| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "sandbox/policy/win/sandbox_win.h" |
| |
| #include <stddef.h> |
| |
| #include <string> |
| #include <utility> |
| #include <vector> |
| |
| #include "base/command_line.h" |
| #include "base/cxx17_backports.h" |
| #include "base/debug/activity_tracker.h" |
| #include "base/feature_list.h" |
| #include "base/files/file_path.h" |
| #include "base/files/file_util.h" |
| #include "base/hash/hash.h" |
| #include "base/hash/sha1.h" |
| #include "base/logging.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/field_trial.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/histogram_functions.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" |
| #include "base/no_destructor.h" |
| #include "base/path_service.h" |
| #include "base/process/launch.h" |
| #include "base/strings/strcat.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_split.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" |
| #include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h" |
| #include "base/system/sys_info.h" |
| #include "base/trace_event/trace_arguments.h" |
| #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h" |
| #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h" |
| #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" |
| #include "base/win/win_util.h" |
| #include "base/win/windows_version.h" |
| #include "printing/buildflags/buildflags.h" |
| #include "sandbox/policy/features.h" |
| #include "sandbox/policy/mojom/sandbox.mojom.h" |
| #include "sandbox/policy/sandbox_type.h" |
| #include "sandbox/policy/switches.h" |
| #include "sandbox/policy/win/lpac_capability.h" |
| #include "sandbox/policy/win/sandbox_diagnostics.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/app_container.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/job.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_diagnostic.h" |
| #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h" |
| |
| namespace sandbox { |
| namespace policy { |
| using sandbox::mojom::Sandbox; |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL; |
| |
| // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes |
| // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short |
| // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension. |
| // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off |
| // of it, see: |
| // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers |
| const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { |
| L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"activedetect32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"activedetect64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"airfoilinject3.dll", // Airfoil. |
| L"akinsofthook32.dll", // Akinsoft Software Engineering. |
| L"assistant_x64.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"atcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64. |
| L"avcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64. |
| L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. |
| L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator. |
| L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. |
| L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. |
| L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris. |
| L"cplushook.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. |
| L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others. |
| L"easyhook64.dll", // Symantec BlueCoat and others. |
| L"esspd.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT. |
| L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5. |
| L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. |
| L"guard64.dll", // Comodo Internet Security x64. |
| L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. |
| L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. |
| L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. |
| L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. |
| L"icatcdll.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT. |
| L"icdcnl.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT. |
| L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). |
| L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). |
| L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. |
| L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). |
| L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. |
| L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. |
| L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy. |
| L"n64hooks.dll", // Neilsen//NetRatings NetSight. |
| L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. |
| L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. |
| L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). |
| L"nphooks.dll", // Neilsen//NetRatings NetSight. |
| L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. |
| L"pastali32.dll", // PastaLeads. |
| L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. |
| L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. |
| L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. |
| L"picrmi32.dll", // PicRec. |
| L"picrmi64.dll", // PicRec. |
| L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. |
| L"prochook.dll", // Unknown (GBill-Tools?) (crbug.com/974722). |
| L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). |
| L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. |
| L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. |
| L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. |
| L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection. |
| L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). |
| L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. |
| L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. |
| L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. |
| L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). |
| L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"windowsapihookdll32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"windowsapihookdll64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056). |
| L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. |
| }; |
| |
