| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "content/common/sandbox_policy.h" |
| |
| #include <string> |
| |
| #include "base/command_line.h" |
| #include "base/debug/debugger.h" |
| #include "base/debug/trace_event.h" |
| #include "base/file_util.h" |
| #include "base/lazy_instance.h" |
| #include "base/logging.h" |
| #include "base/path_service.h" |
| #include "base/process_util.h" |
| #include "base/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/stringprintf.h" |
| #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h" |
| #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" |
| #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" |
| #include "base/win/windows_version.h" |
| #include "content/common/debug_flags.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_client.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/process_type.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h" |
| #include "ui/gl/gl_switches.h" |
| |
| static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL; |
| static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL; |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes |
| // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short |
| // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension. |
| const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { |
| L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. |
| L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator. |
| L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. |
| L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. |
| L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris. |
| L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. |
| L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others. |
| L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5. |
| L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. |
| L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. |
| L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. |
| L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. |
| L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. |
| L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). |
| L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). |
| L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. |
| L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). |
| L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. |
| L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. |
| L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy. |
| L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. |
| L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. |
| L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). |
| L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. |
| L"owexplorer-10513.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10514.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10515.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10516.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10517.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10518.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10519.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10520.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10521.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10522.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"owexplorer-10523.dll", // Overwolf. |
| L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. |
| L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. |
| L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. |
| L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. |
| L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. |
| L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. |
| L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. |
| L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection. |
| L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). |
| L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. |
| L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. |
| L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. |
| L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). |
| L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. |
| }; |
| |
| // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes |
| // when they are loaded in the plugin process. |
| const wchar_t* const kTroublesomePluginDlls[] = { |
| L"rpmainbrowserrecordplugin.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"rpchrome10browserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"ycwebcamerasource.ax" // Cyberlink Camera helper. |
| L"CLRGL.ax" // Cyberlink Camera helper. |
| }; |
| |
| // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes |
| // when they are loaded in the GPU process. |
| const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeGpuDlls[] = { |
| L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| }; |
| |
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|. |
| // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also |
| // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders. |
| bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| FilePath directory; |
| if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (sub_dir) { |
| directory = directory.Append(sub_dir); |
| file_util::AbsolutePath(&directory); |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\"; |
| if (children) |
| directory_str += L"*"; |
| // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator. |
| |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory_str.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|. |
| // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys. |
| bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, |
| key.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| key += L"\\*"; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, |
| key.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|. |
| bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) { |
| wchar_t path[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path)); |
| if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) { |
| // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway. |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path))) |
| return false; |
| FilePath fname(path); |
| return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name); |
| } |
| |
| // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist. |
| // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll |
| // is also loaded in this process. |
| void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name, |
| bool check_in_browser, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL; |
| if (!module) { |
| // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check |
| // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes |
| // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'. |
| std::wstring name(module_name); |
| size_t period = name.rfind(L'.'); |
| DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period); |
| DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period)); |
| if (period <= 8) |
| return; |
| for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) { |
| const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0}; |
| std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix; |
| alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size()); |
| if (check_in_browser) { |
| module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str()); |
| if (!module) |
| return; |
| // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we |
| // want to make sure it is the right one. |
| if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name)) |
| return; |
| } |
| // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy. |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); |
| } |
| } |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); |
| DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. |
| // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module |
| // does not get a chance to execute any code. |
| void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) |
| BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Same as AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy but specifically for plugins. In this |
| // case we add the blacklisted dlls even if they are not loaded in this process. |
| void AddPluginDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomePluginDlls); ++ix) |
| BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomePluginDlls[ix], false, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Same as AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy but specifically for the GPU process. |
| // In this we add the blacklisted dlls even if they are not loaded in this |
| // process. |
| void AddGpuDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeGpuDlls); ++ix) |
| BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeGpuDlls[ix], false, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session. |
| string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const char16* object) { |
| // Cache this because it can't change after process creation. |
| static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0; |
| if (s_session_id == 0) { |
| HANDLE token; |
| DWORD session_id_length; |
| DWORD session_id = 0; |
| |
| CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)); |
| CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id, |
| sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length)); |
| CloseHandle(token); |
| if (session_id) |
| s_session_id = session_id; |
| } |
| |
| return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object); |
| } |
| |
| // Closes handles that are opened at process creation and initialization. |
| void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| // Being able to manipulate anything BaseNamedObjects is bad. |
| string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(L"\\BaseNamedObjects"); |
| policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Directory", object_path.data()); |
| object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath( |
| L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters"); |
| policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data()); |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. |
| bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file |
| // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with |
| // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| // Allow the server side of a pipe restricted to the "chrome.nacl." |
| // namespace so that it cannot impersonate other system or other chrome |
| // service pipes. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have |
| // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Add the policy for debug message only in debug |
| #ifndef NDEBUG |
| FilePath app_dir; |
| if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir)) |
| return false; |
| |
| wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(), |
| long_path_buf, |
| MAX_PATH); |
| if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH) |
| return false; |
| |
| FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf); |
| debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, |
| debug_message.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| #endif // NDEBUG |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // For the GPU process we gotten as far as USER_LIMITED. The next level |
| // which is USER_RESTRICTED breaks both the DirectX backend and the OpenGL |
| // backend. Note that the GPU process is connected to the interactive |
| // desktop. |
| // TODO(cpu): Lock down the sandbox more if possible. |
| bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) == |
| gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) { |
| // Open GL path. |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, |
| sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| } else { |
| if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) == |
| gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName || |
| cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox) || |
| cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableImageTransportSurface)) { |
| // Swiftshader path. |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, |
| sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| } else { |
| // Angle + DirectX path. |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, |
| sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED); |
| // This is a trick to keep the GPU out of low-integrity processes. It |
| // starts at low-integrity for UIPI to work, then drops below |
| // low-integrity after warm-up. |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED); |
| } |
| |
| // UI restrictions break when we access Windows from outside our job. |
| // However, we don't want a proxy window in this process because it can |
| // introduce deadlocks where the renderer blocks on the gpu, which in |
| // turn blocks on the browser UI thread. So, instead we forgo a window |
| // message pump entirely and just add job restrictions to prevent child |
| // processes. |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER, |
| JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS | |
| JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP | |
| JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS | |
| JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS); |
| |
| policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| } |
| } else { |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, |
| sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| } |
| |
| // Allow the server side of GPU sockets, which are pipes that have |
| // the "chrome.gpu" namespace and an arbitrary suffix. |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule( |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, |
| L"Section"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| #ifdef USE_AURA |
| // GPU also needs to add sections to the browser for aura |
| // TODO(jschuh): refactor the GPU channel to remove this. crbug.com/128786 |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER, |
| L"Section"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| #endif |
| |
| AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| AddGpuDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| #endif |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU. |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, |
| L"Section"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Renderers need to share events with plugins. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, |
| L"Event"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Renderers need to send named pipe handles and shared memory |
| // segment handles to NaCl loader processes. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, |
| L"File"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0); |
| |
| sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main |
| // token is restricted. |
| initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; |
| } |
| |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN); |
| // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes. |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED); |
| |
| bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch( |
| switches::kDisableAltWinstation); |
| |
| if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) { |
| DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; |
| } |
| |
| AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // The Pepper process as locked-down as a renderer execpt that it can |
| // create the server side of chrome pipes. |
| bool AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*"); |
| return result == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of |
| // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes. |
| #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD |
| base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle; |
| |
| BOOL (WINAPI *g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle)(HANDLE source_process_handle, |
| HANDLE source_handle, |
| HANDLE target_process_handle, |
| LPHANDLE target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| BOOL inherit_handle, |
| DWORD options); |
| |
| NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL; |
| |
| static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning = |
| "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed" |
| " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or" |
| " contact security@chromium.org for assistance."; |
| |
| void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) { |
| // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14). |
| BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)]; |
| OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = |
| reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer); |
| ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t); |
| NTSTATUS error; |
| error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size); |
| CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); |
| type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; |
| |
| // Get the object basic information. |
| OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info; |
| size = sizeof(basic_info); |
| error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size, |
| &size); |
| CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); |
| |
| if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) { |
| const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | |
| SYNCHRONIZE); |
| CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) << |
| kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle, |
| HANDLE source_handle, |
| HANDLE target_process_handle, |
| LPHANDLE target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| BOOL inherit_handle, |
| DWORD options) { |
| // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask. |
| if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle, |
| target_process_handle, target_handle, |
| desired_access, inherit_handle, options)) |
| return FALSE; |
| |
| // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries. |
| if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle || |
| target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess()) |
| return TRUE; |
| |
| // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them. |
| BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; |
| if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) { |
| // We need a handle with permission to check the job object. |
| if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { |
| base::win::ScopedHandle process; |
| CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(), |
| target_process_handle, |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), |
| process.Receive(), |
| PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, |
| FALSE, 0)); |
| CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (is_in_job) { |
| // We never allow inheritable child handles. |
| CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| |
| // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions. |
| base::win::ScopedHandle handle; |
| CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle, |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), handle.Receive(), |
| 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)); |
| |
| // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack. |
| CheckDuplicateHandle(handle); |
| } |
| |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| namespace sandbox { |
| |
| bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) { |
| // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread()); |
| // See <http://b/1287166>. |
| DCHECK(broker_services); |
| DCHECK(!g_broker_services); |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init(); |
