| // Copyright 2019 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "content/browser/webauth/authenticator_common.h" |
| |
| #include <array> |
| #include <string> |
| #include <utility> |
| #include <vector> |
| |
| #include "base/bind.h" |
| #include "base/check.h" |
| #include "base/command_line.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" |
| #include "base/notreached.h" |
| #include "base/rand_util.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_piece.h" |
| #include "base/strings/utf_string_conversion_utils.h" |
| #include "base/task/task_traits.h" |
| #include "base/task/thread_pool.h" |
| #include "base/timer/timer.h" |
| #include "build/build_config.h" |
| #include "build/chromeos_buildflags.h" |
| #include "content/browser/bad_message.h" |
| #include "content/browser/webauth/authenticator_environment_impl.h" |
| #include "content/browser/webauth/virtual_authenticator_request_delegate.h" |
| #include "content/browser/webauth/virtual_fido_discovery_factory.h" |
| #include "content/browser/webauth/webauth_request_security_checker.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/browser_context.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/content_browser_client.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/device_service.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/is_uvpaa.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/navigation_handle.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/render_frame_host.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/render_process_host.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/render_widget_host_view.h" |
| #include "content/public/browser/web_contents.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_client.h" |
| #include "content/public/common/content_features.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha2.h" |
| #include "device/base/features.h" |
| #include "device/fido/attestation_statement.h" |
| #include "device/fido/ctap_make_credential_request.h" |
| #include "device/fido/features.h" |
| #include "device/fido/fido_authenticator.h" |
| #include "device/fido/fido_constants.h" |
| #include "device/fido/fido_parsing_utils.h" |
| #include "device/fido/fido_transport_protocol.h" |
| #include "device/fido/filter.h" |
| #include "device/fido/get_assertion_request_handler.h" |
| #include "device/fido/make_credential_request_handler.h" |
| #include "device/fido/public_key.h" |
| #include "device/fido/public_key_credential_descriptor.h" |
| #include "device/fido/public_key_credential_params.h" |
| #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" |
| #include "net/cert/asn1_util.h" |
| #include "net/der/input.h" |
| #include "net/der/parse_values.h" |
| #include "net/der/parser.h" |
| #include "services/network/public/cpp/is_potentially_trustworthy.h" |
| #include "url/url_constants.h" |
| #include "url/url_util.h" |
| |
| #if defined(OS_MAC) |
| #include "device/fido/mac/authenticator.h" |
| #include "device/fido/mac/credential_metadata.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(OS_WIN) |
| #include "device/fido/win/authenticator.h" |
| #include "device/fido/win/webauthn_api.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| namespace content { |
| |
| // RequestExtension is a type of extension in a WebAuthn request that might |
| // yield an extension output in the response. |
| enum class RequestExtension { |
| kAppID, |
| kHMACSecret, |
| kPRF, |
| kCredProps, |
| kLargeBlobEnable, |
| kLargeBlobRead, |
| kLargeBlobWrite, |
| }; |
| |
| namespace client_data { |
| const char kCreateType[] = "webauthn.create"; |
| const char kGetType[] = "webauthn.get"; |
| const char kU2fSignType[] = "navigator.id.getAssertion"; |
| const char kU2fRegisterType[] = "navigator.id.finishEnrollment"; |
| } // namespace client_data |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| // Validates whether the given origin is authorized to use the provided App |
| // ID value, mostly according to the rules in |
| // https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-appid-and-facets-v1.2-ps-20170411.html#determining-if-a-caller-s-facetid-is-authorized-for-an-appid. |
| // |
| // Returns the App ID to use for the request, or base::nullopt if the origin |
| // is not authorized to use the provided value. |
| base::Optional<std::string> ProcessAppIdExtension(std::string appid, |
| const url::Origin& origin) { |
| // The CryptoToken U2F extension checks the appid before calling the WebAuthn |
| // API so there is no need to validate it here. |
| if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension(origin)) { |
| if (!GURL(appid).is_valid()) { |
| DCHECK(false) << "cryptotoken request did not set a valid App ID"; |
| return base::nullopt; |
| } |
| return appid; |
| } |
| |
| // Step 1: "If the AppID is not an HTTPS URL, and matches the FacetID of the |
| // caller, no additional processing is necessary and the operation may |
| // proceed." |
| |
| // Webauthn is only supported on secure origins and |ValidateEffectiveDomain| |
| // has already checked this property of |origin| before this call. Thus this |
| // step is moot. |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/1158302): Use IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy? |
| DCHECK(network::IsUrlPotentiallyTrustworthy(origin.GetURL())); |
| |
| // Step 2: "If the AppID is null or empty, the client must set the AppID to be |
| // the FacetID of the caller, and the operation may proceed without additional |
| // processing." |
| if (appid.empty()) { |
| // While the U2F spec says to default the App ID to the Facet ID, which is |
| // the origin plus a trailing forward slash [1], cryptotoken and Firefox |
| // just use the site's Origin without trailing slash. We follow their |
| // implementations rather than the spec. |
| // |
| // [1]https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-appid-and-facets-v2.0-id-20180227.html#determining-the-facetid-of-a-calling-application |
| appid = origin.Serialize(); |
| } |
| |
| // Step 3: "If the caller's FacetID is an https:// Origin sharing the same |
| // host as the AppID, (e.g. if an application hosted at |
| // https://fido.example.com/myApp set an AppID of |
| // https://fido.example.com/myAppId), no additional processing is necessary |
| // and the operation may proceed." |
| GURL appid_url = GURL(appid); |
| if (!appid_url.is_valid() || appid_url.scheme() != url::kHttpsScheme || |
| appid_url.scheme_piece() != origin.scheme()) { |
| return base::nullopt; |
| } |
| |
| // This check is repeated inside |SameDomainOrHost|, just after this. However |
| // it's cheap and mirrors the structure of the spec. |
| if (appid_url.host_piece() == origin.host()) { |
| return appid; |
| } |
| |
| // At this point we diverge from the specification in order to avoid the |
| // complexity of making a network request which isn't believed to be |
| // necessary in practice. See also |
| // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1244959#c8 |
| if (net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost( |
| appid_url, origin, |
| net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) { |
| return appid; |
| } |
| |
| // As a compatibility hack, sites within google.com are allowed to assert two |
| // special-case AppIDs. Firefox also does this: |
| // https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.platform/Uiu3fwnA2xw/201ynAiPAQAJ |
| const GURL kGstatic1 = |
| GURL("https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/origins.json"); |
| const GURL kGstatic2 = |
| GURL("https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/a/google.com/origins.json"); |
| DCHECK(kGstatic1.is_valid() && kGstatic2.is_valid()); |
| |
| if (origin.DomainIs("google.com") && !appid_url.has_ref() && |
| (appid_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(kGstatic1) || |
| appid_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(kGstatic2))) { |
| return appid; |
| } |
| |
| return base::nullopt; |
| } |
| |
| // The application parameter is the SHA-256 hash of the UTF-8 encoding of |
| // the application identity (i.e. relying_party_id) of the application |
| // requesting the registration. |
| std::array<uint8_t, crypto::kSHA256Length> CreateApplicationParameter( |
| const std::string& relying_party_id) { |
| std::array<uint8_t, crypto::kSHA256Length> application_parameter; |
| crypto::SHA256HashString(relying_party_id, application_parameter.data(), |
| application_parameter.size()); |
| return application_parameter; |
| } |
| |
| device::CtapGetAssertionRequest CreateCtapGetAssertionRequest( |
| const std::string& client_data_json, |
| const blink::mojom::PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsPtr& options, |
| base::Optional<std::string> app_id, |
| bool is_off_the_record) { |
| device::CtapGetAssertionRequest request_parameter(options->relying_party_id, |
| client_data_json); |
| |
| request_parameter.allow_list = options->allow_credentials; |
| |
| request_parameter.user_verification = options->user_verification; |
| |
| if (app_id) { |
| request_parameter.alternative_application_parameter = |
