| # Certificate Lifetimes |
| |
| As part of our ongoing commitment to ensuring users’ security, Google is |
| reducing the maximum allowed lifetimes of TLS certificates. |
| |
| ## Upcoming Changes |
| |
| Beginning with Chrome 85, TLS server certificates issued on or after |
| 2020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC will be required to have a validity period of 398 days |
| or less. This will only apply to TLS server certificates from CAs that are |
| trusted in a default installation of Google Chrome, commonly known as |
| "publicly trusted CAs", and will not apply to locally-operated CAs that have |
| been manually configured. |
| |
| Certificates that do not comply with this requirement will not work, and may |
| cause webpages to fail to load or to render incorrectly. |
| |
| If a certificate that does not comply with this requirement is issued by a CA |
| trusted in a default installation of Google Chrome, this will be treated as a |
| failure to comply with the security policies necessary to being a trusted CA, |
| and may result in the removal of trust of that CA’s certificates. |
| |
| ## Technical Details |
| |
| * A certificate will be impacted by this restriction if either the notBefore |
| of the certificate is on or after 2020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC, or if the first |
| precertificate logged by the CA to a Certificate Transparency Log that is |
| qualified at time of issuance is on or after this date. |
| * The validity period of a certificate is defined within RFC 5280, Section |
| 4.1.2.5, as "the period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive." |
| * 398 days is measured with a day being equal to 86,400 seconds. Any time |
| greater than this indicates an additional day of validity. |
| * To avoid the risk of misissuance, such as due to leap seconds or |
| CA-configured randomization, CAs SHOULD issue such server certificates with |
| validity periods of 397 days or less. |
| |
| ## Frequently Asked Questions |
| |
| * Why is Chrome making this change? |
| * Shortening certificate lifetimes protects users by reducing the impact |
| of compromised keys, and by speeding up the replacement of insecure |
| technologies and practices across the web. Key compromises and the |
| discovery of internet security weaknesses are common events that can lead |
| to real-world harm, and the web’s users should be better protected against |
| them. |
| * Does this apply to locally-operated CAs, such as those used within |
| enterprises that use enterprise-configured configured CAs? |
| * No. This only applies to the set of CAs that are trusted by default by |
| Google Chrome, and not CAs that are operated by an enterprise and that |
| have no certification paths to CAs that are trusted by default. |
| * Is there an enterprise policy to disable this enforcement? |
| * No. These changes are transparent and do not offer an enterprise control |
| to override, as they only apply to so-called "publicly trusted" CAs. |
| Enterprises that wish to have certificates with validity periods longer |
| than 398 days may do so by using a locally-operated CA that does not have |
| any certification paths up to a publicly trusted CA. |
| * Does this mean I have to replace my existing certificates? |
| * No. This requirement only applies to new certificate issuance on or after |
| 2020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC. Existing certificates whose validity period |
| exceeds 398 days will continue to work, while new certificates must comply |
| with these new requirements, such as when they are renewed or replaced. |
| * Will this make certificates more expensive? |
| * As with past changes to the maximum certificate lifetimes, many CAs have |
| committed to providing additional certificates, as needed by the shortened |
| maximum lifetime, at no additional cost. |
| * What will happen if a certificate is issued that does not meet these |
| requirements? |
| * Google Chrome will reject such certificates as having too long a validity |
| period, consistent with existing validity-period based enforcement. |
| Additionally, such certificates will be treated as a critical security |
| failure by the CA, and may result in further action taken on the CA that |
| may affect how current or future certificates from that CA function. |
| Chromium-based browsers will have this enforcement enabled by default, and |
| will need to modify the source to disable this. |
| * What are other browsers doing? |
| * Apple previously announced this change for versions of iOS, iPadOS, macOS, |
| tvOS, and watchOS, as documented at |
| https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211025, which will apply to all |
| applications, and not just those of Safari. This certificate lifetime |
| requirement is fully interoperable with Apple’s requirements. |
| |
| Microsoft, Mozilla, Opera, and 360 have previously indicated their support |
| for these requirements, although have not yet made announcements at the |
| time of this post (2020-06-22). Other browsers, including those browsers |
| based on Chromium, may provide additional guidance or clarification. |