| // This is for finch. See also crbug.com/464430 for details. |
| const base::Feature kEnableCsrssLockdownFeature{ |
| "EnableCsrssLockdown", base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT}; |
| |
| // Helps emit trace events for sandbox policy. This mediates memory between |
| // chrome.exe and chrome.dll. |
| class PolicyTraceHelper : public base::trace_event::ConvertableToTraceFormat { |
| public: |
| explicit PolicyTraceHelper(TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| // |info| must live until JsonString() output is copied. |
| std::unique_ptr<PolicyInfo> info = policy->GetPolicyInfo(); |
| json_string_ = std::string(info->JsonString()); |
| } |
| ~PolicyTraceHelper() override = default; |
| |
| // ConvertableToTraceFormat. |
| void AppendAsTraceFormat(std::string* out) const override { |
| out->append(json_string_); |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| std::string json_string_; |
| }; // PolicyTraceHelper |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|. |
| // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also |
| // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders. |
| bool AddDirectory(int path, |
| const wchar_t* sub_dir, |
| bool children, |
| TargetPolicy::Semantics access, |
| TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| base::FilePath directory; |
| if (!base::PathService::Get(path, &directory)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (sub_dir) |
| directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir)); |
| |
| ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\"; |
| if (children) |
| directory_str += L"*"; |
| // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator. |
| |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory_str.c_str()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| #endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| |
| // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|. |
| bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) { |
| wchar_t path[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, base::size(path)); |
| if ((sz == base::size(path)) || (sz == 0)) { |
| // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway. |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, base::size(path))) |
| return false; |
| base::FilePath fname(path); |
| return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name); |
| } |
| |
| std::vector<std::wstring> GetShortNameVariants(const std::wstring& name) { |
| std::vector<std::wstring> alt_names; |
| size_t period = name.rfind(L'.'); |
| DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period); |
| DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period)); |
| if (period <= 8) |
| return alt_names; |
| |
| // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check |
| // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes |
| // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'. |
| alt_names.reserve(3); |
| for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) { |
| const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0}; |
| alt_names.push_back( |
| base::StrCat({name.substr(0, 6), suffix, name.substr(period)})); |
| } |
| return alt_names; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blocklist. |
| // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll |
| // is also loaded in this process. |
| void BlocklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name, |
| bool check_in_browser, |
| TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| if (check_in_browser) { |
| HMODULE module = ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name); |
| if (module) { |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); |
| DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name; |
| } else { |
| for (const auto& alt_name : GetShortNameVariants(module_name)) { |
| module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str()); |
| // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we |
| // want to make sure it is the right one. |
| if (module && IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name)) { |
| // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy. |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); |
| for (const auto& alt_name : GetShortNameVariants(module_name)) { |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. |
| // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module |
| // does not get a chance to execute any code. |
| void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| for (int ix = 0; ix != base::size(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) |
| BlocklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session. |
| std::wstring PrependWindowsSessionPath(const wchar_t* object) { |
| // Cache this because it can't change after process creation. |
| static DWORD s_session_id = 0; |
| if (s_session_id == 0) { |
| HANDLE token; |
| DWORD session_id_length; |
| DWORD session_id = 0; |
| |
| CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)); |
| CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id, |
| sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length)); |
| CloseHandle(token); |
| if (session_id) |
| s_session_id = session_id; |
| } |
| |
| return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%lu%ls", s_session_id, object); |
| } |
| |
| // Checks if the sandbox can be let to run without a job object assigned. |
| // Returns true if the job object has to be applied to the sandbox and false |
| // otherwise. |
| bool ShouldSetJobLevel(bool allow_no_sandbox_job) { |
| // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other |
| // job. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::Version::WIN8) |
| return true; |
| |
| BOOL in_job = true; |
| // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job, |
| if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job)) |
| NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError(); |
| if (!in_job) |
| return true; |
| |
| // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set. |
| JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {}; |