| g_broker_services = broker_services; |
| |
| // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle. |
| BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; |
| #ifdef NACL_WIN64 |
| CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job)); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD |
| if (!is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) { |
| HMODULE module = NULL; |
| wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH]; |
| CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS, |
| reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices), |
| &module)); |
| DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH); |
| if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) { |
| ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject); |
| g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = ::DuplicateHandle; |
| g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch( |
| module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle", |
| DuplicateHandlePatch); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK == result; |
| } |
| |
| bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) { |
| DCHECK(target_services); |
| DCHECK(!g_target_services); |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init(); |
| g_target_services = target_services; |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK == result; |
| } |
| |
| base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line, |
| const FilePath& exposed_dir) { |
| const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
| content::ProcessType type; |
| std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); |
| if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClBrokerProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiBrokerProcess) { |
| type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER; |
| } else { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str); |
| |
| // To decide if the process is going to be sandboxed we have two cases. |
| // First case: all process types except the nacl broker, and the plugin |
| // process are sandboxed by default. |
| bool in_sandbox = |
| (type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER) && |
| (type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) && |
| (type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER); |
| |
| // If it is the GPU process then it can be disabled by a command line flag. |
| if ((type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) && |
| (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) { |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| DVLOG(1) << "GPU sandbox is disabled"; |
| } |
| |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) || |
| cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) { |
| // The user or the caller has explicity opted-out from all sandboxing. |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD) |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) { |
| // In process plugins won't work if the sandbox is enabled. |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) && |
| !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL) && |
| browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) { |
| // In process WebGL won't work if the sandbox is enabled. |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| } |
| |
| // Propagate the Chrome Frame flag to sandboxed processes if present. |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { |
| if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool child_needs_help = |
| DebugFlags::ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox); |
| |
| // Prefetch hints on windows: |
| // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows |
| // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc. |
| cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type)); |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target; |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy(); |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64. |
| if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN && |
| !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) && |
| content::GetContentClient()->SandboxPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) { |
| in_sandbox = true; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!in_sandbox) { |
| policy->Release(); |
| base::ProcessHandle process = 0; |
| base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process); |
| g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process); |
| return process; |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(jschuh): Make NaCl work with DEP and SEHOP. crbug.com/147752 |
| sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE | |
| MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | |
| MITIGATION_HIGH_ENTROPY_ASLR; |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_DEP | |
| MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | |
| MITIGATION_SEHOP; |
| #if defined(NDEBUG) |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_RELOCATE_IMAGE | |
| MITIGATION_RELOCATE_IMAGE_REQUIRED; |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return 0; |
| |
| mitigations = MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS | |
| MITIGATION_EXTENSION_DLL_DISABLE | |
| MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER; |
| #if defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_DEP | |
| MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) { |
| AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| AddPluginDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| } else if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) { |
| if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy)) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| if (!AddPolicyForRenderer(policy)) |
| return 0; |
| // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper. |
| // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first. |
| if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER || |
| type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER) { |
| AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Pepper uses the renderer's policy, whith some tweaks. |
| if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kGuestRenderer) || |
| type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN) { |
| if (!AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(policy)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) { |
| // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into |
| // this subprocess. See |
| // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580 |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer "); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!exposed_dir.empty()) { |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| exposed_dir.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return 0; |
| |
| FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| exposed_files.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); |
| |
| result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget( |
| cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(), |
| cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(), |
| policy, target.Receive()); |
| policy->Release(); |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); |
| |
| if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| // For Native Client sel_ldr processes on 32-bit Windows, reserve 1 GB of |
| // address space to prevent later failure due to address space fragmentation |
| // from .dll loading. The NaCl process will attempt to locate this space by |
| // scanning the address space using VirtualQuery. |
| // TODO(bbudge) Handle the --no-sandbox case. |
| // http://code.google.com/p/nativeclient/issues/detail?id=2131 |
| if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER) { |
| const SIZE_T kOneGigabyte = 1 << 30; |
| void* nacl_mem = VirtualAllocEx(target.process_handle(), |
| NULL, |
| kOneGigabyte, |
| MEM_RESERVE, |
| PAGE_NOACCESS); |
| if (!nacl_mem) { |
| DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to reserve address space for Native Client"; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| |
| ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()); |
| |
| // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if |
| // the process is in a sandbox. |
| if (child_needs_help) |
| base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.process_id()); |
| |
| return target.TakeProcessHandle(); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace sandbox |
| |
| namespace content { |
| |
| bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle, |
| DWORD target_process_id, |
| HANDLE* target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| DWORD options) { |
| // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle. |
| if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) { |
| return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle, |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle, |
| desired_access, FALSE, options); |
| |
| } |
| |
| // Try the broker next |
| if (g_target_services && |
| g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id, |
| target_handle, desired_access, |
| options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Finally, see if we already have access to the process. |
| base::win::ScopedHandle target_process; |
| target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE, |
| target_process_id)); |
| if (target_process.IsValid()) { |
| return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle, |
| target_process, target_handle, |
| desired_access, FALSE, options); |
| } |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) { |
| return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess( |
| CommandLine* cmd_line, |
| const FilePath& exposed_dir) { |
| return sandbox::StartProcessWithAccess(cmd_line, exposed_dir); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace content |
