| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h" |
| |
| #include <stddef.h> |
| |
| #include <string> |
| |
| #include "base/base_switches.h" |
| #include "base/command_line.h" |
| #include "base/debug/profiler.h" |
| #include "base/files/file_util.h" |
| #include "base/hash.h" |
| #include "base/logging.h" |
| #include "base/macros.h" |
| #include "base/memory/shared_memory.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/field_trial.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" |
| #include "base/path_service.h" |
| #include "base/process/launch.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" |
| #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h" |
| #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h" |
| #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" |
| #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" |
| #include "base/win/win_util.h" |
| #include "base/win/windows_version.h" |
| #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_client.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_features.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h" |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h" // nogncheck: unused #ifdef NACL_WIN64 |
| #endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| |
| static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL; |
| |
| namespace content { |
| namespace { |
| |
| // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes |
| // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short |
| // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension. |
| // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off |
| // of it, see: |
| // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers |
| const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { |
| L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"activedetect32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"activedetect64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"airfoilinject3.dll", // Airfoil. |
| L"akinsofthook32.dll", // Akinsoft Software Engineering. |
| L"assistant_x64.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"avcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64. |
| L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. |
| L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator. |
| L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. |
| L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. |
| L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris. |
| L"cplushook.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. |
| L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others. |
| L"esspd.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT. |
| L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5. |
| L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. |
| L"guard64.dll", // Comodo Internet Security x64. |
| L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. |
| L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. |
| L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. |
| L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. |
| L"icatcdll.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT. |
| L"icdcnl.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT. |
| L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). |
| L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). |
| L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. |
| L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). |
| L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. |
| L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. |
| L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy. |
| L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. |
| L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. |
| L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). |
| L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. |
| L"pastali32.dll", // PastaLeads. |
| L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. |
| L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. |
| L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. |
| L"picrmi32.dll", // PicRec. |
| L"picrmi64.dll", // PicRec. |
| L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. |
| L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. |
| L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. |
| L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. |
| L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection. |
| L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). |
| L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. |
| L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. |
| L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. |
| L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). |
| L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"windowsapihookdll32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"windowsapihookdll64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. |
| }; |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|. |
| // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also |
| // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders. |
| bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| base::FilePath directory; |
| if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (sub_dir) |
| directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir)); |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\"; |
| if (children) |
| directory_str += L"*"; |
| // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator. |
| |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory_str.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| #endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| |
| // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|. |
| bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) { |
| wchar_t path[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path)); |
| if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) { |
| // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway. |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path))) |
| return false; |
| base::FilePath fname(path); |
| return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name); |
| } |
| |
| // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist. |
| // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll |
| // is also loaded in this process. |
| void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name, |
| bool check_in_browser, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL; |
| if (!module) { |
| // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check |
| // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes |
| // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'. |
| std::wstring name(module_name); |
| size_t period = name.rfind(L'.'); |
| DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period); |
| DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period)); |
| if (period <= 8) |
| return; |
| for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) { |
| const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0}; |
| std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix; |
| alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size()); |
| if (check_in_browser) { |
| module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str()); |
| if (!module) |
| return; |
| // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we |
| // want to make sure it is the right one. |
| if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name)) |
| return; |
| } |
| // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy. |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); |
| } |
| } |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); |
| DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. |
| // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module |
| // does not get a chance to execute any code. |
| void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) |
| BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session. |
| base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) { |
| // Cache this because it can't change after process creation. |
| static DWORD s_session_id = 0; |
| if (s_session_id == 0) { |
| HANDLE token; |
| DWORD session_id_length; |
| DWORD session_id = 0; |
| |
| CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)); |
| CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id, |
| sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length)); |
| CloseHandle(token); |
| if (session_id) |
| s_session_id = session_id; |
| } |
| |
| return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%lu%ls", s_session_id, object); |
| } |
| |
| // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned. |
| bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) { |
| if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) |
| return true; |
| |
| // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other |
| // job. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) |
| return true; |
| |
| BOOL in_job = true; |
| // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job, |
| if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job)) |
| NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError(); |
| if (!in_job) |
| return true; |
| |
| // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set. |
| JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {}; |