| if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL, JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, |
| &job_info, sizeof(job_info), NULL)) { |
| NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError(); |
| return true; |
| } |
| if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK) |
| return true; |
| |
| // Lastly in place of the flag which was supposed to be used only for running |
| // Chrome in remote sessions we do this check explicitly here. |
| // According to MS this flag can be false for a remote session only on Windows |
| // Server 2012 and newer so if we do the check last we should be on the safe |
| // side. See: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa380798.aspx. |
| if (!::GetSystemMetrics(SM_REMOTESESSION)) { |
| // TODO(pastarmovj): Even though the number are low, this flag is still |
| // necessary in some limited set of cases. Remove it once Windows 7 is no |
| // longer supported together with the rest of the checks in this function. |
| return !allow_no_sandbox_job; |
| } |
| |
| // Allow running without the sandbox in this case. This slightly reduces the |
| // ability of the sandbox to protect its children from spawning new processes |
| // or preventing them from shutting down Windows or accessing the clipboard. |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. |
| ResultCode AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| ResultCode result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file |
| // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with |
| // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services. |
| result = |
| policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have |
| // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix. |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*"); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for debug message only in debug |
| #ifndef NDEBUG |
| base::FilePath app_dir; |
| if (!base::PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir)) |
| return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; |
| |
| wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD long_path_return_value = |
| GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(), long_path_buf, MAX_PATH); |
| if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH) |
| return SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE; |
| |
| base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf); |
| debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, |
| TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, |
| debug_message.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| #endif // NDEBUG |
| |
| // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for stack traces. |
| #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD) |
| base::FilePath exe; |
| if (!base::PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe)) |
| return SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC; |
| base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| pdb_path.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE) |
| DWORD coverage_dir_size = |
| ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0); |
| if (coverage_dir_size == 0) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work."; |
| } else { |
| std::wstring coverage_dir; |
| wchar_t* coverage_dir_str = |
| base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size); |
| coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable( |
| L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size); |
| CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size); |
| base::FilePath sancov_path = |
| base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| sancov_path.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| void LogLaunchWarning(ResultCode last_warning, DWORD last_error) { |
| base::UmaHistogramSparse("Process.Sandbox.Launch.WarningResultCode", |
| last_warning); |
| base::UmaHistogramSparse("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Warning", last_error); |
| } |
| |
| ResultCode AddDefaultPolicyForSandboxedProcess(TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| |
| // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::Version::WIN8) |
| result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi"); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| // On 2003/Vista+ the initial token has to be restricted if the main |
| // token is restricted. |
| result = policy->SetTokenLevel(USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, USER_LOCKDOWN); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes. |
| result = policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| result = policy->SetIntegrityLevel(INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl(); |
| |
| result = policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| // We ignore the result of setting the alternate desktop, however log |
| // a launch warning. |
| LogLaunchWarning(result, ::GetLastError()); |
| DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; |
| result = SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of |
| // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes. |
| #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD) && !defined(COMPONENT_BUILD) |
| base::win::IATPatchFunction& GetIATPatchFunctionHandle() { |
| static base::NoDestructor<base::win::IATPatchFunction> |
| iat_patch_duplicate_handle; |
| return *iat_patch_duplicate_handle; |
| } |
| |
| typedef BOOL(WINAPI* DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle, |
| HANDLE source_handle, |
| HANDLE target_process_handle, |
| LPHANDLE target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| BOOL inherit_handle, |
| DWORD options); |
| |
| DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle; |
| |
| NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL; |
| |
| static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning = |
| "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed" |
| " process.\n Please contact security@chromium.org for assistance."; |
| |
| void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) { |
| // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14). |
| BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)]; |
| OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = |
| reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer); |
| ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t); |
| NTSTATUS error; |
| error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size); |
| CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); |
| type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; |
| |
| // Get the object basic information. |
| OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info; |
| size = sizeof(basic_info); |
| error = |
| g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size, &size); |
| CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); |
| |
| CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) << kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| |
| if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) { |
| const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = |
| ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE); |
| CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) |
| << kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle, |
| HANDLE source_handle, |
| HANDLE target_process_handle, |
| LPHANDLE target_handle, |
| DWORD desired_access, |
| BOOL inherit_handle, |
| DWORD options) { |
| // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask. |
| if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle, |
| target_process_handle, target_handle, |
| desired_access, inherit_handle, options)) |
| return FALSE; |
| |
| // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries. |
| if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle || |
| target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess()) |
| return TRUE; |
| |
| // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them. |
| BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; |
| if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) { |
| // We need a handle with permission to check the job object. |
| if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { |
| HANDLE temp_handle; |
| CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle( |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_process_handle, ::GetCurrentProcess(), |
| &temp_handle, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, 0)); |
| base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle); |
| CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (is_in_job) { |
| // We never allow inheritable child handles. |
| CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning; |
| |
| // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions. |
| HANDLE temp_handle; |
| CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle, |
| ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle, 0, |
| FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)); |
| base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle); |
| |
| // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack. |
| CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get()); |
| } |
| |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| bool IsAppContainerEnabled() { |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN8) |
| return false; |
| |
| return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kRendererAppContainer); |
| } |
| |
| ResultCode SetJobMemoryLimit(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| DCHECK_NE(policy->GetJobLevel(), JOB_NONE); |
| |
| #ifdef _WIN64 |
| size_t memory_limit = static_cast<size_t>(kDataSizeLimit); |
| |
| // Note that this command line flag hasn't been fetched by all |
| // callers of SetJobLevel, only those in this file. |
| Sandbox sandbox_type = SandboxTypeFromCommandLine(cmd_line); |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu || sandbox_type == Sandbox::kRenderer) { |
| int64_t GB = 1024 * 1024 * 1024; |
| // Allow the GPU/RENDERER process's sandbox to access more physical memory |
| // if it's available on the system. |
| // |
| // Renderer processes are allowed to access 16 GB; the GPU process, up |
| // to 64 GB. |
| int64_t physical_memory = base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory(); |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu && physical_memory > 64 * GB) { |
| memory_limit = 64 * GB; |
| } else if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu && physical_memory > 32 * GB) { |
| memory_limit = 32 * GB; |
| } else if (physical_memory > 16 * GB) { |
| memory_limit = 16 * GB; |
| } else { |
| memory_limit = 8 * GB; |
| } |
| } |
| return policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(memory_limit); |
| #else |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| // Generate a unique sandbox AC profile for the appcontainer based on the SHA1 |
| // hash of the appcontainer_id. This does not need to be secure so using SHA1 |
| // isn't a security concern. |
| std::wstring GetAppContainerProfileName(const std::string& appcontainer_id, |
| Sandbox sandbox_type) { |
| std::string sandbox_base_name; |
| switch (sandbox_type) { |
| case Sandbox::kXrCompositing: |
| sandbox_base_name = std::string("cr.sb.xr"); |
| break; |
| case Sandbox::kGpu: |
| sandbox_base_name = std::string("cr.sb.gpu"); |
| break; |
| case Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm: |
| sandbox_base_name = std::string("cr.sb.cdm"); |
| break; |
| case Sandbox::kNetwork: |
| sandbox_base_name = std::string("cr.sb.net"); |
| break; |
| case Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver: |
| sandbox_base_name = std::string("cr.sb.pxy"); |
| break; |
| default: |
| DCHECK(0); |
| } |
| |
| auto sha1 = base::SHA1HashString(appcontainer_id); |
| std::string profile_name = base::StrCat( |
| {sandbox_base_name, base::HexEncode(sha1.data(), sha1.size())}); |
| // CreateAppContainerProfile requires that the profile name is at most 64 |
| // characters but 50 on WCOS systems. The size of sha1 is a constant 40, |
| // so validate that the base names are sufficiently short that the total |
| // length is valid on all systems. |
| DCHECK_LE(profile_name.length(), 50U); |
