blob: 4f15604cc946dcd23ffc105fdab3c077c96565d7 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2021 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include <tuple>
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/memory/raw_ref.h"
#include "base/path_service.h"
#include "base/threading/thread_restrictions.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_frame_host_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.h"
#include "content/public/browser/content_browser_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_paths.h"
#include "content/public/test/browser_test.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test_content_browser_client.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_browser_test_utils.h"
#include "content/public/test/content_mock_cert_verifier.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_navigation_observer.h"
#include "content/shell/browser/shell.h"
#include "net/base/filename_util.h"
#include "net/dns/mock_host_resolver.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/embedded_test_server.h"
namespace content {
class ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest : public ContentBrowserTest {
protected:
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->Start());
}
WebContentsImpl* web_contents() const {
return static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell()->web_contents());
}
RenderFrameHostImpl* current_frame_host() {
return web_contents()->GetPrimaryMainFrame();
}
};
// Test that the console error message for a Content Security Policy violation
// triggered by web assembly compilation does not mention the keyword
// 'wasm-eval' (which is currently only supported for extensions). This is a
// regression test for https://crbug.com/1169592.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest,
WasmEvalBlockedConsoleMessage) {
GURL url = embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/csp_wasm_eval.html");
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern(
"[Report Only] Refused to compile or instantiate WebAssembly module "
"because 'unsafe-eval' is not an allowed source of script in the "
"following Content Security Policy directive: \"script-src "
"'unsafe-inline'\".\n");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
}
// Test that creating a duplicate Trusted Types policy will yield a console
// message containing "already exists".
//
// This & the following test together ensure that different error causes get
// appropriate messages.
//
// Note: The bulk of Trusted Types related tests are found in the WPT suite
// under trusted-types/*. These two are here, because they need to access
// console messages.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest,
TrustedTypesCreatePolicyDupeMessage) {
const char* page = R"(
data:text/html,
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="require-trusted-types-for 'script';trusted-types a;">
<script>
trustedTypes.createPolicy("a", {});
trustedTypes.createPolicy("a", {});
</script>)";
GURL url(page);
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern("*already exists*");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
}
// Test that creating a Trusted Types policy with a disallowed name will yield
// a console message indicating a directive has been violated.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest,
TrustedTypesCreatePolicyForbiddenMessage) {
const char* page = R"(
data:text/html,
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="require-trusted-types-for 'script';trusted-types a;">
<script>
trustedTypes.createPolicy("b", {});
</script>)";
GURL url(page);
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern("*violates*the following*directive*");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest,
WildcardNotMatchingNonNetworkSchemeBrowserSide) {
const char* page = R"(
data:text/html,
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="frame-src *">
<iframe src="mailto:arthursonzogni@chromium.org"></iframe>
)";
GURL url(page);
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern(
"Refused to frame '' because it violates the following Content Security "
"Policy directive: \"frame-src *\". Note that '*' matches only URLs with "
"network schemes ('http', 'https', 'ws', 'wss'), or URLs whose scheme "
"matches `self`'s scheme. The scheme 'mailto:' must be added "
"explicitly.\n");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest,
WildcardNotMatchingNonNetworkSchemeRendererSide) {
const char* page = R"(
data:text/html,
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="script-src *">
<script src="mailto:arthursonzogni@chromium.org"></script>
)";
GURL url(page);
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern(
"Refused to load the script 'mailto:arthursonzogni@chromium.org' because "
"it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "
"\"script-src *\". Note that 'script-src-elem' was not explicitly set, "
"so 'script-src' is used as a fallback. Note that '*' matches only URLs "
"with network schemes ('http', 'https', 'ws', 'wss'), or URLs whose "
"scheme matches `self`'s scheme. The scheme 'mailto:' must be added "
"explicitly.\n");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
}
namespace {
base::FilePath TestFilePath(const char* filename) {
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
return GetTestFilePath("", filename);
}
} // namespace
// We test that we correctly match the file: scheme against file: URLs.