| CreateApplicationParameter(*app_id); |
| request_parameter.app_id = std::move(*app_id); |
| } |
| |
| if (!options->cable_authentication_data.empty()) { |
| request_parameter.cable_extension = options->cable_authentication_data; |
| } |
| if (options->large_blob_read) { |
| request_parameter.large_blob_read = true; |
| request_parameter.large_blob_key = true; |
| } |
| if (options->large_blob_write) { |
| request_parameter.large_blob_key = true; |
| } |
| request_parameter.is_off_the_record_context = is_off_the_record; |
| return request_parameter; |
| } |
| |
| // Parses the FIDO transport types extension from the DER-encoded, X.509 |
| // certificate in |der_cert| and appends any unique transport types found to |
| // |out_transports|. |
| void AppendUniqueTransportsFromCertificate( |
| base::span<const uint8_t> der_cert, |
| std::vector<device::FidoTransportProtocol>* out_transports) { |
| // See |
| // https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-u2f-authenticator-transports-extension-v1.2-ps-20170411.html#fido-u2f-certificate-transports-extension |
| static constexpr uint8_t kTransportTypesOID[] = { |
| 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x82, 0xe5, 0x1c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}; |
| bool present, critical; |
| base::StringPiece contents; |
| if (!net::asn1::ExtractExtensionFromDERCert( |
| base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(der_cert.data()), |
| der_cert.size()), |
| base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kTransportTypesOID), |
| sizeof(kTransportTypesOID)), |
| &present, &critical, &contents) || |
| !present) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| const net::der::Input contents_der(contents); |
| net::der::Parser contents_parser(contents_der); |
| net::der::BitString transport_bits; |
| if (!contents_parser.ReadBitString(&transport_bits)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // The certificate extension contains a BIT STRING where different bits |
| // indicate support for different transports. The following array maps |
| // between these bit indexes and the FidoTransportProtocol enum. |
| static constexpr struct { |
| uint8_t bit_index; |
| device::FidoTransportProtocol transport; |
| } kTransportMapping[] = { |
| // Bit 0 is "Bluetooth Classic", not BLE. Since webauthn doesn't define a |
| // transport type for this we ignore it. |
| {1, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kBluetoothLowEnergy}, |
| {2, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kUsbHumanInterfaceDevice}, |
| {3, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kNearFieldCommunication}, |
| {4, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal}, |
| }; |
| |
| for (const auto& mapping : kTransportMapping) { |
| if (transport_bits.AssertsBit(mapping.bit_index) && |
| !base::Contains(*out_transports, mapping.transport)) { |
| out_transports->push_back(mapping.transport); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| enum class AttestationErasureOption { |
| kIncludeAttestation, |
| kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid, |
| kEraseAttestationAndAaguid, |
| }; |
| |
| base::TimeDelta AdjustTimeout(base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> timeout, |
| RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) { |
| // Time to wait for an authenticator to successfully complete an operation. |
| static constexpr base::TimeDelta kAdjustedTimeoutLower = |
| base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10); |
| static constexpr base::TimeDelta kAdjustedTimeoutUpper = |
| base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(10); |
| |
| if (!timeout) { |
| return kAdjustedTimeoutUpper; |
| } |
| const bool testing_api_enabled = |
| AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance() |
| ->IsVirtualAuthenticatorEnabledFor( |
| static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host) |
| ->frame_tree_node()); |
| if (testing_api_enabled) { |
| return *timeout; |
| } |
| return std::max(kAdjustedTimeoutLower, |
| std::min(kAdjustedTimeoutUpper, *timeout)); |
| } |
| |
| blink::mojom::MakeCredentialAuthenticatorResponsePtr |
| CreateMakeCredentialResponse( |
| const std::string& client_data_json, |
| device::AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse response_data, |
| AttestationErasureOption attestation_erasure, |
| const base::flat_set<RequestExtension>& requested_extensions) { |
| auto response = blink::mojom::MakeCredentialAuthenticatorResponse::New(); |
| auto common_info = blink::mojom::CommonCredentialInfo::New(); |
| common_info->client_data_json.assign(client_data_json.begin(), |
| client_data_json.end()); |
| common_info->authenticator_data = response_data.attestation_object() |
| .authenticator_data() |
| .SerializeToByteArray(); |
| if (response_data.android_client_data_ext()) { |
| DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport)); |
| common_info->client_data_json = *response_data.android_client_data_ext(); |
| } |
| common_info->raw_id = response_data.raw_credential_id(); |
| common_info->id = response_data.GetId(); |
| response->info = std::move(common_info); |
| |
| // The transport list must not contain duplicates but the order doesn't matter |
| // because Blink will sort the resulting strings before returning them. |
| std::vector<device::FidoTransportProtocol> transports; |
| if (response_data.transport_used()) { |
| transports.push_back(*response_data.transport_used()); |
| } |
| // If the attestation certificate specifies that the token supports any other |
| // transports, include them in the list. |
| base::Optional<base::span<const uint8_t>> leaf_cert = |
| response_data.attestation_object() |
| .attestation_statement() |
| .GetLeafCertificate(); |
| if (leaf_cert) { |
| AppendUniqueTransportsFromCertificate(*leaf_cert, &transports); |
| } |
| |
| response->transports = std::move(transports); |
| |
| bool did_create_hmac_secret = false; |
| const base::Optional<cbor::Value>& maybe_extensions = |
| response_data.attestation_object().authenticator_data().extensions(); |
| if (maybe_extensions) { |
| DCHECK(maybe_extensions->is_map()); |
| const cbor::Value::MapValue& extensions = maybe_extensions->GetMap(); |
| const auto hmac_secret_it = |
| extensions.find(cbor::Value(device::kExtensionHmacSecret)); |
| if (hmac_secret_it != extensions.end() && |
| hmac_secret_it->second.is_bool() && hmac_secret_it->second.GetBool()) { |
| did_create_hmac_secret = true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (const RequestExtension ext : requested_extensions) { |
| switch (ext) { |
| case RequestExtension::kPRF: |
| response->echo_prf = true; |
| response->prf = did_create_hmac_secret; |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kHMACSecret: |
| response->echo_hmac_create_secret = true; |
| response->hmac_create_secret = did_create_hmac_secret; |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kCredProps: |
| response->echo_cred_props = true; |
| if (response_data.is_resident_key) { |
| response->has_cred_props_rk = true; |
| response->cred_props_rk = *response_data.is_resident_key; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobEnable: |
| response->echo_large_blob = true; |
| response->supports_large_blob = |
| response_data.large_blob_key().has_value(); |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kAppID: |
| case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobRead: |
| case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobWrite: |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch (attestation_erasure) { |
| case AttestationErasureOption::kIncludeAttestation: |
| break; |
| case AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid: |
| response_data.EraseAttestationStatement( |
| device::AttestationObject::AAGUID::kInclude); |
| break; |
| case AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid: |
| response_data.EraseAttestationStatement( |
| device::AttestationObject::AAGUID::kErase); |
| break; |
| } |
| response->attestation_object = |
| response_data.GetCBOREncodedAttestationObject(); |
| |
| const device::PublicKey* public_key = response_data.attestation_object() |
| .authenticator_data() |
| .attested_data() |
| ->public_key(); |
| response->public_key_algo = public_key->algorithm; |
| const base::Optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& public_key_der = |
| public_key->der_bytes; |
| if (public_key_der) { |
| response->public_key_der.emplace(public_key_der.value()); |
| } |
| |
| return response; |
| } |
| |
| blink::mojom::GetAssertionAuthenticatorResponsePtr CreateGetAssertionResponse( |
| const std::string& client_data_json, |
| device::AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse response_data, |
| const base::Optional<std::string>& app_id, |
| const base::flat_set<RequestExtension>& requested_extensions) { |
| auto response = blink::mojom::GetAssertionAuthenticatorResponse::New(); |
| auto common_info = blink::mojom::CommonCredentialInfo::New(); |
| common_info->client_data_json.assign(client_data_json.begin(), |
| client_data_json.end()); |