| return base::UTF8ToWide(profile_name); |
| } |
| |
| ResultCode SetupAppContainerProfile(AppContainer* container, |
| const base::CommandLine& command_line, |
| Sandbox sandbox_type) { |
| if (sandbox_type != Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm && |
| sandbox_type != Sandbox::kGpu && |
| sandbox_type != Sandbox::kXrCompositing && |
| sandbox_type != Sandbox::kNetwork && |
| sandbox_type != Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver) { |
| return SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED; |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu && |
| !container->AddImpersonationCapability(L"chromeInstallFiles")) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddImpersonationCapability(" |
| "chromeInstallFiles) failed"; |
| return SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| |
| if ((sandbox_type == Sandbox::kXrCompositing || |
| sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu) && |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacPnpNotifications")) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddCapability(lpacPnpNotifications) failed"; |
| return SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kXrCompositing && |
| !container->AddCapability(L"chromeInstallFiles")) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddCapability(chromeInstallFiles) failed"; |
| return SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm) { |
| // Please refer to the following design doc on why we add the capabilities: |
| // https://docs.google.com/document/d/19Y4Js5v3BlzA5uSuiVTvcvPNIOwmxcMSFJWtuc1A-w8/edit#heading=h.iqvhsrml3gl9 |
| if (!container->AddCapability( |
| sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kPrivateNetworkClientServer) || |
| !container->AddCapability( |
| sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kInternetClient)) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) |
| << "AppContainer::AddCapability() - " |
| << "Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm internet capabilities failed"; |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| |
| if (!container->AddCapability(L"lpacCom") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacIdentityServices") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacMedia") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacPnPNotifications") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacServicesManagement") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacSessionManagement") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacAppExperience") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacInstrumentation") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacCryptoServices") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacEnterprisePolicyChangeNotifications") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"mediaFoundationCdmFiles")) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddCapability() - " |
| << "Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm lpac capabilities failed"; |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver) { |
| if (!container->AddCapability( |
| sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kInternetClient)) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddCapability() - " |
| << "Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver internet " |
| "capabilities failed"; |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| |
| if (!container->AddCapability(L"lpacServicesManagement") || |
| !container->AddCapability(L"lpacEnterprisePolicyChangeNotifications")) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddCapability() - " |
| << "Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver lpac " |
| "capabilities failed"; |
| return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| std::vector<std::wstring> base_caps = { |
| L"lpacChromeInstallFiles", |
| L"registryRead", |
| }; |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu) { |
| auto cmdline_caps = base::SplitString( |
| command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kAddGpuAppContainerCaps), |
| L",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY); |
| base_caps.insert(base_caps.end(), cmdline_caps.begin(), cmdline_caps.end()); |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kXrCompositing) { |
| auto cmdline_caps = base::SplitString( |
| command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kAddXrAppContainerCaps), |
| L",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY); |
| base_caps.insert(base_caps.end(), cmdline_caps.begin(), cmdline_caps.end()); |
| } |
| |
| for (const auto& cap : base_caps) { |
| if (!container->AddCapability(cap.c_str())) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "AppContainer::AddCapability() failed"; |
| return SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_CAPABILITY; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Enable LPAC for GPU process, but not for XRCompositor service. |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu && |
| base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGpuLPAC)) { |
| container->SetEnableLowPrivilegeAppContainer(true); |
| } |
| |
| // Enable LPAC for Network service. |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kNetwork) { |
| container->AddCapability( |
| sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kPrivateNetworkClientServer); |
| container->AddCapability(sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kInternetClient); |
| container->AddCapability( |
| sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kEnterpriseAuthentication); |
| container->AddCapability(L"lpacIdentityServices"); |
| container->AddCapability(L"lpacCryptoServices"); |
| container->SetEnableLowPrivilegeAppContainer(true); |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm) { |
| container->AddCapability(kMediaFoundationCdmData); |
| container->SetEnableLowPrivilegeAppContainer(true); |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver) { |
| container->SetEnableLowPrivilegeAppContainer(true); |
| } |
| |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| // Launches outside of the sandbox - the process will not be associated with |