| if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL, |
| JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info, |
| sizeof(job_info), NULL)) { |
| NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError(); |
| return true; |
| } |
| if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK) |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. |
| sandbox::ResultCode AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file |
| // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with |
| // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file |
| // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with |
| // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to |
| // system services. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have |
| // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix. |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for debug message only in debug |
| #ifndef NDEBUG |
| base::FilePath app_dir; |
| if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir)) |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; |
| |
| wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(), |
| long_path_buf, |
| MAX_PATH); |
| if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH) |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE; |
| |
| base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf); |
| debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, |
| debug_message.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| #endif // NDEBUG |
| |
| // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for stack traces. |
| #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD) |
| base::FilePath exe; |
| if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe)) |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; |
| base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| pdb_path.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE) |
| DWORD coverage_dir_size = |
| ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0); |
| if (coverage_dir_size == 0) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work."; |
| } else { |
| std::wstring coverage_dir; |
| wchar_t* coverage_dir_str = |
| base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size); |
| coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable( |
| L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size); |
| CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size); |
| base::FilePath sancov_path = |
| base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| sancov_path.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| void LogLaunchWarning(sandbox::ResultCode last_warning, DWORD last_error) { |
| UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.WarningResultCode", |
| last_warning); |
| UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Warning", last_error); |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess( |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| |
| // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7) |
| result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // Close the proxy settings on XP. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) |
| result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key", |
| L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \ |
| L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main |
| // token is restricted. |
| initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; |
| } |
| |
| result = policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes. |
| result = policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| result = policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl(); |
| |
| result = policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| // We ignore the result of setting the alternate desktop, however log |
| // a launch warning. |
| LogLaunchWarning(result, ::GetLastError()); |
| DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; |
| result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags |
| // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to |
| // command_line as needed. |
| void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) { |
| const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line = |
| *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
| std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); |
| if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) { |
| // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag. |
| std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII( |
| switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren); |
| if (value.empty() || value == type) { |
| command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger); |
| } |
| command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of |
| // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes. |
| #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD |
| base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle; |
| |
| typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle, |
| HANDLE source_handle, |
| HANDLE target_process_handle, |
| LPHANDLE target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| BOOL inherit_handle, |
| DWORD options); |
| |
| DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle; |
| |
| NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL; |
| |
| static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning = |
| "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed" |
| " process.\n Please contact security@chromium.org for assistance."; |
| |
| void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) { |
| // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14). |
| BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)]; |
| OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = |
| reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer); |
| ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t); |
| NTSTATUS error; |
| error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size); |
| CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); |
| type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; |
| |
| // Get the object basic information. |
| OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info; |
| size = sizeof(basic_info); |
| error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size, |
| &size); |
| CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); |
| |
| CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) << |
| kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| |
| if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) { |
| const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = |
| ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE); |
| CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) << |
| kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle, |
| HANDLE source_handle, |
| HANDLE target_process_handle, |
| LPHANDLE target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| BOOL inherit_handle, |
| DWORD options) { |
| // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask. |
| if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle, |
| target_process_handle, target_handle, |
| desired_access, inherit_handle, options)) |
| return FALSE; |
| |
| // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries. |
| if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle || |
| target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess()) |
| return TRUE; |
| |
| // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them. |
| BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; |
| if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) { |
| // We need a handle with permission to check the job object. |
| if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { |
| HANDLE temp_handle; |
| CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(), |
| target_process_handle, |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), |
| &temp_handle, |
| PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, |
| FALSE, 0)); |
| base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle); |
| CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (is_in_job) { |
| // We never allow inheritable child handles. |
| CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| |
| // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions. |
| HANDLE temp_handle; |
| CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle, |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle, |
| 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)); |
| base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle); |
| |
| // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack. |
| CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get()); |
| } |
| |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| bool IsAppContainerEnabled() { |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8) |
| return false; |
| const base::CommandLine& command_line = |
| *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
| const std::string appcontainer_group_name = |
| base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("EnableAppContainer"); |
| if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppContainer)) |
| return false; |
| if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppContainer)) |
| return true; |
| return base::StartsWith(appcontainer_group_name, "Enabled", |