| if (response_data.android_client_data_ext()) { |
| DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport)); |
| common_info->client_data_json = *response_data.android_client_data_ext(); |
| } |
| common_info->raw_id = response_data.raw_credential_id(); |
| common_info->id = response_data.GetId(); |
| response->info = std::move(common_info); |
| response->info->authenticator_data = |
| response_data.auth_data().SerializeToByteArray(); |
| response->signature = response_data.signature(); |
| response_data.user_entity() |
| ? response->user_handle.emplace(response_data.user_entity()->id) |
| : response->user_handle.emplace(); |
| |
| for (RequestExtension ext : requested_extensions) { |
| switch (ext) { |
| case RequestExtension::kAppID: |
| DCHECK(app_id); |
| response->echo_appid_extension = true; |
| if (response_data.GetRpIdHash() == |
| CreateApplicationParameter(*app_id)) { |
| response->appid_extension = true; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kPRF: { |
| response->echo_prf = true; |
| base::Optional<base::span<const uint8_t>> hmac_secret = |
| response_data.hmac_secret(); |
| if (hmac_secret) { |
| auto prf_values = blink::mojom::PRFValues::New(); |
| DCHECK(hmac_secret->size() == 32 || hmac_secret->size() == 64); |
| prf_values->first = device::fido_parsing_utils::Materialize( |
| hmac_secret->subspan(0, 32)); |
| if (hmac_secret->size() == 64) { |
| prf_values->second = device::fido_parsing_utils::Materialize( |
| hmac_secret->subspan(32, 32)); |
| } |
| response->prf_results = std::move(prf_values); |
| } else { |
| response->prf_not_evaluated = |
| response_data.hmac_secret_not_evaluated(); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobRead: |
| response->echo_large_blob = true; |
| response->large_blob = response_data.large_blob(); |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobWrite: |
| response->echo_large_blob = true; |
| response->echo_large_blob_written = true; |
| response->large_blob_written = response_data.large_blob_written(); |
| break; |
| case RequestExtension::kHMACSecret: |
| case RequestExtension::kCredProps: |
| case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobEnable: |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return response; |
| } |
| |
| void IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableImpl( |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* delegate, |
| device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* discovery_factory, |
| BrowserContext* browser_context, |
| blink::mojom::Authenticator:: |
| IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableCallback callback) { |
| if (!delegate) { |
| // TODO(crbug/1110081): Investigate why this can be nullptr. |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| std::move(callback).Run(false); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| base::Optional<bool> is_uvpaa_override = |
| delegate->IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableOverride(); |
| if (is_uvpaa_override) { |
| std::move(callback).Run(*is_uvpaa_override); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(OS_MAC) |
| const base::Optional<device::fido::mac::AuthenticatorConfig> config = |
| delegate->GetTouchIdAuthenticatorConfig(); |
| std::move(callback).Run(config && |
| IsUVPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(*config)); |
| return; |
| #elif defined(OS_WIN) |
| if (browser_context->IsOffTheRecord()) { |
| std::move(callback).Run(false); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| std::move(callback).Run(IsUVPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable( |
| discovery_factory->win_webauthn_api())); |
| return; |
| #elif BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS_ASH) |
| if (browser_context->IsOffTheRecord()) { |
| std::move(callback).Run(false); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // ChromeOS needs to do a dbus call to determine platform authenticator |
| // availability. The call is fast in practice, but nonetheless may |
| // theoretically block. |
| base::ThreadPool::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult( |
| FROM_HERE, {base::TaskPriority::USER_BLOCKING, base::MayBlock()}, |
| base::BindOnce(&IsUVPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable), std::move(callback)); |
| #else |
| std::move(callback).Run(false); |
| return; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| // GetAvailableTransports returns the set of transports that should be passed to |
| // a FidoRequestHandler for the current request. This determines for which |
| // transports the request handler will attempt to obtain FidoDiscovery |
| // instances. |
| base::flat_set<device::FidoTransportProtocol> GetAvailableTransports( |
| RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* delegate, |
| device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* discovery_factory, |
| const url::Origin& caller_origin) { |
| // U2F requests proxied from the cryptotoken extension are limited to USB |
| // devices. |
| if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin)) { |
| return base::flat_set<device::FidoTransportProtocol>( |
| {device::FidoTransportProtocol::kUsbHumanInterfaceDevice}); |
| } |
| |
| base::flat_set<device::FidoTransportProtocol> transports; |
| transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kUsbHumanInterfaceDevice); |
| |
| #if BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS_ASH) |
| // TODO(crbug.com/1157651): Work around CrOS platform authenticator being |
| // unavailable in Incognito. |
| if (!content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host) |
| ->GetBrowserContext() |
| ->IsOffTheRecord()) { |
| transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal); |
| } |
| #else |
| transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (discovery_factory->IsTestOverride()) { |
| // The desktop implementation does not support BLE or NFC, but we emulate |
| // them if the testing API is enabled. |
| transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kBluetoothLowEnergy); |
| transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kNearFieldCommunication); |
| } |
| |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuthCable) || |
| base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport)) { |
| transports.insert( |
| device::FidoTransportProtocol::kCloudAssistedBluetoothLowEnergy); |
| } |
| |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport)) { |
| transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kAndroidAccessory); |
| } |
| |
| return transports; |
| } |
| |
| // Returns a new FidoDiscoveryFactory for the current request. This may be |
| // a factory for virtual authenticators if the testing API is enabled for the |
| // given frame. |
| std::unique_ptr<device::FidoDiscoveryFactory> MakeDiscoveryFactory( |
| RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* request_delegate, |
| bool is_u2f_api_request) { |
| VirtualAuthenticatorManagerImpl* virtual_authenticator_manager = |
| AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance() |
| ->MaybeGetVirtualAuthenticatorManager( |
| static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host) |
| ->frame_tree_node()); |
| if (virtual_authenticator_manager) { |
| return virtual_authenticator_manager->MakeDiscoveryFactory(); |
| } |
| |
| auto discovery_factory = std::make_unique<device::FidoDiscoveryFactory>(); |
| #if defined(OS_MAC) |
| discovery_factory->set_mac_touch_id_info( |
| request_delegate->GetTouchIdAuthenticatorConfig()); |
| #endif // defined(OS_MAC) |
| |
| #if defined(OS_WIN) |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthUseNativeWinApi)) { |
| discovery_factory->set_win_webauthn_api( |
| device::WinWebAuthnApi::GetDefault()); |
| } |
| #endif // defined(OS_WIN) |
| |
| #if BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS_ASH) |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthCrosPlatformAuthenticator)) { |
| discovery_factory->set_generate_request_id_callback( |
| request_delegate->GetGenerateRequestIdCallback(render_frame_host)); |
| } |
| #endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS_ASH) |
| |
| return discovery_factory; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| AuthenticatorCommon::AuthenticatorCommon(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) |
| : render_frame_host_(render_frame_host), |
| security_checker_(static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host) |
| ->GetWebAuthRequestSecurityChecker()) { |
| DCHECK(render_frame_host_); |
| // Disable the back-forward cache for any document that makes WebAuthn |
| // requests. Pages using privacy-sensitive APIs are generally exempt from |
| // back-forward cache for now as a precaution. |
| BackForwardCache::DisableForRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host, |
| "WebAuthenticationAPI"); |
| } |
| |
| AuthenticatorCommon::~AuthenticatorCommon() { |
| // This call exists to assert that |render_frame_host_| outlives this object. |
| // If this is violated, ASAN should notice. |
| render_frame_host_->GetRoutingID(); |