| // a Policy or TargetProcess. This supports both kNoSandbox and the --no-sandbox |
| // command line flag. |
| ResultCode LaunchWithoutSandbox( |
| const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| const base::HandlesToInheritVector& handles_to_inherit, |
| SandboxDelegate* delegate, |
| base::Process* process) { |
| base::LaunchOptions options; |
| options.handles_to_inherit = handles_to_inherit; |
| // Network process runs in a job even when unsandboxed. This is to ensure it |
| // does not outlive the browser, which could happen if there is a lot of I/O |
| // on process shutdown, in which case TerminateProcess can fail. See |
| // https://crbug.com/820996. |
| if (delegate->ShouldUnsandboxedRunInJob()) { |
| BOOL in_job = true; |
| // Prior to Windows 8 nested jobs aren't possible. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::Version::WIN8 || |
| (::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), nullptr, &in_job) && |
| !in_job)) { |
| static HANDLE job_object_handle = nullptr; |
| if (!job_object_handle) { |
| Job job_obj; |
| DWORD result = job_obj.Init(JOB_UNPROTECTED, nullptr, 0, 0); |
| if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) |
| return SBOX_ERROR_CANNOT_INIT_JOB; |
| job_object_handle = job_obj.Take().Take(); |
| } |
| options.job_handle = job_object_handle; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Chromium binaries are marked as CET Compatible but some processes |
| // are not. When --no-sandbox is specified we disable CET for all children. |
| // Otherwise we are here because the sandbox type is kNoSandbox, and allow |
| // the process delegate to indicate if it is compatible with CET. |
| if (cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) || |
| base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) { |
| options.disable_cetcompat = true; |
| } else if (!delegate->CetCompatible()) { |
| options.disable_cetcompat = true; |
| } |
| |
| *process = base::LaunchProcess(cmd_line, options); |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| bool IsUnsandboxedProcess( |
| Sandbox sandbox_type, |
| const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| const base::CommandLine& launcher_process_command_line) { |
| if (IsUnsandboxedSandboxType(sandbox_type)) |
| return true; |
| if (cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) |
| return true; |
| if (launcher_process_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) |
| return true; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| JobLevel job_level, |
| uint32_t ui_exceptions, |
| TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| if (!ShouldSetJobLevel(policy->GetAllowNoSandboxJob())) |
| return policy->SetJobLevel(JOB_NONE, 0); |
| |
| ResultCode ret = policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions); |
| if (ret != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return ret; |
| |
| return SetJobMemoryLimit(cmd_line, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper. |
| // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first. |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kEnableCsrssLockdownFeature)) { |
| // Close all ALPC ports. |
| ResultCode ret = policy->SetDisconnectCsrss(); |
| if (ret != SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy. |
| std::wstring object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath( |
| L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters"); |
| return policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data()); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::AddAppContainerPolicy(TargetPolicy* policy, |
| const wchar_t* sid) { |
| if (IsAppContainerEnabled()) |
| return policy->SetLowBox(sid); |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| // Win32k Lockdown is supported on Windows 8+. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN8) |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| |
| MitigationFlags flags = policy->GetProcessMitigations(); |
| // Check not enabling twice. Should not happen. |
| DCHECK_EQ(0U, flags & MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE); |
| |
| flags |= MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE; |
| ResultCode result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(flags); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| return policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN, |
| TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT, nullptr); |
| #else |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::AddAppContainerProfileToPolicy( |
| const base::CommandLine& command_line, |
| Sandbox sandbox_type, |
| const std::string& appcontainer_id, |
| TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN10_RS1) |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| std::wstring profile_name = |
| GetAppContainerProfileName(appcontainer_id, sandbox_type); |
| ResultCode result = |
| policy->AddAppContainerProfile(profile_name.c_str(), true); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| scoped_refptr<AppContainer> container = policy->GetAppContainer(); |
| result = |
| SetupAppContainerProfile(container.get(), command_line, sandbox_type); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| DWORD granted_access; |
| BOOL granted_access_status; |
| bool access_check = |
| container->AccessCheck(command_line.GetProgram().value().c_str(), |
| SE_FILE_OBJECT, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE, |
| &granted_access, &granted_access_status) && |
| granted_access_status; |
| if (!access_check) |
| return SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_ACCESS_CHECK; |
| |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool SandboxWin::IsAppContainerEnabledForSandbox( |
| const base::CommandLine& command_line, |
| Sandbox sandbox_type) { |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN10_RS1) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kGpu) |
| return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGpuAppContainer); |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kNetwork) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver) |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool SandboxWin::InitBrokerServices(BrokerServices* broker_services) { |
| // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread()); |
| // See <http://b/1287166>. |
| DCHECK(broker_services); |
| DCHECK(!g_broker_services); |
| ResultCode init_result = broker_services->Init(); |
| g_broker_services = broker_services; |
| |
| // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle. This |
| // isn't useful under a component build, since there will be multiple modules, |
| // each of which may have a slot to patch (if the symbol is even present). |
| #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD) && !defined(COMPONENT_BUILD) |
| BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; |
| CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job)); |
| if (!is_in_job && !GetIATPatchFunctionHandle().is_patched()) { |
| HMODULE module = NULL; |
| wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH]; |
| CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS, |
| reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices), |
| &module)); |
| DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH); |
| if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) { |
| ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject); |
| result = GetIATPatchFunctionHandle().Patch( |
| module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle", |
| reinterpret_cast<void*>(DuplicateHandlePatch)); |
| CHECK_EQ(0u, result); |
| g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = |
| reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>( |
| GetIATPatchFunctionHandle().original_function()); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK == init_result; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool SandboxWin::InitTargetServices(TargetServices* target_services) { |
| DCHECK(target_services); |
| ResultCode result = target_services->Init(); |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK == result; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::GeneratePolicyForSandboxedProcess( |
| const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| const std::string& process_type, |
| const base::HandlesToInheritVector& handles_to_inherit, |
| SandboxDelegate* delegate, |
| const scoped_refptr<TargetPolicy>& policy) { |
| const base::CommandLine& launcher_process_command_line = |
| *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
| |
| Sandbox sandbox_type = delegate->GetSandboxType(); |
| // --no-sandbox and kNoSandbox are launched without a policy. |
| if (IsUnsandboxedProcess(sandbox_type, cmd_line, |
| launcher_process_command_line)) { |
| return ResultCode::SBOX_ERROR_UNSANDBOXED_PROCESS; |
| } |
| |
| // Allow no sandbox job if the --allow-no-sandbox-job switch is present. |
| if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch( |
| switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) { |
| policy->SetAllowNoSandboxJob(); |
| } |
| |
| // Add any handles to be inherited to the policy. |
| for (HANDLE handle : handles_to_inherit) |
| policy->AddHandleToShare(handle); |
| |
| // Pre-startup mitigations. |
| MitigationFlags mitigations = |
| MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE | |
| MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | |
| MITIGATION_DEP | |
| MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | |
| MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE | |
| MITIGATION_SEHOP | |
| MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE | |
| MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE | |
| MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL | |
| MITIGATION_RESTRICT_INDIRECT_BRANCH_PREDICTION; |
| |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWinSboxDisableKtmComponent)) |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_KTM_COMPONENT; |
| |
| // CET is enabled with the CETCOMPAT bit on chrome.exe so must be |
| // disabled for processes we know are not compatible. |
| if (!delegate->CetCompatible()) |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_CET_DISABLED; |
| |
| ResultCode result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess) { |
| result = SandboxWin::AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy.get()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| // Post-startup mitigations. |
| mitigations = MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER; |
| if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowThirdPartyModules) && |
| sandbox_type != Sandbox::kSpeechRecognition) { |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_FORCE_MS_SIGNED_BINS; |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kNetwork || sandbox_type == Sandbox::kAudio || |
| sandbox_type == Sandbox::kIconReader) { |
| mitigations |= MITIGATION_DYNAMIC_CODE_DISABLE; |
| } |
| |
| result = policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| result = SetJobLevel(cmd_line, JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy.get()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| |
| if (!delegate->DisableDefaultPolicy()) { |
| result = AddDefaultPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy.get()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess && |
| base::FeatureList::IsEnabled( |
| {"GpuLockdownDefaultDacl", base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT})) { |
| policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl(); |
| policy->AddRestrictingRandomSid(); |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) |
| if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess || |
| process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess || |
| sandbox_type == Sandbox::kPrintCompositor) { |
| AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS, NULL, true, |
| TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, policy.get()); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| result = AddGenericPolicy(policy.get()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| std::string appcontainer_id; |
| if (IsAppContainerEnabledForSandbox(cmd_line, sandbox_type) && |
| delegate->GetAppContainerId(&appcontainer_id)) { |
