| # Severity Guidelines for Security Issues |
| |
| [TOC] |
| |
| Vendors shipping products based on Chromium might wish to rate the severity of |
| security issues in the products they release. This document contains guidelines |
| for how to rate these issues. Check out our |
| [security release management page](https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/security-release-management) |
| for guidance on how to release fixes based on severity. |
| |
| Any significant mitigating factors, such as unusual or additional user |
| interaction, or running Chrome with a specific command line flag or non-default |
| feature enabled, may reduce an issue’s severity by one or more levels. |
| |
| Conversely, we do not consider it a mitigating factor if a vulnerability applies |
| only to a particular group of users. For instance, a Critical vulnerability is |
| still considered Critical even if it applies only to Linux or to those users |
| running with accessibility features enabled. |
| |
| Also note that most crashes do not indicate vulnerabilities. Chromium is designed |
| to crash in a controlled manner (e.g., with a ```__debugBreak```) when memory is |
| exhausted or in other exceptional circumstances. |
| |
| |
| ## Critical severity {#TOC-Critical-severity} |
| |
| Critical severity issues allow an attacker to read or write arbitrary resources |
| (including but not limited to the file system, registry, network, et c.) on the |
| underlying platform, with the user's full privileges. |
| |
| They are normally assigned priority **Pri-0** and assigned to the current stable |
| milestone (or earliest milestone affected). For critical severity bugs, |
| [SheriffBot](https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage) will |
| automatically assign the milestone. |
| |
| **For critical severity vulnerabilities, we aim to deploy the patch to all |
| Chrome users in under 30 days.** |
| |
| Critical vulnerability details may be made public in 60 days, |
| in accordance with Google's general [vulnerability disclosure recommendations](https://security.googleblog.com/2010/07/rebooting-responsible-disclosure-focus.html), |
| or [faster (7 days)](https://security.googleblog.com/2013/05/disclosure-timeline-for-vulnerabilities.html) |
| if there is evidence of active exploitation. |
| |
| Example bugs: |
| |
| * Memory corruption in the browser process ([319125](https://crbug.com/319125#c10)). |
| * Exploit chains made up of multiple bugs that can lead to code execution |
| outside of the sandbox ([416449](https://crbug.com/416449)). |
| * A bug that enables web content to read local files |
| ([962500](https://crbug.com/962500)). |
| |
| Note that the individual bugs that make up the chain will have lower severity |
| ratings. |
| |
| |
| ## High severity {#TOC-High-severity} |
| |
| High severity vulnerabilities allow an attacker to execute code in the context |
| of, or otherwise impersonate other origins or read cross-origin data. |
| Bugs which would normally be |
| critical severity with unusual mitigating factors may be rated as high severity. |
| For example, renderer sandbox escapes fall into this category as their impact is |
| that of a critical severity bug, but they require the precondition of a |
| compromised renderer. |
| |
| They are normally assigned priority **Pri-1** and assigned to the current stable |
| milestone (or earliest milestone affected). For high severity bugs, |
| [SheriffBot](https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage) will |
| automatically assign the milestone. |
| |
| **For high severity vulnerabilities, we aim to deploy the patch to all Chrome |
| users in under 60 days.** |
| |
| Example bugs: |
| |
| * A bug that allows full circumvention of the same origin policy. Universal XSS |
| bugs fall into this category, as they allow script execution in the context of |
| an arbitrary origin ([534923](https://crbug.com/534923)). |
| * A bug that allows arbitrary code execution within the confines of the sandbox, |
| such as renderer or GPU process memory corruption |
| ([570427](https://crbug.com/570427), [468936](https://crbug.com/468936)). |
| * Complete control over the apparent origin in the omnibox |
| ([76666](https://crbug.com/76666)). |
| * Memory corruption in the browser process that can only be triggered from a |
| compromised renderer, leading to a sandbox escape |
| ([469152](https://crbug.com/469152)). |
| * Kernel memory corruption that could be used as a sandbox escape from a |
| compromised renderer ([377392](https://crbug.com/377392)). |
| * Memory corruption in the browser process that requires specific user |
| interaction, such as granting a permission ([455735](https://crbug.com/455735)). |
| * Site Isolation bypasses: |
| - Cross-site execution contexts unexpectedly sharing a renderer process |
| ([863069](https://crbug.com/863069), [886976](https://crbug.com/886976)). |
| - Cross-site data disclosure |
| ([917668](https://crbug.com/917668), [927849](https://crbug.com/927849)). |
| |
| |
| ## Medium severity {#TOC-Medium-severity} |
| |
| Medium severity bugs allow attackers to read or modify limited amounts of |
| information, or are not harmful on their own but potentially harmful when |
| combined with other bugs. This includes information leaks that could be useful |
| in potential memory corruption exploits, or exposure of sensitive user |
| information that an attacker can exfiltrate. Bugs that would normally be rated |
| at a higher severity level with unusual mitigating factors may be rated as |
| medium severity. |
| |
| They are normally assigned priority **Pri-1** and assigned to the current stable |
| milestone (or earliest milestone affected). If the fix seems too complicated to |
| merge to the current stable milestone, they may be assigned to the next stable |
| milestone. |
| |
| Example bugs: |
| |
| * An out-of-bounds read in a renderer process |
| ([281480](https://crbug.com/281480)). |
| * An uninitialized memory read in the browser process where the values are |
| passed to a compromised renderer via IPC ([469151](https://crbug.com/469151)). |
| * Memory corruption that requires a specific extension to be installed |
| ([313743](https://crbug.com/313743)). |
| * An HSTS bypass ([461481](https://crbug.com/461481)). |
| * A bypass of the same origin policy for pages that meet several preconditions |
| ([419383](https://crbug.com/419383)). |
| * A bug that allows web content to tamper with trusted browser UI |
| ([550047](https://crbug.com/550047)). |
| * A bug that reduces the effectiveness of the sandbox |
| ([338538](https://crbug.com/338538)). |
| * A bug that allows arbitrary pages to bypass security interstitials |
| ([540949](https://crbug.com/540949)). |
| * A bug that allows an attacker to reliably read or infer browsing history |
| ([381808](https://crbug.com/381808)). |
| * An address bar spoof where only certain URLs can be displayed, or with other |
| mitigating factors ([265221](https://crbug.com/265221)). |
| * Memory corruption in a renderer process that requires specific user |
| interaction, such as dragging an object ([303772](https://crbug.com/303772)). |
| |
| |
| ## Low severity {#TOC-Low-severity} |
| |
| Low severity vulnerabilities are usually bugs that would normally be a higher |
| severity, but which have extreme mitigating factors or highly limited scope. |
| |
| They are normally assigned priority **Pri-2**. Milestones can be assigned to low |
| severity bugs on a case-by-case basis, but they are not normally merged to |
| stable or beta branches. |
| |
| Example bugs: |
| |
| * Bypass requirement for a user gesture ([256057](https://crbug.com/256057)). |
| * Partial CSP bypass ([534570](https://crbug.com/534570)). |
| * A limited extension permission bypass ([169632](https://crbug.com/169632)). |
| * An uncontrolled single-byte out-of-bounds read |
| ([128163](https://crbug.com/128163)). |
| |
| The [security FAQ](faq.md) covers many of the cases that we do not consider to |
| be security bugs, such as [denial of service](faq.md#TOC-Are-denial-of-service-issues-considered-security-bugs-). |