| } |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate> |
| AuthenticatorCommon::CreateRequestDelegate() { |
| auto* frame_tree_node = |
| static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host_)->frame_tree_node(); |
| if (AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance() |
| ->IsVirtualAuthenticatorEnabledFor(frame_tree_node)) { |
| return std::make_unique<VirtualAuthenticatorRequestDelegate>( |
| frame_tree_node); |
| } |
| return GetContentClient()->browser()->GetWebAuthenticationRequestDelegate( |
| render_frame_host_); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::StartMakeCredentialRequest( |
| bool allow_skipping_pin_touch) { |
| InitDiscoveryFactory(); |
| |
| request_delegate_->ConfigureCable( |
| caller_origin_, base::span<const device::CableDiscoveryData>(), |
| discovery_factory()); |
| |
| make_credential_options_->allow_skipping_pin_touch = allow_skipping_pin_touch; |
| |
| request_ = std::make_unique<device::MakeCredentialRequestHandler>( |
| discovery_factory(), |
| GetAvailableTransports(render_frame_host_, request_delegate_.get(), |
| discovery_factory(), caller_origin_), |
| *ctap_make_credential_request_, *make_credential_options_, |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnRegisterResponse, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())); |
| |
| request_delegate_->RegisterActionCallbacks( |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnCancelFromUI, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()) /* cancel_callback */, |
| base::BindRepeating( |
| &AuthenticatorCommon::StartMakeCredentialRequest, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), |
| /*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/false) /* start_over_callback */, |
| base::BindRepeating( |
| &device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::StartAuthenticatorRequest, |
| request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* request_callback */, |
| base::BindRepeating( |
| &device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::PowerOnBluetoothAdapter, |
| request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* bluetooth_adapter_power_on_callback */); |
| if (make_credential_options_->resident_key != |
| device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kDiscouraged) { |
| request_delegate_->SetMightCreateResidentCredential(true); |
| } |
| request_->set_observer(request_delegate_.get()); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::StartGetAssertionRequest( |
| bool allow_skipping_pin_touch) { |
| InitDiscoveryFactory(); |
| |
| base::span<const device::CableDiscoveryData> cable_pairings; |
| if (ctap_get_assertion_request_->cable_extension && IsFocused()) { |
| cable_pairings = *ctap_get_assertion_request_->cable_extension; |
| } |
| request_delegate_->ConfigureCable(caller_origin_, cable_pairings, |
| discovery_factory()); |
| |
| request_ = std::make_unique<device::GetAssertionRequestHandler>( |
| discovery_factory(), |
| GetAvailableTransports(render_frame_host_, request_delegate_.get(), |
| discovery_factory(), caller_origin_), |
| *ctap_get_assertion_request_, *ctap_get_assertion_options_, |
| allow_skipping_pin_touch, |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnSignResponse, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())); |
| |
| request_delegate_->RegisterActionCallbacks( |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnCancelFromUI, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()) /* cancel_callback */, |
| base::BindRepeating( |
| &AuthenticatorCommon::StartGetAssertionRequest, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), |
| /*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/false) /* start_over_callback */, |
| base::BindRepeating( |
| &device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::StartAuthenticatorRequest, |
| request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* request_callback */, |
| base::BindRepeating( |
| &device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::PowerOnBluetoothAdapter, |
| request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* bluetooth_adapter_power_on_callback */); |
| |
| request_->set_observer(request_delegate_.get()); |
| } |
| |
| bool AuthenticatorCommon::IsFocused() const { |
| return render_frame_host_->IsCurrent() && request_delegate_->IsFocused(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnLargeBlobCompressed( |
| data_decoder::DataDecoder::ResultOrError<mojo_base::BigBuffer> result) { |
| ctap_get_assertion_request_->large_blob_write = |
| device::fido_parsing_utils::MaterializeOrNull(result.value); |
| StartGetAssertionRequest(/*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/true); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnLargeBlobUncompressed( |
| device::AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse response, |
| data_decoder::DataDecoder::ResultOrError<mojo_base::BigBuffer> result) { |
| response.set_large_blob( |
| device::fido_parsing_utils::MaterializeOrNull(result.value)); |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(get_assertion_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS, |
| CreateGetAssertionResponse(client_data_json_, std::move(response), |
| app_id_, requested_extensions_)); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| // mojom::Authenticator |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::MakeCredential( |
| url::Origin caller_origin, |
| blink::mojom::PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsPtr options, |
| blink::mojom::Authenticator::MakeCredentialCallback callback) { |
| if (request_) { |
| if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin)) { |
| // Requests originating from cryptotoken will generally outlive any |
| // navigation events on the tab of the request's sender. Evict pending |
| // requests if cryptotoken sends a new one such that requests from before |
| // a navigation event do not prevent new requests. See |
| // https://crbug.com/935480. |
| CancelWithStatus(blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| } else { |
| std::move(callback).Run( |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PENDING_REQUEST, nullptr); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| DCHECK(!request_); |
| |
| bool is_cross_origin; |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status = |
| security_checker_->ValidateAncestorOrigins( |
| caller_origin, |
| WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::RequestType::kMakeCredential, |
| &is_cross_origin); |
| if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| request_delegate_ = CreateRequestDelegate(); |
| if (!request_delegate_) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PENDING_REQUEST, |
| nullptr, Focus::kDontCheck); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| base::Optional<std::string> rp_id = |
| request_delegate_->MaybeGetRelyingPartyIdOverride( |
| options->relying_party.id, caller_origin); |
| |
| if (!rp_id) { |
| // If the delegate didn't override RP ID selection then apply standard |
| // rules. |
| rp_id = std::move(options->relying_party.id); |
| status = security_checker_->ValidateDomainAndRelyingPartyID(caller_origin, |
| *rp_id); |
| if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status, nullptr, |
| Focus::kDontCheck); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| caller_origin_ = caller_origin; |
| relying_party_id_ = *rp_id; |
| options->relying_party.id = std::move(*rp_id); |
| request_delegate_->SetRelyingPartyId(relying_party_id_); |
| |
| device::fido_filter::MaybeInitialize(); |
| switch (device::fido_filter::Evaluate( |
| device::fido_filter::Operation::MAKE_CREDENTIAL, relying_party_id_, |
| /*device=*/base::nullopt, |
| /*id=*/base::nullopt)) { |
| case device::fido_filter::Action::ALLOW: |
| break; |
| case device::fido_filter::Action::NO_ATTESTATION: |
| // This will be handled by the request handler. |
| break; |
| case device::fido_filter::Action::BLOCK: |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR, nullptr, |
| Focus::kDontCheck); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| base::Optional<std::string> appid_exclude; |
| if (options->appid_exclude) { |
| appid_exclude = |
| ProcessAppIdExtension(*options->appid_exclude, caller_origin); |
| if (!appid_exclude) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::INVALID_DOMAIN, nullptr, |
| Focus::kDontCheck); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (options->user.icon_url) { |
| status = security_checker_->ValidateAPrioriAuthenticatedUrl( |
| *options->user.icon_url); |
| } |
| if (status == blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS && |
| options->relying_party.icon_url) { |
| status = security_checker_->ValidateAPrioriAuthenticatedUrl( |
| *options->relying_party.icon_url); |
| } |
| if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) { |
| bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(render_frame_host_->GetProcess(), |
| bad_message::AUTH_INVALID_ICON_URL); |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status, nullptr, |