// Unfortunately, we cannot write this as Web Platform Test since Web Platform
// Tests don't support file: urls.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest, FileURLs) {
GURL::Replacements add_localhost;
add_localhost.SetHostStr("localhost");
GURL::Replacements none;
struct {
const char* csp;
std::string element_name;
const raw_ref<const GURL::Replacements, ExperimentalAsh> document_host;
const raw_ref<const GURL::Replacements, ExperimentalAsh> element_host;
bool expect_allowed;
} test_cases[] = {
{"img-src 'none'", "img", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(none), false},
{"img-src file:", "img", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(none), true},
{"img-src 'self'", "img", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(none), true},
{"img-src 'none'", "img", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(add_localhost), false},
{"img-src file:", "img", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(add_localhost), true},
{"img-src 'self'", "img", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(add_localhost), true},
{"img-src 'none'", "img", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(none), false},
{"img-src file:", "img", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(none), true},
{"img-src 'self'", "img", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(none), true},
{"img-src 'none'", "img", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(add_localhost),
false},
{"img-src file:", "img", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(add_localhost),
true},
{"img-src 'self'", "img", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(add_localhost),
true},
{"frame-src 'none'", "iframe", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(none), false},
{"frame-src file:", "iframe", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(none), true},
{"frame-src 'self'", "iframe", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(none), true},
{"frame-src 'none'", "iframe", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(add_localhost),
false},
{"frame-src file:", "iframe", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(add_localhost),
true},
// TODO(antoniosartori): The following one behaves differently than
// img-src.
{"frame-src 'self'", "iframe", raw_ref(none), raw_ref(add_localhost),
true},
{"frame-src 'none'", "iframe", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(none),
false},
{"frame-src file:", "iframe", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(none),
true},
// TODO(antoniosartori): The following one behaves differently than
// img-src.
{"frame-src 'self'", "iframe", raw_ref(add_localhost), raw_ref(none),
true},
{"frame-src 'none'", "iframe", raw_ref(add_localhost),
raw_ref(add_localhost), false},
{"frame-src file:", "iframe", raw_ref(add_localhost),
raw_ref(add_localhost), true},
{"frame-src 'self'", "iframe", raw_ref(add_localhost),
raw_ref(add_localhost), true},
};
for (const auto& test_case : test_cases) {
GURL document_url = net::FilePathToFileURL(TestFilePath("hello.html"))
.ReplaceComponents(*test_case.document_host);
// On windows, if `document_url` contains the host part "localhost", the
// actual committed URL does not. So we omit EXPECT_TRUE and ignore the
// result value here.
std::ignore = NavigateToURL(shell(), document_url);
GURL element_url = net::FilePathToFileURL(TestFilePath(
test_case.element_name == "iframe" ? "empty.html" : "blank.jpg"));
element_url = element_url.ReplaceComponents(*test_case.element_host);
TestNavigationObserver load_observer(shell()->web_contents());
EXPECT_TRUE(
ExecJs(current_frame_host(),
JsReplace(R"(
var violation = new Promise(resolve => {
document.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", (e) => {
resolve("got violation");
});
});
let meta = document.createElement('meta');
meta.httpEquiv = 'Content-Security-Policy';
meta.content = $1;
document.head.appendChild(meta);
let element = document.createElement($2);
element.src = $3;
var promise = new Promise(resolve => {
element.onload = () => { resolve("allowed"); };
element.onerror = () => { resolve("blocked"); };
});
document.body.appendChild(element);
)",
test_case.csp, test_case.element_name, element_url)));
if (test_case.element_name == "iframe") {
// Since iframes always trigger the onload event, we need to be more
// careful checking whether the iframe was blocked or not.
load_observer.Wait();
const url::Origin child_origin = current_frame_host()
->child_at(0)
->current_frame_host()
->GetLastCommittedOrigin();
if (test_case.expect_allowed) {
EXPECT_TRUE(load_observer.last_navigation_succeeded())
<< element_url << " in " << document_url << " with CSPs \""
<< test_case.csp << "\" should be allowed";
EXPECT_FALSE(child_origin.opaque());
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(load_observer.last_navigation_succeeded());
EXPECT_EQ(net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CSP, load_observer.last_net_error_code());
// The blocked frame's origin should become unique.