| base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| sandbox::JobLevel job_level, |
| uint32_t ui_exceptions, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| if (!ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) |
| return policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0); |
| |
| #ifdef _WIN64 |
| sandbox::ResultCode ret = |
| policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024); |
| if (ret != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return ret; |
| #endif |
| return policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions); |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper. |
| // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first. |
| sandbox::ResultCode AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy. |
| base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath( |
| L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters"); |
| return policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data()); |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode AddAppContainerPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, |
| const wchar_t* sid) { |
| if (IsAppContainerEnabled()) |
| return policy->SetLowBox(sid); |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, |
| bool enable_opm) { |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| if (!IsWin32kLockdownEnabled()) |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| |
| // Enable win32k lockdown if not already. |
| sandbox::MitigationFlags flags = policy->GetProcessMitigations(); |
| if ((flags & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE) == |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE) |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = |
| policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN, |
| enable_opm ? sandbox::TargetPolicy::IMPLEMENT_OPM_APIS |
| : sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT, |
| nullptr); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| if (enable_opm) |
| policy->SetEnableOPMRedirection(); |
| |
| flags |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE; |
| return policy->SetProcessMitigations(flags); |
| #else |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) { |
| // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread()); |
| // See <http://b/1287166>. |
| DCHECK(broker_services); |
| DCHECK(!g_broker_services); |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init(); |
| g_broker_services = broker_services; |
| |
| // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle. |
| #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD |
| BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; |
| CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job)); |
| // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this |
| // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the |
| // original function. |
| if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() && |
| !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) { |
| HMODULE module = NULL; |
| wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH]; |
| CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS, |
| reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices), |
| &module)); |
| DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH); |
| if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) { |
| ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject); |
| result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch( |
| module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle", |
| DuplicateHandlePatch); |
| CHECK(result == 0); |
| g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = |
| reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>( |
| g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function()); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result; |
| } |
| |
| bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) { |
| DCHECK(target_services); |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init(); |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result; |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode StartSandboxedProcess( |
| SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate, |
| base::CommandLine* cmd_line, |
| const base::HandlesToInheritVector& handles_to_inherit, |
| base::Process* process) { |
| DCHECK(delegate); |
| const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line = |
| *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
| std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT1("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess", "type", type_str); |
| |
| // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present. |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) && |
| !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) { |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob); |
| } |
| |
| ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line); |
| |
| if ((!delegate->ShouldSandbox()) || |
| browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) || |
| cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) { |
| base::LaunchOptions options; |
| |
| base::HandlesToInheritVector handles = handles_to_inherit; |
| if (!handles_to_inherit.empty()) { |
| options.inherit_handles = true; |
| options.handles_to_inherit = &handles; |
| } |
| base::Process unsandboxed_process = base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, options); |
| |
| *process = std::move(unsandboxed_process); |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy(); |
| |
| // Add any handles to be inherited to the policy. |
| for (HANDLE handle : handles_to_inherit) |
| policy->AddHandleToShare(handle); |
| |
| // Pre-startup mitigations. |
| sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL; |
| |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWinSboxDisableExtensionPoints)) |
| mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE; |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; |
| result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations); |
| |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess && IsWin32kLockdownEnabled()) { |
| result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy, false); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| // Post-startup mitigations. |
| mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS | |
| sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER; |
| |
| result = policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| result = SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| if (!delegate->DisableDefaultPolicy()) { |
| result = AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess || |
| type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) { |
| AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS, NULL, true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, policy); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) { |
| // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into |
| // this subprocess. See |
| // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580 |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer "); |
| } |
| |
| result = AddGenericPolicy(policy); |
| |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| // Allow the renderer and gpu processes to access the log file. |
| if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess || |
| type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) { |
| if (logging::IsLoggingToFileEnabled()) { |
| DCHECK(base::FilePath(logging::GetLogFileFullPath()).IsAbsolute()); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| logging::GetLogFileFullPath().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will |
| // have no effect. These calls can fail with SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS. |
| policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)); |
| policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)); |
| |
| if (!delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy)) |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_DELEGATE_PRE_SPAWN; |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS"); |
| |
| PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {}; |
| sandbox::ResultCode last_warning = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| DWORD last_error = ERROR_SUCCESS; |
| result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget( |
| cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(), |
| cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(), policy, &last_warning, |
| &last_error, &temp_process_info); |
| |
| base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info); |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS"); |
| |
| if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) { |
| UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error", last_error); |
| if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC) |
| DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process"; |
| else |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result; |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != last_warning) { |
| LogLaunchWarning(last_warning, last_error); |
| } |
| |
| delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle()); |
| |
| CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != static_cast<DWORD>(-1)); |
| *process = base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle()); |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace content |