| result = AddAppContainerProfileToPolicy(cmd_line, sandbox_type, |
| appcontainer_id, policy.get()); |
| DCHECK(result == SBOX_ALL_OK); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| // Allow the renderer, gpu and utility processes to access the log file. |
| if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess || |
| process_type == switches::kGpuProcess || |
| process_type == switches::kUtilityProcess) { |
| if (logging::IsLoggingToFileEnabled()) { |
| DCHECK(base::FilePath(logging::GetLogFileFullPath()).IsAbsolute()); |
| result = policy->AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| logging::GetLogFileFullPath().c_str()); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (sandbox_type == Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm) { |
| // Set a policy that would normally allow for process creation. This allows |
| // the mf cdm process to launch the protected media pipeline process |
| // (mfpmp.exe) without process interception. |
| result = policy->SetJobLevel(JOB_INTERACTIVE, 0); |
| if (result != SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD) |
| // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will |
| // have no effect. These calls can fail with SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS. |
| policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)); |
| policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy.get())) |
| return SBOX_ERROR_DELEGATE_PRE_SPAWN; |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::StartSandboxedProcess( |
| const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, |
| const std::string& process_type, |
| const base::HandlesToInheritVector& handles_to_inherit, |
| SandboxDelegate* delegate, |
| base::Process* process) { |
| scoped_refptr<TargetPolicy> policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy(); |
| ResultCode result = GeneratePolicyForSandboxedProcess( |
| cmd_line, process_type, handles_to_inherit, delegate, policy); |
| |
| if (ResultCode::SBOX_ERROR_UNSANDBOXED_PROCESS == result) { |
| return LaunchWithoutSandbox(cmd_line, handles_to_inherit, delegate, |
| process); |
| } |
| if (SBOX_ALL_OK != result) |
| return result; |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS"); |
| |
| PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {}; |
| ResultCode last_warning = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| DWORD last_error = ERROR_SUCCESS; |
| result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget( |
| cmd_line.GetProgram().value().c_str(), |
| cmd_line.GetCommandLineString().c_str(), policy, &last_warning, |
| &last_error, &temp_process_info); |
| |
| base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info); |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS"); |
| |
| // Trace policy as processes are started. Useful for both failure and success. |
| TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("sandbox"), "processLaunch", |
| TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS, "sandboxType", |
| GetSandboxTypeInEnglish(delegate->GetSandboxType()), |
| "policy", |
| std::make_unique<PolicyTraceHelper>(policy.get())); |
| |
| if (SBOX_ALL_OK != result) { |
| base::UmaHistogramSparse("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error", last_error); |
| if (result == SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC) |
| DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process"; |
| else |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result; |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| base::debug::GlobalActivityTracker* tracker = |
| base::debug::GlobalActivityTracker::Get(); |
| if (tracker) { |
| tracker->RecordProcessLaunch(target.process_id(), |
| cmd_line.GetCommandLineString()); |
| } |
| |
| if (SBOX_ALL_OK != last_warning) |
| LogLaunchWarning(last_warning, last_error); |
| |
| delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle()); |
| CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != static_cast<DWORD>(-1)); |
| |
| *process = base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle()); |
| return SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| ResultCode SandboxWin::GetPolicyDiagnostics( |
| base::OnceCallback<void(base::Value)> response) { |
| CHECK(g_broker_services); |
| CHECK(!response.is_null()); |
| auto receiver = std::make_unique<ServiceManagerDiagnosticsReceiver>( |
| base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get(), std::move(response)); |
| return g_broker_services->GetPolicyDiagnostics(std::move(receiver)); |
| } |
| |
| void BlocklistAddOneDllForTesting(const wchar_t* module_name, |
| bool check_in_browser, |
| TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| BlocklistAddOneDll(module_name, check_in_browser, policy); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| std::string SandboxWin::GetSandboxTypeInEnglish(Sandbox sandbox_type) { |
| switch (sandbox_type) { |
| case Sandbox::kNoSandbox: |
| return "Unsandboxed"; |
| case Sandbox::kNoSandboxAndElevatedPrivileges: |
| return "Unsandboxed (Elevated)"; |
| case Sandbox::kXrCompositing: |
| return "XR Compositing"; |
| case Sandbox::kRenderer: |
| return "Renderer"; |
| case Sandbox::kUtility: |
| return "Utility"; |
| case Sandbox::kGpu: |
| return "GPU"; |
| case Sandbox::kPpapi: |
| return "PPAPI"; |
| case Sandbox::kNetwork: |
| return "Network"; |
| case Sandbox::kCdm: |
| return "CDM"; |
| case Sandbox::kPrintCompositor: |
| return "Print Compositor"; |
| #if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING) |
| case Sandbox::kPrintBackend: |
| return "Print Backend"; |
| #endif |
| case Sandbox::kAudio: |
| return "Audio"; |
| case Sandbox::kSpeechRecognition: |
| return "Speech Recognition"; |
| case Sandbox::kPdfConversion: |
| return "PDF Conversion"; |
| case Sandbox::kMediaFoundationCdm: |
| return "Media Foundation CDM"; |
| case Sandbox::kService: |
| return "Service"; |
| case Sandbox::kIconReader: |
| return "Icon Reader"; |
| case Sandbox::kWindowsSystemProxyResolver: |
| return "Windows System Proxy Resolver"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace policy |
| } // namespace sandbox |