| Focus::kDontCheck); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (!IsFocused()) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_FOCUSED); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| const device::AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria |
| authenticator_selection_criteria = |
| options->authenticator_selection |
| ? *options->authenticator_selection |
| : device::AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria(); |
| make_credential_options_ = device::MakeCredentialRequestHandler::Options( |
| authenticator_selection_criteria); |
| |
| const bool might_create_resident_key = |
| make_credential_options_->resident_key != |
| device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kDiscouraged; |
| if (might_create_resident_key && !request_delegate_->SupportsResidentKeys()) { |
| if (make_credential_options_->resident_key == |
| device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kRequired) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::RESIDENT_CREDENTIALS_UNSUPPORTED); |
| return; |
| } |
| // Downgrade 'preferred' to 'discouraged'. |
| make_credential_options_->resident_key = |
| device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kDiscouraged; |
| } |
| |
| // Reject any non-sensical credProtect extension values. |
| if ( // Can't require the default policy (or no policy). |
| (options->enforce_protection_policy && |
| (options->protection_policy == |
| blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UNSPECIFIED || |
| options->protection_policy == blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::NONE)) || |
| // For non-resident keys, NONE doesn't make sense. (UV_OR_CRED_ID_REQUIRED |
| // does because, with CTAP 2.0, just because a resident key isn't |
| // _required_ doesn't mean that one won't be created and an RP might want |
| // credProtect to take effect if that happens.) |
| (!might_create_resident_key && |
| options->protection_policy == blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::NONE) || |
| // UV_REQUIRED only makes sense if UV is required overall. |
| (options->protection_policy == |
| blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UV_REQUIRED && |
| authenticator_selection_criteria.user_verification_requirement() != |
| device::UserVerificationRequirement::kRequired)) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PROTECTION_POLICY_INCONSISTENT); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| base::Optional<device::CredProtectRequest> cred_protect_request; |
| switch (options->protection_policy) { |
| case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UNSPECIFIED: |
| if (might_create_resident_key) { |
| // If not specified, kUVOrCredIDRequired is made the default unless |
| // the authenticator defaults to something better. |
| cred_protect_request = |
| device::CredProtectRequest::kUVOrCredIDRequiredOrBetter; |
| } |
| break; |
| case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::NONE: |
| cred_protect_request = device::CredProtectRequest::kUVOptional; |
| break; |
| case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UV_OR_CRED_ID_REQUIRED: |
| cred_protect_request = device::CredProtectRequest::kUVOrCredIDRequired; |
| break; |
| case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UV_REQUIRED: |
| cred_protect_request = device::CredProtectRequest::kUVRequired; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (cred_protect_request) { |
| make_credential_options_->cred_protect_request = { |
| {*cred_protect_request, options->enforce_protection_policy}}; |
| } |
| |
| DCHECK(make_credential_response_callback_.is_null()); |
| make_credential_response_callback_ = std::move(callback); |
| |
| timer_->Start( |
| FROM_HERE, AdjustTimeout(options->timeout, render_frame_host_), |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnTimeout, base::Unretained(this))); |
| |
| const bool origin_is_crypto_token_extension = |
| WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin_); |
| |
| // Cryptotoken provides the sender origin for register requests in the |
| // |relying_party| |name| attribute. (The |id| attribute contains the AppID.) |
| client_data_json_ = |
| origin_is_crypto_token_extension |
| ? device::SerializeCollectedClientDataToJson( |
| client_data::kU2fRegisterType, *options->relying_party.name, |
| options->challenge, /*is_cross_origin=*/false, |
| /*use_legacy_u2f_type_key=*/true) |
| : device::SerializeCollectedClientDataToJson( |
| client_data::kCreateType, caller_origin_.Serialize(), |
| options->challenge, is_cross_origin); |
| |
| // Cryptotoken requests should be proxied without UI. |
| if (origin_is_crypto_token_extension || disable_ui_) |
| request_delegate_->DisableUI(); |
| |
| ctap_make_credential_request_ = device::CtapMakeCredentialRequest( |
| client_data_json_, options->relying_party, options->user, |
| device::PublicKeyCredentialParams(options->public_key_parameters)); |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->exclude_list = options->exclude_credentials; |
| if (options->prf_enable) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kPRF); |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->hmac_secret = true; |
| } |
| if (options->hmac_create_secret) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kHMACSecret); |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->hmac_secret = true; |
| } |
| if (options->cred_props) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kCredProps); |
| } |
| if (options->large_blob_enable != device::LargeBlobSupport::kNotRequested) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kLargeBlobEnable); |
| } |
| make_credential_options_->large_blob_support = options->large_blob_enable; |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->app_id = std::move(appid_exclude); |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->is_off_the_record_context = |
| browser_context()->IsOffTheRecord(); |
| // On dual protocol CTAP2/U2F devices, force credential creation over U2F. |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->is_u2f_only = origin_is_crypto_token_extension; |
| |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport) && |
| !origin_is_crypto_token_extension && !is_cross_origin) { |
| // Send the unhashed origin and challenge to caBLEv2 authenticators, because |
| // the Android API requires them. It does not accept clientDataJSON or its |
| // hash. |
| // NOTE: Because Android has no way of building a clientDataJSON for |
| // cross-origin requests, we don't create the extension for those. This |
| // problem will go away once we add clientDataHash inputs to Android. |
| make_credential_options_->android_client_data_ext.emplace( |
| client_data::kCreateType, caller_origin_, options->challenge); |
| } |
| |
| // Compute the effective attestation conveyance preference. |
| device::AttestationConveyancePreference attestation = options->attestation; |
| // Enterprise attestation should not have been approved by this point. |
| DCHECK(attestation != |
| device::AttestationConveyancePreference::kEnterpriseApprovedByBrowser); |
| if (attestation == device::AttestationConveyancePreference:: |
| kEnterpriseIfRPListedOnAuthenticator && |
| request_delegate_->ShouldPermitIndividualAttestation(relying_party_id_)) { |
| attestation = |
| device::AttestationConveyancePreference::kEnterpriseApprovedByBrowser; |
| } |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->attestation_preference = attestation; |
| |
| StartMakeCredentialRequest(/*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/true); |
| } |
| |
| // mojom:Authenticator |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::GetAssertion( |
| url::Origin caller_origin, |
| blink::mojom::PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsPtr options, |
| blink::mojom::Authenticator::GetAssertionCallback callback) { |
| if (request_) { |
| if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin)) { |
| // Requests originating from cryptotoken will generally outlive any |
| // navigation events on the tab of the request's sender. Evict pending |
| // requests if cryptotoken sends a new one such that requests from before |
| // a navigation event do not prevent new requests. See |
| // https://crbug.com/935480. |
| CancelWithStatus(blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| } else { |
| std::move(callback).Run( |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PENDING_REQUEST, nullptr); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| DCHECK(!request_); |
| |
| bool is_cross_origin; |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status = |
| security_checker_->ValidateAncestorOrigins( |
| caller_origin, |
| WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::RequestType::kGetAssertion, |
| &is_cross_origin); |
| if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| request_delegate_ = CreateRequestDelegate(); |
| if (!request_delegate_) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PENDING_REQUEST, |
| nullptr); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| base::Optional<std::string> rp_id = |
| request_delegate_->MaybeGetRelyingPartyIdOverride( |