EXPECT_TRUE(child_origin.opaque())
<< element_url << " in " << document_url << " with CSPs \""
<< test_case.csp << "\" should be blocked";
}
} else {
std::string expect_message =
test_case.expect_allowed ? "allowed" : "blocked";
EXPECT_EQ(expect_message, EvalJs(current_frame_host(), "promise"))
<< element_url << " in " << document_url << " with CSPs \""
<< test_case.csp << "\" should be " << expect_message;
}
if (!test_case.expect_allowed) {
EXPECT_EQ("got violation", EvalJs(current_frame_host(), "violation"));
}
}
}
// Test that a 'csp' attribute longer than 4096 bytes is ignored.
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest, CSPAttributeTooLong) {
std::string long_csp_attribute = "script-src 'none' ";
long_csp_attribute.resize(4097, 'a');
std::string page = "data:text/html,<body><iframe csp=\"" +
long_csp_attribute + "\"></iframe></body>";
GURL url(page);
WebContentsConsoleObserver console_observer(web_contents());
console_observer.SetPattern("'csp' attribute too long*");
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(shell(), url));
ASSERT_TRUE(console_observer.Wait());
EXPECT_EQ(current_frame_host()->child_count(), 1u);
EXPECT_FALSE(current_frame_host()->child_at(0)->csp_attribute());
}
namespace {
const char kAppHost[] = "app.com";
const char kNonAppHost[] = "other.com";
} // namespace
class IsolatedWebAppContentBrowserClient
: public ContentBrowserTestContentBrowserClient {
public:
bool ShouldUrlUseApplicationIsolationLevel(BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) override {
return url.host() == kAppHost;
}
};
class ContentSecurityPolicyIsolatedAppBrowserTest
: public ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest {
public:
ContentSecurityPolicyIsolatedAppBrowserTest()
: https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {}
void SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) override {
ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
mock_cert_verifier_.SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
}
void SetUpInProcessBrowserTestFixture() override {
ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest::SetUpInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
mock_cert_verifier_.SetUpInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
}
void TearDownInProcessBrowserTestFixture() override {
mock_cert_verifier_.TearDownInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest::TearDownInProcessBrowserTestFixture();
}
void SetUpOnMainThread() override {
ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest::SetUpOnMainThread();
client_ = std::make_unique<IsolatedWebAppContentBrowserClient>();
host_resolver()->AddRule("*", "127.0.0.1");
mock_cert_verifier_.mock_cert_verifier()->set_default_result(net::OK);
https_server()->ServeFilesFromSourceDirectory(GetTestDataFilePath());
ASSERT_TRUE(https_server()->Start());
}
void TearDownOnMainThread() override {
client_.reset();
ContentSecurityPolicyBrowserTest::TearDownOnMainThread();
}
protected:
net::EmbeddedTestServer* https_server() { return &https_server_; }
private:
net::EmbeddedTestServer https_server_;
ContentMockCertVerifier mock_cert_verifier_;
std::unique_ptr<IsolatedWebAppContentBrowserClient> client_;
};
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyIsolatedAppBrowserTest, Base) {
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(
shell(),
https_server()->GetURL(kAppHost, "/cross-origin-isolated.html")));
// Base element should be disabled.
