| Known security limitations |
| ========================== |
| |
| Secure memory wiping |
| -------------------- |
| |
| `Memory wiping`_ is used to protect secret data or key material from attackers |
| with access to deallocated memory. This is a defense-in-depth measure against |
| vulnerabilities that leak application memory. |
| |
| Many ``cryptography`` APIs which accept ``bytes`` also accept types which |
| implement the buffer interface. Thus, users wishing to do so can pass |
| ``memoryview`` or another mutable type to ``cryptography`` APIs, and overwrite |
| the contents once the data is no longer needed. |
| |
| However, ``cryptography`` does not clear memory by default, as there is no way |
| to clear immutable structures such as ``bytes``. As a result, ``cryptography``, |
| like almost all software in Python is potentially vulnerable to this attack. The |
| `CERT secure coding guidelines`_ assesses this issue as "Severity: medium, |
| Likelihood: unlikely, Remediation Cost: expensive to repair" and we do not |
| consider this a high risk for most users. |
| |
| RSA PKCS1 v1.5 constant time decryption |
| --------------------------------------- |
| |
| RSA decryption has several different modes, one of which is PKCS1 v1.5. When |
| used in **online contexts**, a secure protocol implementation requires that |
| peers not be able to tell whether RSA PKCS1 v1.5 decryption failed or |
| succeeded, even by timing variability. |
| |
| ``cryptography`` does not provide an API that makes this possible, due to the |
| fact that RSA decryption raises an exception on failure, which takes a |
| different amount of time than returning a value in the success case. |
| |
| In OpenSSL 3.2.0 and newer, this is automatically mitigated by OpenSSL (by |
| returning a random value and never raising an exception). If you are using |
| cryptography with an older version of OpenSSL, such attacks are still possible. |
| |
| Regardless of OpenSSL version, we recommend not implementing or using online |
| protocols that use RSA PKCS1 v1.5 decryption, as such protocols generally have |
| poor security properties due to their lack of forward security. |
| |
| .. _`Memory wiping`: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/?p=4223 |
| .. _`CERT secure coding guidelines`: https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/MEM03-C.+Clear+sensitive+information+stored+in+reusable+resources |