| options->relying_party_id, caller_origin); |
| |
| if (!rp_id) { |
| // If the delegate didn't override RP ID selection then apply standard |
| // rules. |
| status = security_checker_->ValidateDomainAndRelyingPartyID( |
| caller_origin, options->relying_party_id); |
| if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status, nullptr); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| rp_id = std::move(options->relying_party_id); |
| } |
| |
| caller_origin_ = caller_origin; |
| relying_party_id_ = *rp_id; |
| options->relying_party_id = std::move(*rp_id); |
| request_delegate_->SetRelyingPartyId(relying_party_id_); |
| |
| const bool origin_is_crypto_token_extension = |
| WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin_); |
| |
| // Cryptotoken provides the sender origin for U2F sign requests in the |
| // |relying_party_id| attribute. |
| client_data_json_ = |
| origin_is_crypto_token_extension |
| ? device::SerializeCollectedClientDataToJson( |
| client_data::kU2fSignType, options->relying_party_id, |
| options->challenge, /*is_cross_origin=*/false, |
| /*use_legacy_u2f_type_key=*/true) |
| : device::SerializeCollectedClientDataToJson( |
| client_data::kGetType, caller_origin_.Serialize(), |
| options->challenge, is_cross_origin); |
| |
| device::fido_filter::MaybeInitialize(); |
| if (device::fido_filter::Evaluate( |
| device::fido_filter::Operation::GET_ASSERTION, relying_party_id_, |
| /*device=*/base::nullopt, |
| /*id=*/base::nullopt) == device::fido_filter::Action::BLOCK) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Cryptotoken requests should be proxied without UI. |
| if (origin_is_crypto_token_extension || disable_ui_) |
| request_delegate_->DisableUI(); |
| |
| if (options->allow_credentials.empty()) { |
| if (!request_delegate_->SupportsResidentKeys()) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::RESIDENT_CREDENTIALS_UNSUPPORTED); |
| return; |
| } |
| empty_allow_list_ = true; |
| } |
| |
| if (options->appid) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kAppID); |
| app_id_ = ProcessAppIdExtension(*options->appid, caller_origin_); |
| if (!app_id_) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::INVALID_DOMAIN); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (options->large_blob_read && options->large_blob_write) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::CANNOT_READ_AND_WRITE_LARGE_BLOB); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (options->large_blob_read) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kLargeBlobRead); |
| } else if (options->large_blob_write) { |
| if (options->allow_credentials.size() != 1) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus:: |
| INVALID_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS_FOR_LARGE_BLOB); |
| return; |
| } |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kLargeBlobWrite); |
| } |
| |
| DCHECK(get_assertion_response_callback_.is_null()); |
| get_assertion_response_callback_ = std::move(callback); |
| |
| timer_->Start( |
| FROM_HERE, AdjustTimeout(options->timeout, render_frame_host_), |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnTimeout, base::Unretained(this))); |
| |
| ctap_get_assertion_request_ = CreateCtapGetAssertionRequest( |
| client_data_json_, options, app_id_, browser_context()->IsOffTheRecord()); |
| ctap_get_assertion_options_.emplace(); |
| |
| bool is_first = true; |
| base::Optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> last_id; |
| if (options->prf) { |
| requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kPRF); |
| for (const auto& prf_input_from_renderer : options->prf_inputs) { |
| device::CtapGetAssertionOptions::PRFInput prf_input; |
| |
| // This statement enforces invariants that should be established by the |
| // renderer. |
| if ( |
| // Only the first element in the vector may be the default. |
| (!is_first && !prf_input_from_renderer->id) || |
| // The PRF inputs must be sorted by credential ID to show that there |
| // are no duplicates. |
| (last_id.has_value() && prf_input_from_renderer->id.has_value() && |
| *last_id >= *prf_input_from_renderer->id) || |
| // The lengths are specified in authenticator.mojom, so hopefully Mojo |
| // enforces them too. |
| prf_input_from_renderer->first.size() != prf_input.salt1.size() || |
| (prf_input_from_renderer->second && |
| prf_input_from_renderer->second->size() != prf_input.salt1.size())) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(get_assertion_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::UNKNOWN_ERROR); |
| return; |
| } |
| is_first = false; |
| last_id = prf_input_from_renderer->id; |
| |
| if (prf_input_from_renderer->id) { |
| prf_input.credential_id = std::move(*prf_input_from_renderer->id); |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(prf_input.salt1.data(), prf_input_from_renderer->first.data(), |
| prf_input.salt1.size()); |
| if (prf_input_from_renderer->second) { |
| prf_input.salt2.emplace(); |
| memcpy(prf_input.salt2->data(), prf_input_from_renderer->second->data(), |
| prf_input.salt2->size()); |
| } |
| |
| ctap_get_assertion_options_->prf_inputs.emplace_back( |
| std::move(prf_input)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ctap_get_assertion_request_->is_u2f_only = origin_is_crypto_token_extension; |
| if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport) && |
| !origin_is_crypto_token_extension && !is_cross_origin) { |
| // Send the unhashed origin and challenge to caBLEv2 authenticators, because |
| // the Android API requires them. It does not accept clientDataJSON or its |
| // hash. |
| // NOTE: Because Android has no way of building a clientDataJSON for |
| // cross-origin requests, we don't create the extension for those. This |
| // problem will go away once we add clientDataHash inputs to Android. |
| ctap_get_assertion_request_->android_client_data_ext.emplace( |
| client_data::kGetType, caller_origin_, options->challenge); |
| } |
| |
| if (options->large_blob_write) { |
| data_decoder_.GzipCompress( |
| *options->large_blob_write, |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnLargeBlobCompressed, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| StartGetAssertionRequest(/*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/true); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable( |
| blink::mojom::Authenticator:: |
| IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableCallback callback) { |
| // Use |request_delegate_| if a request is currently in progress; or create a |
| // temporary request delegate otherwise. Note that CreateRequestDelegate() may |
| // return nullptr if there is an active |request_delegate_| already. |
| std::unique_ptr<AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate> maybe_request_delegate = |
| request_delegate_ ? nullptr : CreateRequestDelegate(); |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* request_delegate_ptr = |
| request_delegate_ ? request_delegate_.get() |
| : maybe_request_delegate.get(); |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<device::FidoDiscoveryFactory> discovery_factory = |
| MakeDiscoveryFactory(render_frame_host_, request_delegate_ptr, |
| /*is_u2f_api_request=*/false); |
| device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* discovery_factory_testing_override = |
| AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance() |
| ->MaybeGetDiscoveryFactoryTestOverride(); |
| device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* discovery_factory_ptr = |
| discovery_factory_testing_override ? discovery_factory_testing_override |
| : discovery_factory.get(); |
| |
| auto post_done_callback = base::BindOnce( |
| [](blink::mojom::Authenticator:: |
| IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableCallback callback, |
| bool is_available) { |
| base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(std::move(callback), is_available)); |
| }, |
| std::move(callback)); |
| |
| IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableImpl( |
| request_delegate_ptr, discovery_factory_ptr, browser_context(), |
| std::move(post_done_callback)); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::Cancel() { |
| CancelWithStatus(blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::ABORT_ERROR); |
| } |
| |
| // Callback to handle the async registration response from a U2fDevice. |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnRegisterResponse( |
| device::MakeCredentialStatus status_code, |
| base::Optional<device::AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse> response_data, |
| const device::FidoAuthenticator* authenticator) { |
| if (!request_) { |
| // Either the callback was called immediately and |request_| has not yet |
| // been assigned (this is a bug), or a navigation caused the request to be |
| // canceled while a callback was enqueued. |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| switch (status_code) { |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kUserConsentButCredentialExcluded: |
| // Duplicate registration: the new credential would be created on an |
| // authenticator that already contains one of the credentials in |