EXPECT_EQ("violation", EvalJs(shell(), R"(
new Promise(resolve => {
document.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', e => {
resolve('violation');
});
let base = document.createElement('base');
base.href = '/test';
document.body.appendChild(base);
})
)"));
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyIsolatedAppBrowserTest, Src) {
constexpr auto kHttp = net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTP;
constexpr auto kHttps = net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS;
struct {
std::string element_name;
net::EmbeddedTestServer::Type scheme;
std::string host;
std::string path;
std::string expectation;
} test_cases[] = {
// Cross-origin HTTPS images and media are allowed (but need a
// Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy header, and will error otherwise)
{"img", kHttps, kAppHost, "/single_face.jpg", "allowed"},
{"img", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/single_face.jpg", "error"},
{"img", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/single_face_corp.jpg", "allowed"},
{"audio", kHttps, kAppHost, "/media/bear.flac", "allowed"},
{"audio", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/media/bear.flac", "error"},
{"audio", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/media/bear_corp.flac", "allowed"},
{"video", kHttps, kAppHost, "/media/bear.webm", "allowed"},
{"video", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/media/bear.webm", "error"},
{"video", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/media/bear_corp.webm", "allowed"},
// Plugins are disabled.
{"embed", kHttps, kAppHost, "/single_face.jpg", "violation"},
// Iframes can contain cross-origin HTTPS content.
{"iframe", kHttps, kAppHost, "/cross-origin-isolated.html", "allowed"},
{"iframe", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/simple.html", "allowed"},
{"iframe", kHttp, kNonAppHost, "/simple.html", "violation"},
// Script tags must be same-origin.
{"script", kHttps, kAppHost, "/result_queue.js", "allowed"},
{"script", kHttps, kNonAppHost, "/result_queue.js", "violation"},
};
for (const auto& test_case : test_cases) {
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(
shell(),
https_server()->GetURL(kAppHost, "/cross-origin-isolated.html")));
net::EmbeddedTestServer* test_server =
test_case.scheme == net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTP
? embedded_test_server()
: https_server();
GURL src = test_server->GetURL(test_case.host, test_case.path);
std::string test_js = JsReplace(R"(
const policy = window.trustedTypes.createPolicy('policy', {
createScriptURL: url => url,
});
new Promise(resolve => {
document.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', e => {
resolve('violation');
});
let element = document.createElement($1);
// Not all elements being tested require Trusted Types, but
// passing src through the policy for all elements works.
element.src = policy.createScriptURL($2);
element.addEventListener('canplay', () => resolve('allowed'));
element.addEventListener('load', () => resolve('allowed'));
element.addEventListener('error', e => resolve('error'));
document.body.appendChild(element);
})
)",
test_case.element_name, src);
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Running testcase: "
<< test_case.element_name << " " << src);
EXPECT_EQ(test_case.expectation, EvalJs(shell(), test_js));
}
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyIsolatedAppBrowserTest,
TrustedTypes) {
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(
shell(),
https_server()->GetURL(kAppHost, "/cross-origin-isolated.html")));
// Trusted Types should be required for scripts.
EXPECT_EQ("exception", EvalJs(shell(), R"(
new Promise(resolve => {
document.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', e => {
resolve('violation');
});
try {
let element = document.createElement('script');
element.src = '/result_queue.js';
element.addEventListener('load', () => resolve('allowed'));
element.addEventListener('error', e => resolve('error'));
document.body.appendChild(element);
} catch (e) {
resolve('exception');
}
})
)"));
}
IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(ContentSecurityPolicyIsolatedAppBrowserTest, Wasm) {
EXPECT_TRUE(NavigateToURL(
shell(),
https_server()->GetURL(kAppHost, "/cross-origin-isolated.html")));
EXPECT_EQ("allowed", EvalJs(shell(), R"(
new Promise(async (resolve) => {
document.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', e => {
resolve('violation');
});
try {
await WebAssembly.compile(new Uint8Array(
// The smallest possible Wasm module. Just the header
// (0, "A", "S", "M"), and the version (0x1).
[0x00, 0x61, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]));
resolve('allowed');
} catch (e) {
resolve('exception: ' + e);
}
})
)"));
}
} // namespace content