollforward == numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() || |
| max_kernel_rollforward == numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) |
| << "Max rollforward values were not sent in rollback response: " |
| << " max_kernel_rollforward=" << max_kernel_rollforward |
| << " max_firmware_rollforward=" << max_firmware_rollforward |
| << " rollback_allowed_milestones=" |
| << params->rollback_allowed_milestones(); |
| } else { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Setting the max rollforward values: " |
| << " max_kernel_rollforward=" << max_kernel_rollforward |
| << " max_firmware_rollforward=" << max_firmware_rollforward |
| << " rollback_allowed_milestones=" |
| << params->rollback_allowed_milestones(); |
| system_state_->hardware()->SetMaxKernelKeyRollforward( |
| max_kernel_rollforward); |
| // TODO(crbug/783998): Set max firmware rollforward when implemented. |
| } |
| } else { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Rollback is not allowed. Setting max rollforward values" |
| << " to infinity"; |
| // When rollback is not allowed, explicitly set the max roll forward to |
| // infinity. |
| system_state_->hardware()->SetMaxKernelKeyRollforward(kRollforwardInfinity); |
| // TODO(crbug/783998): Set max firmware rollforward when implemented. |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool OmahaResponseHandlerAction::AreHashChecksMandatory( |
| const OmahaResponse& response) { |
| // We sometimes need to waive the hash checks in order to download from |
| // sources that don't provide hashes, such as dev server. |
| // At this point UpdateAttempter::IsAnyUpdateSourceAllowed() has already been |
| // checked, so an unofficial update URL won't get this far unless it's OK to |
| // use without a hash. Additionally, we want to always waive hash checks on |
| // unofficial builds (i.e. dev/test images). |
| // The end result is this: |
| // * Base image: |
| // - Official URLs require a hash. |
| // - Unofficial URLs only get this far if the IsAnyUpdateSourceAllowed() |
| // devmode/debugd checks pass, in which case the hash is waived. |
| // * Dev/test image: |
| // - Any URL is allowed through with no hash checking. |
| if (!system_state_->request_params()->IsUpdateUrlOfficial() || |
| !system_state_->hardware()->IsOfficialBuild()) { |
| // Still do a hash check if a public key is included. |
| if (!response.public_key_rsa.empty()) { |
| // The autoupdate_CatchBadSignatures test checks for this string |
| // in log-files. Keep in sync. |
| LOG(INFO) << "Mandating payload hash checks since Omaha Response " |
| << "for unofficial build includes public RSA key."; |
| return true; |
| } else { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Waiving payload hash checks for unofficial update URL."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| LOG(INFO) << "Mandating hash checks for official URL on official build."; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace chromeos_update_engine |