| // |exclude_credentials|. |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kKeyAlreadyRegistered, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::CREDENTIAL_EXCLUDED); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kAuthenticatorResponseInvalid: |
| // The response from the authenticator was corrupted. |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(make_credential_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR, nullptr, |
| Focus::kDoCheck); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kUserConsentDenied: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kUserConsentDenied, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kSoftPINBlock: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kSoftPINBlock, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kHardPINBlock: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kHardPINBlock, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kAuthenticatorRemovedDuringPINEntry: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorRemovedDuringPINEntry, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kAuthenticatorMissingResidentKeys: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorMissingResidentKeys, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kAuthenticatorMissingUserVerification: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorMissingUserVerification, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kAuthenticatorMissingLargeBlob: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorMissingLargeBlob, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kNoCommonAlgorithms: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kNoCommonAlgorithms, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kStorageFull: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kStorageFull, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kWinInvalidStateError: |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(make_credential_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::CREDENTIAL_EXCLUDED, nullptr, |
| Focus::kDoCheck); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kWinNotAllowedError: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kWinUserCancelled, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::MakeCredentialStatus::kSuccess: |
| DCHECK(response_data.has_value()); |
| DCHECK(authenticator); |
| |
| const base::Optional<device::FidoTransportProtocol> transport_used = |
| authenticator->AuthenticatorTransport(); |
| bool is_transport_used_internal = false; |
| bool is_transport_used_cable = false; |
| if (transport_used) { |
| request_delegate_->UpdateLastTransportUsed(*transport_used); |
| is_transport_used_internal = |
| (*transport_used == device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal); |
| is_transport_used_cable = |
| (*transport_used == |
| device::FidoTransportProtocol::kCloudAssistedBluetoothLowEnergy); |
| } |
| |
| const auto attestation = |
| ctap_make_credential_request_->attestation_preference; |
| base::Optional<AttestationErasureOption> attestation_erasure; |
| const bool origin_is_crypto_token_extension = |
| WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin_); |
| |
| // cryptotoken checks the attestation blocklist itself. |
| if (!origin_is_crypto_token_extension && |
| response_data->attestation_should_be_filtered && |
| !request_delegate_->ShouldPermitIndividualAttestation( |
| relying_party_id_)) { |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid; |
| } else if (origin_is_crypto_token_extension && |
| attestation != |
| device::AttestationConveyancePreference::kNone) { |
| // Cryptotoken requests may bypass the attestation prompt because the |
| // extension implements its own. Invoking the attestation prompt code |
| // here would not work anyway, because the WebContents associated with |
| // the extension is not associated with any tab and therefore cannot |
| // draw modal dialogs for the UI. |
| // |
| // Note that for AttestationConveyancePreference::kNone, attestation |
| // erasure is still performed as usual. |
| attestation_erasure = AttestationErasureOption::kIncludeAttestation; |
| } else if (attestation == device::AttestationConveyancePreference:: |
| kEnterpriseApprovedByBrowser) { |
| // If enterprise attestation was approved by policy then it can be |
| // returned immediately. |
| attestation_erasure = AttestationErasureOption::kIncludeAttestation; |
| } else if (attestation == device::AttestationConveyancePreference:: |
| kEnterpriseIfRPListedOnAuthenticator && |
| !response_data->enterprise_attestation_returned) { |
| // If enterprise attestation was requested, not approved by policy, and |
| // not approved by the authenticator, then any attestation is stripped. |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid; |
| } else if (is_transport_used_cable) { |
| // Attestation is not returned when caBLEv2 is used, but the AAGUID is |
| // maintained. |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid; |
| } else if (attestation != |
| device::AttestationConveyancePreference::kNone) { |
| awaiting_attestation_response_ = true; |
| request_delegate_->ShouldReturnAttestation( |
| relying_party_id_, authenticator, |
| response_data->enterprise_attestation_returned, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &AuthenticatorCommon::OnRegisterResponseAttestationDecided, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(*response_data), |
| is_transport_used_internal)); |
| } else if (response_data->IsSelfAttestation()) { |
| attestation_erasure = AttestationErasureOption::kIncludeAttestation; |
| } else if (is_transport_used_internal) { |
| // Contrary to what the WebAuthn spec says, for internal (platform) |
| // authenticators we do not erase the AAGUID from authenticatorData, |
| // even if requested attestationConveyancePreference is "none". |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid; |
| } else { |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid; |
| } |
| |
| if (attestation_erasure.has_value()) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(make_credential_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS, |
| CreateMakeCredentialResponse( |
| client_data_json_, std::move(*response_data), |
| *attestation_erasure, requested_extensions_), |
| Focus::kDoCheck); |
| } |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnRegisterResponseAttestationDecided( |
| device::AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse response_data, |
| bool is_transport_used_internal, |
| bool attestation_permitted) { |
| awaiting_attestation_response_ = false; |
| if (!request_) { |
| // The request has already been cleaned up, probably because a navigation |
| // occurred while the permissions prompt was pending. |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| AttestationErasureOption attestation_erasure; |
| if (!attestation_permitted) { |
| if (is_transport_used_internal) { |
| // For internal (platform) authenticators, we do not erase the |
| // AAGUID from authenticatorData even if the user declines to |
| // share attestation. |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid; |
| } else { |
| attestation_erasure = |
| AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid; |
| } |
| } else { |
| attestation_erasure = AttestationErasureOption::kIncludeAttestation; |
| } |
| |
| // The check for IsAttestationCertificateInappropriatelyIdentifying is |
| // performed after the permissions prompt, even though we know the answer |
| // before, because this still effectively discloses the make & model of |
| // the authenticator: If an RP sees a "none" attestation from Chrome after |
| // requesting direct attestation then it knows that it was one of the |
| // tokens with inappropriate certs. |
| if (response_data.IsAttestationCertificateInappropriatelyIdentifying() && |
| !request_delegate_->ShouldPermitIndividualAttestation( |
| relying_party_id_)) { |
| // The attestation response is incorrectly individually identifiable, but |
| // the consent is for make & model information about a token, not for |
| // individually-identifiable information. Erase the attestation to stop it |
| // begin a tracking signal. |
| |
| // The only way to get the underlying attestation will be to list the RP ID |
| // in the enterprise policy, because that enables the individual attestation |
| // bit in the register request and permits individual attestation generally. |
| attestation_erasure = AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid; |
| } |
| |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(make_credential_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS, |
| CreateMakeCredentialResponse(client_data_json_, std::move(response_data), |
| attestation_erasure, requested_extensions_), |
| Focus::kDoCheck); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnSignResponse( |
| device::GetAssertionStatus status_code, |
| base::Optional<std::vector<device::AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse>> |
| response_data, |
| const device::FidoAuthenticator* authenticator) { |
| DCHECK(!response_data || !response_data->empty()); // empty vector is invalid |
| |
| if (!request_) { |
| // Either the callback was called immediately and |request_| has not yet |
| // been assigned (this is a bug), or a navigation caused the request to be |
| // canceled while a callback was enqueued. |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| switch (status_code) { |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kUserConsentButCredentialNotRecognized: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kKeyNotRegistered, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kAuthenticatorResponseInvalid: |
| // The response from the authenticator was corrupted. |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(get_assertion_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kUserConsentDenied: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kUserConsentDenied, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kSoftPINBlock: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kSoftPINBlock, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kHardPINBlock: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kHardPINBlock, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kAuthenticatorRemovedDuringPINEntry: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorRemovedDuringPINEntry, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kAuthenticatorMissingResidentKeys: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorMissingResidentKeys, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kAuthenticatorMissingUserVerification: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kAuthenticatorMissingUserVerification, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kWinNotAllowedError: |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason:: |
| kWinUserCancelled, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| return; |
| case device::GetAssertionStatus::kSuccess: |
| DCHECK(response_data.has_value()); |
| DCHECK(authenticator); |
| |
| if (authenticator->AuthenticatorTransport()) { |
| request_delegate_->UpdateLastTransportUsed( |
| *authenticator->AuthenticatorTransport()); |
| } |
| |
| // Show an account picker for requests with empty allow lists. |
| // Authenticators may omit the identifying information in the user entity |
| // if only one credential matches, or if they have account selection UI |
| // built-in. In that case, consider that credential pre-selected. |
| if (empty_allow_list_ && |
| (response_data->size() > 1 || |
| (response_data->at(0).user_entity() && |
| (response_data->at(0).user_entity()->name || |
| response_data->at(0).user_entity()->display_name)))) { |
| request_delegate_->SelectAccount( |
| std::move(*response_data), |
| base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnAccountSelected, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())); |
| } else { |
| OnAccountSelected(std::move(response_data->at(0))); |
| } |
| return; |
| } |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnAccountSelected( |
| device::AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse response) { |
| if (response.large_blob()) { |
| std::vector<uint8_t> blob = std::move(*response.large_blob()); |
| data_decoder_.GzipUncompress( |
| blob, base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnLargeBlobUncompressed, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(response))); |
| return; |
| } |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| std::move(get_assertion_response_callback_), |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS, |
| CreateGetAssertionResponse(client_data_json_, std::move(response), |
| app_id_, requested_extensions_)); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| const ::device::FidoAuthenticator* authenticator, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason reason, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status) { |
| error_awaiting_user_acknowledgement_ = status; |
| |
| // The request has failed, but the UI may delay resolution of the request |
| // callback and cleanup of the FidoRequestHandler and its associated |
| // discoveries and authenticators. Tell them to stop processing the request in |
| // the meantime. |
| request_->StopDiscoveries(); |
| request_->CancelActiveAuthenticators(); |
| |
| // If WebAuthnUi is enabled, this error blocks until after receiving user |
| // acknowledgement. Otherwise, the error is returned right away. |
| if (request_delegate_->DoesBlockRequestOnFailure(reason)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| CancelWithStatus(error_awaiting_user_acknowledgement_); |
| } // namespace content |
| |
| // TODO(crbug.com/814418): Add web tests to verify timeouts are |
| // indistinguishable from NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR cases. |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnTimeout() { |
| DCHECK(request_delegate_); |
| if (awaiting_attestation_response_) { |
| awaiting_attestation_response_ = false; |
| } |
| |
| SignalFailureToRequestDelegate( |
| /*authenticator=*/nullptr, |
| AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate::InterestingFailureReason::kTimeout, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::CancelWithStatus( |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status) { |
| // If response callback is invoked already, then ignore cancel request. |
| if (!make_credential_response_callback_ && !get_assertion_response_callback_) |
| return; |
| if (make_credential_response_callback_) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(make_credential_response_callback_), |
| status); |
| } else if (get_assertion_response_callback_) { |
| InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(get_assertion_response_callback_), |
| status); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::OnCancelFromUI() { |
| CancelWithStatus(error_awaiting_user_acknowledgement_); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| blink::mojom::Authenticator::MakeCredentialCallback callback, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status, |
| blink::mojom::MakeCredentialAuthenticatorResponsePtr response, |
| Focus check_focus) { |
| if (check_focus != Focus::kDontCheck && !(request_delegate_ && IsFocused())) { |
| std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_FOCUSED, |
| nullptr); |
| } else { |
| std::move(callback).Run(status, std::move(response)); |
| } |
| |
| Cleanup(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::InvokeCallbackAndCleanup( |
| blink::mojom::Authenticator::GetAssertionCallback callback, |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status, |
| blink::mojom::GetAssertionAuthenticatorResponsePtr response) { |
| std::move(callback).Run(status, std::move(response)); |
| Cleanup(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::Cleanup() { |
| if (awaiting_attestation_response_) { |
| awaiting_attestation_response_ = false; |
| } |
| |
| timer_->Stop(); |
| request_.reset(); |
| discovery_factory_.reset(); |
| discovery_factory_testing_override_ = nullptr; |
| ctap_make_credential_request_.reset(); |
| make_credential_options_.reset(); |
| ctap_get_assertion_request_.reset(); |
| ctap_get_assertion_options_.reset(); |
| request_delegate_.reset(); |
| make_credential_response_callback_.Reset(); |
| get_assertion_response_callback_.Reset(); |
| client_data_json_.clear(); |
| app_id_.reset(); |
| caller_origin_ = url::Origin(); |
| relying_party_id_.clear(); |
| empty_allow_list_ = false; |
| error_awaiting_user_acknowledgement_ = |
| blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR; |
| requested_extensions_.clear(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::DisableUI() { |
| disable_ui_ = true; |
| } |
| |
| BrowserContext* AuthenticatorCommon::browser_context() const { |
| return content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host_) |
| ->GetBrowserContext(); |
| } |
| |
| device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* AuthenticatorCommon::discovery_factory() { |
| DCHECK(discovery_factory_); |
| return discovery_factory_testing_override_ |
| ? discovery_factory_testing_override_ |
| : discovery_factory_.get(); |
| } |
| |
| void AuthenticatorCommon::InitDiscoveryFactory() { |
| const bool is_u2f_api_request = |
| WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension( |
| caller_origin_); |
| discovery_factory_ = MakeDiscoveryFactory( |
| render_frame_host_, request_delegate_.get(), is_u2f_api_request); |
| // TODO(martinkr): |discovery_factory_testing_override_| is a long-lived |
| // VirtualFidoDeviceDiscovery so that tests can maintain and alter virtual |
| // authenticator state in between requests. We should extract a longer-lived |
| // configuration object from VirtualFidoDeviceDiscovery, so we can simply |
| // stick a short-lived instance into |discovery_factory_| and eliminate |
| // |discovery_factory_testing_override_|. |
| discovery_factory_testing_override_ = |
| AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance() |
| ->MaybeGetDiscoveryFactoryTestOverride(); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace content |
